The Lord Bishop of Chester: We wholeheartedly concur with the careful analysis offered by the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Hylton. In all such matters, we must put the interests of the child at the centre.

Various voluntary societies that care for children have come together in the Refugee Children's Consortium, among them the Church of England Children's Society, Barnardo's and a number of other organisations. Their collective wisdom is that there must be very exceptional reasons to justify the detention of a child. It is unclear that those reasons usually exist. It is nothing short of a scandal that it happened in the Konan case, which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, spoke about.

If it is the case that, because of the dynamics of a particular family, it is in the best interests of a child to detain that child, it is doubly important that the interests of the child are put first. As the amendment says, that would require an independent assessment of the child's needs—not simply an assessment in the department, a political entity, but an independent assessment. There are creative ways of addressing that. One thinks of the work that the education services do with Traveller children. We are light years ahead of where we used to be with children who come into schools for a short period. One can think of all sorts of things that can be done. In the exceptional conditions in which a child is detained, we must bend over backwards to do the best for that child, so that detention does not become something of a nightmare, as, I imagine, it normally would.

I hope that the Government can assure us that, in their plans and policies, the interests of the child will always come first. They should confirm that consideration of those interests will not normally—only very exceptionally—require the detention of the child. If we are to detain a child, we must bend over backwards to do what is in the best interests of the child, while we, as a society, are responsible for him or her. That is not recent wisdom; it goes back to the Old Testament. Concern for the stranger in the midst was at the heart of the ethic of a society that sought to care. Among those strangers in the midst, the children of asylum seekers must come pretty near the top of the list.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: The noble Lords who put their names to the amendment were right to table it and give us the opportunity to press the Government on the need to assess the requirements of children in detention. I thank the Refugee Children's Consortium for its helpful briefing. I agree with the consortium that detention gives rise to a range of child protection issues and that detention can damage the physical and emotional health of children. The consortium is right to draw attention to the fact that the Bill does not

27 Apr 2004 : Column 711

address the concerns about children being held at immigration removal centres that were highlighted most recently in the report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons. That report was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury.

Like other noble Lords, I noted the Home Office announcement on the assessment of children's welfare and educational needs after 21 days. That will apply only to Dungavel and will not extend to other detention centres. Have the Government reconsidered that position? Have they considered extending the assessments beyond Dungavel?

The briefing from the Refugee Children's Consortium confirms the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that children over the age of 12 at Oakington receive no education and that children under 12 may use the play room, where there is structured play but no formal education. It can be argued—it is, on occasion—that children should not be in detention for long and that, therefore, those problems should not arise. In a perfect world, children would be in detention for as brief a moment as possible. However, we are told by the Refugee Children's Consortium—the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, reminded us about it—that, in two recent cases, single mothers and their children were detained at Oakington for 143 days and 114 respectively. Can the Government assure us that they intend to implement the recommendation of HMIP for an independent assessment of the welfare, educational and developmental needs of each detained child? Will the Government give an assurance that implementation will apply to all centres, not just Dungavel? When will the implementation be carried out?

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: Noble Lords have probably guessed that we are talking about Dungavel because there was an almighty row in Scotland about the children there. Noble Lords may have seen some details of it in the press, I was one of those who, to an extent, defended the Government's position. The row was about not sending children to local schools. I deployed the argument locally that it was probably better for children who were in detention only for a short time that their education should take place in the centre and that they should not be shipped off to a school at which they would make friends before having to go away and leave them behind, making them even more disorientated than they would have been in any case. That was why the Government acted on Dungavel.

It is important that we pay attention to the matter and that assessments are made in the most practical way possible. It is not only a question of assessments; the children should have the right facilities. They must have them, and it is wrong not to provide them.

The right reverend Prelate talked a little as if children were being treated on their own. The children are in the centres because they should not, if possible, be separated from their parents, whom it has been necessary to detain. Apart from trying to move the

27 Apr 2004 : Column 712

parents on as quickly as possible, we must make facilities available. I hope that in her brief the noble Baroness has some detail about what has been provided at Dungavel. I hope that I did not defend her position on false premises.

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: I support the amendment. This issue has been debated on a number of occasions. Very many Members of the Committee are against the whole practice of having children in detention in whatever circumstances. I also think that children and families are among the least likely people to abscond if they are under conditions of reporting fairly frequently to a local police station or wherever. Whatever one's view of that, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the paramount importance of doing what is in the best interests of the children must take precedence over any other considerations, except in really dire circumstances where severe danger is envisaged.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Perhaps I may say straight away that I understand the import of the concern and sentiment behind this new clause. However, while I share the concern that we should have due regard to the welfare of children detained with their families—in practice, we do—I cannot accept on behalf of the Government that this need is best met by what would appear to be a bureaucratic system of assessment and reviews. Not only does it seem unwieldy, but we also question whether it is necessary or workable. I take entirely into account that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has referred to a couple of cases where the time spent in detention has been considerable.

The present position is that the welfare of the children concerned is monitored constantly by the excellent healthcare and other staff in removal centres. Where there are concerns, those are addressed either locally or by the Immigration Service. That includes consideration of whether detention should continue in appropriate cases. Perhaps I may respectfully say that the suggested system of assessment would not help that process. In all probability, it would add an additional layer of bureaucracy.

I assure Members of the Committee that, from our figures, very few families with children are detained. The vast majority of those who are detained are held for only a very short period, most often just before removal. As the published asylum statistics show, there were just 10 individuals under 18 years old detained at 27 December 2003. Two-thirds of those had been detained for 14 days or less.

Lord Avebury: I did point out the absurdity of talking about two-thirds of 10 children. Could the noble Baroness not say whether the figure is six or seven?

4.45 p.m.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I cannot. The figures given to me refer to two-thirds. Members of the Committee will know that the figures are aggregated

27 Apr 2004 : Column 713

and set out in that way. As always, I shall give as much information as I have available to me. If I can obtain that figure, I shall write to the noble Lord. What is important is that the figure of those detained is low. Against that background, it is difficult to see what practical purpose would be served by an independent assessor in those cases. More than likely, the children would have been removed or released from detention before the assessor had a chance to do much if anything at all.

Of course, I note that the proposed assessment system shares some of the features as one of the recommendations made last year by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons in relation to children detained with their families in removal centres. My right honourable friend, the former Minister of State for Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism rejected that recommendation for much the same reasons that I am unable to accept the new clause. But she made it absolutely clear that she would look further at the issue. That remains our position.

Perhaps I may reassure noble Lords that we are not complacent about the issue. We recognise that detention, even if only for a short period, is not an ideal situation for children. No one would argue otherwise. However, we must recognise reality. While the vast majority of asylum-seeking families are not detained and live in the community, there are some cases where detention is necessary in order to maintain an effective immigration control and, in particular, to enforce the removal of those who will not leave voluntarily. That is the reality of the situation in which we find ourselves.

Nevertheless, within that context, we are keen to ensure that children's welfare is taken into account. We have indicated that we have been exploring the scope for enhancing welfare and educational assessment for children who, exceptionally, have been detained for longer periods than the norm. That remains the case. Much good work has been done already. We continue to work with local agencies in that area. For example, we are discussing arrangements with South Lanarkshire Council to conduct a welfare assessment for any child detained at Dungavel for 21 days. The outcome of such a review would inform any ministerial authorisation for detention to continue beyond 28 days.

We are just as interested as anyone in the welfare of children detained with their families. We are just as determined that any problems or concerns are identified and dealt with speedily and appropriately. That is what happens in removal centres now. We approach the issue from the position of established and developing systems, which must be sensible and workable. We must not only have the interests of the child in mind, but also take proper account of the balance that has to be struck between the need to maintain effective immigration control and the need to remove those families who have no lawful basis to stay here. The system proposed in the new clause does not fit that bill.

As regards the case of Ms Konan, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, of course, we accept the court's view that the detention in this case was

27 Apr 2004 : Column 714

unlawful. We regret that it occurred. I say that without any hesitation. The detention procedures have been tightened up since the time of that case. The systems are in place to prevent a recurrence. That is why we have a closer and more frequent review of family-detained cases and ministerial authorisation of detention beyond 28 days. My right honourable colleague Des Browne, who is now the Minister dealing with those cases, will be asked to review the cases which go beyond 28 days.

Of course, I hear the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and others about family facilities at Oakington, plans to replace Oakington and ministerial authorisation for detention. At Oakington, arrangements for educational provision are being put in place. As the noble Lord said, play facilities for older children are being looked into. As yet, no final decision has been taken about what will happen to replace Oakington. But those are the issues that continue to be developed.

I hope that I have already satisfactorily dealt with the system for authorisation as regards those who stay in residence for more than 28 days. Since mid-January, all of those children have been subject to authorisation. I cannot provide precise figures about authorisation, but I will be happy to write to noble Lords. At Dungavel, as at 26 April, we have six families and 10 children, with four of school age. At Oakington, currently, we have 11 families and 14 children, with six of school age. That is a total of 17 families and 24 children, with 10 of school age.

As regards detention of families, between 27 February and 25 March 2004, 95 families were taken into detention. Of 99 other families, 69 families were removed and 30 were released. There have been 134 children removed or released. The average time that those 134 children spent in detention was 9.8 days. Members of the Committee will see that we have done a great deal of work to try to ensure that the children who are taken into detention are those who absolutely need to be taken in with their families. If they are taken in, they are taken in for the very shortest period of time possible.

We will continue to endeavour to do all that we can to make that a proper process. I hope that noble Lords will now agree with me that, bearing in mind those changes, the complicated assessment process that the amendment suggests would not fit well.

Lord Avebury: I am most grateful to all Members of the Committee who have taken part in the debate. Every speaker expressed great concern about the detention of children as a general matter and about the cases we are discussing in particular. The general sense of the Committee is that we have not done enough to minimise the number of children taken into detention or to see that their interests are properly safeguarded. I was worried by the figures that the noble Baroness gave, because they show that that number of children being detained has risen from 10 at the end of December 2003 to 24, so we appear to be detaining more children now.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 715

I asked the Minister what would be the ultimate size of the detention estate for families with children once Yarl's Wood had been extended. She was not able to give me that figure but perhaps she will write to me about it as well as the other matters left hanging in the air. She said that systems are in place to prevent recurrence of cases of the type that we cited, not just that of Jacqueline Konan, but of the two single mothers who were kept in Oakington for 114 and 143 days, as she knows.

There were systems in place at that time. There was something called Parliament and parliamentarians were writing to Ministers. Ministers cannot say that they were not seized of the fact that those women were detained for wholly excessive periods. As I told the noble Baroness, I wrote 13 times to Ministers about the case of Jacqueline Konan. I telephoned the Minster's office endlessly, but they paid no attention. So what systems can we have that would be more effective than Members of Parliament badgering Ministers' offices? The one factor that was missing in those three cases was that we did not have regular reporting from the Home Office of how many children were in detention and for how long they had been there.

One factor in the debate about which I am pleased is that the noble Baroness has seen fit to disclose the current figures, which I hope will not be a one-off. If we get a snapshot and we do not know what is happening in a week or 10 days' time, the position might be entirely different. So I hope that we can guarantee the regular reporting of the number of children in detention and for how long they have been there. In order to ensure that we obtain not only a system of assessment but also a system of reporting we shall need to return to the matter on Report.

While I accept entirely that we may not have the wording exactly right, an independent assessment of the children's needs is essential because the Home Office has manifestly failed to provide children with the necessary facilities that they require to ensure that their educational development and welfare needs are met. As the noble Baroness has just acknowledged, that has been the case in Oakington, where there is no education. There are only play facilities for small children under 12. Although she said that that will be provided at a future date, unless we have an independent monitoring system to ensure that it happens I am certain from our previous experience that we could not guarantee it.

I am grateful to the Minister for what she said, but we still find it unsatisfactory and we look forward to returning to the matter on Report. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 agreed to.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 716

Schedule 3 [Removal of Asylum Seeker to Safe Country]:

[Amendments Nos. 30 and 31 not moved.]

Baroness Anelay of St Johns moved Amendment No. 31A:

Page 44, line 1, leave out from beginning to "as" in line 2 and insert "This Part shall not apply to a state unless the Secretary of State certifies that, in general, the assumptions in sub-paragraph (1A)(a) are true.

(1A) The assumptions are that, in so far as relevant to the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), the State may be treated"

The noble Baroness said: Clause 18 and Schedule 3 deal with situations where a person can be removed to a third country that is deemed safe without substantive consideration for that person's asylum claim. They replace and extend the provisions currently in Sections 11 and 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. I have tabled the amendment to ask the Government to place on the record their response to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the twelfth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am aware that although the report has been published there has been no publication of the Government's response. I hope that the Minister is now able to share it with the Committee.

Paragraphs 11 and 12 make it clear that the,

"consequences of a state being specified in a particular Part of Schedule 3 are that certain assumptions are made by the bill about the safety of that state".

As the report points out,

"there is no express requirement on the Secretary of State to be satisfied that those assumptions in fact apply before making an order which specifies the state".

The committee observes that,

"section 94(5) of the 2002 Act which is amended by clause 15 of the bill and is mentioned in paragraph 15 of the Home Office's memorandum) allows a state, or part of a state, to be added to the list under section 94 only if the Secretary of State is satisfied as to certain matters (such as that there is, in general, no serious risk of persecution)."

In respect of that matter, the committee drew the House's attention to the absence of similar provision in the Bill. It makes the point that the House "will wish"—not even "may wish"—

"to consider whether a similar express restriction should be placed on the powers to list any state in one of the three lists in Schedule 3 (for example, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that, in general, the assumptions which will be made by the listing are true)".

In response to that report from our respected committee of the House I thought it right to table Amendment No. 31A. I am grateful to the Public Bill Office for its assistance. The drafting of my amendment may be pulled apart. I hasten to add that the drafting is not of moment here; I wish to see what the Government's response is.

I tabled the amendment relatively late, last Thursday. Normally, as the Committee will be aware, I like to try to table amendments early to give all Members a full chance to consider them. The reason for the delay was simply that I wanted to see whether the Government would seek the opportunity to

27 Apr 2004 : Column 717

enlighten the Committee in respect of the amendment and others I tabled late. When I was aware that they were not going to do so, taking account of the strictures of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I jumped in and tabled the amendment. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I understand that this is a probing amendment. I make no comment about the noble Baroness's drafting; I compliment her as always on her energy in getting down anything of a fit and proper nature—which this certainly is—that allows me to answer the question that she raised. The amendment's effect is to add the requirement that the Secretary of State expressly certifies that the safety test in terms of the Refugee Convention has been made out when deciding whether to list a country at part 3 of Schedule 3.

Schedule 3 takes a differentiated approach to challenges against removal to safe third countries, an approach based in part on Section 94 of the 2002 Act. It is worth noting that part 6 of Schedule 3 ensures active parliamentary scrutiny of the decision to add a country to any of the lists. Parliament will therefore have an opportunity to debate the appropriateness of including a particular country on a list.

Although the schedule reflects the approach taken towards human rights challenges in the non-suspensive appeals—the NSA provisions set out in Section 94 of the 2002 Act—there is an important difference between the two sets of provisions. Put simply, the fact is that in this schedule we are dealing with returns to safe third countries and not countries of origin, so the provision is not and does not need to be absolutely on all fours with the approach taken in the 2002 Act. Furthermore, we consider that a general safety test is implicit and consequently we do not feel that the insertion of such a test in the manner described is absolutely necessary.

We have not as yet submitted our report to the Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform because of the points raised by this amendment. As noble Lords will know, the directive is still being negotiated at the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which is to meet on Thursday. Of course it is our intention to try to reach agreement in relation to the amendment in accordance with that which is consistent with our domestic policy objectives.

I hope that, with my response, the noble Baroness will feel that she has had sufficient clarification about matters which I know have been of concern to her, as well as on those which she raised with my honourable friend Caroline Flint.

5 p.m.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to the Minister. This clarification suggests that, "We are not giving the answer yet because . . . " rather than giving the answer itself. However, I understand the position in which the Government find themselves. Indeed, a later amendment specifically asks the Government to put on the record assurances with regard to the

27 Apr 2004 : Column 718

negotiations on the directive. Last week as a matter of courtesy I contacted the Bill team to explain the purpose of my amendments, otherwise it would not have been immediately obvious.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for making the distinction between the definition of types of countries; that is, the difference between countries of origin and third countries and therefore the Government's position that there can be a different assessment of whether they are safe and how much information must be included in the Bill. The noble Baroness also pointed out that Part 6 of the schedule provides for active parliamentary scrutiny on whether a country should be included on a list. I leave further comment on that to later amendments because, of course, the noble Baroness will be aware of the concerns that not all orders are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, but are subject to negative resolution. However, I shall return to that matter at the appropriate point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 32 to 36 not moved.]

Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 36A:

Page 46, line 29, after "add" insert "or remove"

The noble Lord said: Clause 18 and Schedule 3 create a new and fiendishly complicated structure of "safe country" provisions which allow a person to be removed without substantive consideration of his asylum application. The proposals now before the Committee represent what I consider to be a large extension of the powers contained in Sections 11 and 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and Section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There are now four sets of circumstances in which a person may be removed without a right of appeal, arranged according to the degree of confidence in their safety.

The first category is removal to states where a person is deemed to be safe vis-à-vis both the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. These are the existing and accession states of the European Union plus Norway and Iceland, which are all members of the Dublin Convention under which an asylum seeker can be sent back to the country that he arrived in first.

The second category comprises unnamed states which are deemed to be Refugee Convention safe, but not necessarily safe from refoulement to a country where a person may not be safe. For these countries, the Secretary of State will certify cases unless there is reason to think that they are not clearly unfounded.

The third category comprises another empty list, also Refugee Convention safe, but where claims based on the ECHR may be certified as clearly unfounded.

Finally, there is individual certification, which may be applied to a person who is not a national of the country to which he is being sent, if he is not at risk of being refouled and is not at risk of being persecuted there for any Refugee Convention reason.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 719

The difference between these provisions and the safe country provisions set out in the 1999 and 2002 Acts is that under previous legislation each case had to be individually certified. The certificate could then be challenged under Section 65 of the 1999 Act and Section 82(1) of the 2002 Act, although in the latter case the right had to be exercised from overseas.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, said in the case of Yogathas and Thangarasa:

"The possibility of a challenge on human rights grounds is preserved by Section 65 of the 1999 Act as was no doubt necessary if that Act was to be compatible with the obligations of the UK under the Human Rights Act . . . ".

In that case it was not suggested that the state to which the person was being sent would itself violate the ECHR, but that he could be sent on to a country where his rights were likely to be violated.

To be fair, the Government are not saying that all the countries in these lists are going to maintain an impeccable human rights performance for all time. In answer to my honourable friend Mark Oaten in Standing Committee on 22 January, the then Minister said:

"If we had evidence that a country was not operating to the letter of the human rights convention, I think that that would mean that we would consider the provisions of Part 2 of Schedule 3 and the inclusion of that country on the list".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 22/1/04; col. 355.]

If the lapse had occurred in only one or two cases, the removal of the country from the list might be an extreme remedy, but the Secretary of State has no power to downgrade a state from list 1 to list 2 or 3, where affirmative resolution certification would be necessary. Unfortunately, while the option of taking the country off the list altogether was set out in the original Bill, it was taken out in Committee for reasons that were not made clear. Perhaps the Minister can give an explanation for that when she comes to reply. Our amendment seeks to restore the power and I hope that the Government will accept the idea in principle, although I acknowledge that the wording needs to be tidied up.

Only 15 years ago the A8 countries were all communist dictatorships, and three of the western European EU states were fascist dictatorships during the post-war era. In the future, other countries will join the EU and will automatically be added to the first list, even though their human rights past may have been appalling. This clause gives no flexibility in the treatment of states in an enlarged Europe which do not continue to maintain the standards we have set, which I am sure is a mistake. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: It may be appropriate for me to speak to the amendment grouped with this one tabled in my name, Amendment No. 36AA. As an aside, I remind the Committee that earlier we were teasing the noble Baroness about whether she could give us any news on what was happening in the usual channels. I have just been handed a draft of amendments to Clause 14, so I suspect that there will now be a flurry of activity on the part of noble Lords.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 720

The Minister seems to think that she does not have a copy of the amendments. However, they are tabled in her name. I am glad to know that she has an alter ego who has been active. At first glance, it appears that these amendments cover the substantive matters that we had hoped to deal with today but which were delayed to allow the Government time for further consideration.

I turn to the matter in hand, Amendment No. 36AA. The effect of the amendment would be to make all orders affirmative, both those that remove countries from the safe list as well as those that add them, As I mentioned, I have given the Government notice of the reason behind my tabling of these amendments.

What will be the impact on the United Kingdom Government's ability to amend safe country lists of the proposed directive on minimum standards of procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status? Last week, EU Sub-committee E on Law and Institutions put questions on this directive to the Minister, Caroline Flint, in advance of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, to which the Minister referred, which sits on 29–30 April. If the directive is adopted, would Her Majesty's Government be able to designate any country they choose as safe without any reference to the terms of the directive? Would Her Majesty's Government be able to remove any country from the safe list without any reference to the directive? In other words, will Her Majesty's Government have complete freedom of action in those designations?

The reason I ask these questions is that when Caroline Flint was giving answers she was directed to two articles in the directive, which is under negotiation at present. Article 30A states that the Council may, acting upon a proposal from the Commission, adopt a minimum common list of third countries that shall be regarded as safe countries of origin by member states. It also provides that the Council may amend that list by adding or removing names of states.

The difficulty arises when one looks at Article 30B, which starts off by making it look as though the member states can go their own way in listing safe countries if they wish. That would be all right. But paragraph 2 goes on to restrict that freedom of action to states that do not appear on the minimum common list as safe countries of origin for the purpose of examining applications for asylum. So, if one puts Articles 30A and 30B together, does that mean that we are bound in this country to adopt the minimum common list, whatever it says?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I shall deal first with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, Amendment No. 36A, before turning to Amendment No. 36AA.

I should like to begin by drawing the Committee's attention to the provisions in Part 6 of the schedule which provide the order-making powers to add a state to the lists at Parts 2, 3 and 4 by an order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. These provisions ensure that the inclusion of a country on any list will be

27 Apr 2004 : Column 721

subject to active parliamentary scrutiny. Part 6 of the schedule provides for the removal of a state from the lists at Parts 3 and 4 by order subject to annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament.

Turning to Amendment No. 36A, we do not consider it necessary to provide a similar order-making power in relation to the removal of a state from the list at Part 2. I should reiterate that we intend that the list at Part 2 should be limited to European Union member states which are party to the Dublin arrangements for determining the state responsible for examining an asylum application, and other states, such as Norway and Iceland, which are associated with those arrangements.

I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, says about new states which may join the Union, but he will remember that all new states seeking to join will still have to comply with the acquis in order to be accepted. In the very unlikely event that such a state deteriorated to a point where it no longer generally met the tests set out in Part 2, we would consider bringing forward new primary legislation to recognise that. This would also apply should any agreements between the Community and other states associating them with the Dublin arrangements be terminated or renounced.

5.15 p.m.

The Earl of Onslow: In 1967, Greece was a functioning, squabbling, shrieking democracy when along came a bunch of colonels who kicked out the democrats. I am not saying that that will happen in any of the new Balkan states or Turkey if, peradventure, it should join, but there will always be that risk. Should we not have a quicker method than primary legislation to deal with the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has shown could theoretically exist?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I of course recognise the noble Lord's anxiety about that. However, he should bear in mind that the deterioration of a member state would be a considerable issue for all other member states. It would be a very serious issue and, in order to act in this way against a fellow member state, primary legislation would be necessary.

Of course, if there were an emergency, it is possible for the parliamentary procedure to be accelerated to meet it. But we hope that that will not be necessary. We are keeping such legislation in reserve for a situation which may very well either never occur or occur in extremis.

As to the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, in her amendment, member states will have the ability to designate safe countries of origin and will have to consider those countries which are in the EU list as safe. However, as countries of origin, there will always be case by case consideration of asylum applications. The provisions of Articles 30A and 30B of the directive do not deal with third countries.

I reiterate what I said earlier: the directive has not yet been finalised. We wish to ensure that it is compatible with our policy objectives and we will negotiate to that end.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 722

Amendment No. 36A seeks to extend the affirmative resolution procedure to the removal of states from the lists at Parts 3 and 4—countries not subject to the Dublin arrangements. We do not agree that any decision that the Government might take to remove a state from these lists should require the approval of both Houses of Parliament in the same manner as we consider appropriate for the addition of a country, which is a matter of greater importance. The approach that we have taken with regard to the amendment of the lists of countries not subject to the Dublin arrangements is consistent with that taken generally within legislation, such as the non-suspensive appeals provisions in the 2002 Act.

I hope that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord are content with that explanation and will not pursue their amendments.

Lord Avebury: I am grateful to the Minister for the explanation that she has given and for drawing our attention to the provisions in Part 6 of the schedule. I had appreciated that the power to remove countries from the lists at Parts 2 and 3 existed and that that power did not extend to the Part 1 list. The whole point of the amendment was that we should treat these countries in a uniform manner.

Although I accept the Minister's argument that we are looking at a very remote contingency in a European Union country, we should consider other countries which are not members at present. We are not legislating only for the next year or two; we hope, presumably, that once the Bill becomes an Act it will still be on the statute book when the next wave of accessions occurs.

We are looking at a very large community of 27 or 28 nations and the Minister is saying that the eventuality that one of them will become undemocratic is so remote that we do not need to take account of that in the Bill. On the other hand, she is saying that the countries on the second list, which are equally democratic—otherwise we would not apply the procedure to them—are obviously going to be more likely to drop out of being democratic and to become dictatorships. If that were not the case, there would be no point in differentiating between the two lists or in saying that we will have an order-making power to cross off those that are not members of the European Union, but, having joined the European Union, those states are so extremely unlikely to revert back to dictatorship or repression that we do not need an equivalent power.

I personally cannot see the logic in that, but we have obviously not succeeded in persuading the Minister that there should be a uniform approach. We shall have to take the matter away and consider, before we come to another stage, whether we want to pursue it further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 36AA not moved.]

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 19 agreed to.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 723

Clause 20 [Deportation or removal: cooperation]:

Lord McNally moved Amendment No. 36B:

Page 19, line 14, at beginning insert "Subject to subsection (1A),"

The noble Lord said: Noble Lords will see from the groupings list that the amendments relating to Clause 20 are split into three separate groups. At a late hour last night, when replying, the Minister reminded us that she had an Exocet in her weaponry, in that she always had a 15 or 20-minute reply ready for every group of amendments. Therefore, faced with that challenge, I had a hard look at the next group of amendments. I believe that it would help the Committee to have a more coherent debate and keep at least two of those Exocets in their boxes, if I spoke now to all five amendments covering the clause—Amendments Nos. 36B to 36F. I sent billets doux to the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and both said that they thought it would be an appropriate course of action.

The Explanatory Notes state:

"Clause 20 creates a new offence of failing to comply, without reasonable excuse, with steps that the Secretary of State may require someone to take so as to enable their deportation or removal from the United Kingdom".

As a number of commentators have said, that represents a considerable extension of powers on behalf of the Government. Concern has been expressed that the clause is drafted in dangerously wide, generalised and all-embracing terms. Failure to comply may lead to prosecution and up to 12 months' imprisonment. Such a serious offence should not be framed so widely as to give immigration officers such enormous discretion to bring prosecutions without clearer interpretation or safeguards in the Bill or in published guidelines.

We believe that much clearer definitions of the specific actions requiring the co-operation of persons are needed. They should include special details of the type of information required; the process and forms referred to; the protection required in relation to personal data processing and recording; the nature and scope of interviews; the circumstances when contacts with other governments and states may reasonably be required; and guidance to immigration officers in the conduct of interviews and decisions to refer for prosecution.

There is particular concern whether data protection in those circumstances is fully compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. There has also been special concern expressed to us about how the clause will affect children. The decision to start returning under-18s and the proposal in Clause 20 to prosecute them for failure to comply with the removal process increases the urgency to provide special guidance for those adjudicating on children's cases.

In short, the complaints that the amendments seek to remedy are that the clause is too broad in its description of the offence, is loose in terms of data protection, and prompts grave concerns about the breaching of confidentiality, with the prospect of

27 Apr 2004 : Column 724

people being returned to a country that may not be safe for them, where information may then be used against them. There are other concerns about how children are to be handled, and a very real concern about the impropriety of compelling documentation before the final resolution of an asylum claim or appeal.

I hope that the Minister does not think that because we have concertinaed these matters together, we are in any way casual about any of those issues. The clause represents an important and a large extension of powers, and we believe that the amendments that we have suggested put a necessary limit on those powers without denying the Government all the extensions that they require for an effective return of people whom they wish to remove from the country. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for his billet doux, which was gratefully received. He has not been in the least bit casual in his explanation of the amendments. I shall try to give as comprehensive an answer as I can, because I understand the noble Lord's worries. I understand, too, that Amendments Nos. 36B and 36C would mean that we would not require, with the prospect of criminal sanction, a person to take certain steps with a view to obtaining a travel document if he or she had an outstanding asylum or human rights application or outstanding appeal.

The offence is all about encouraging people to co-operate with the process of redocumentation so that they may be returned home. Our aim is not to imprison people. The offence is aimed at stopping people from being obstructive. Only in the most extreme circumstances would we want to prosecute people; clearly we would far rather remove them.

Our starting point is that we want to remove people with no basis to stay in the United Kingdom as soon as we can; in most cases, that will be after their appeal rights have been exhausted, but in some cases removal is lawfully possible before that stage—in the case of NSAs, for example.

When someone arrives in the United Kingdom without a passport, they cannot be removed until a travel document is obtained on their behalf. A country will issue it only if it is satisfied of both the true identity and nationality of the person concerned. As I am sure noble Lords know, different countries have different requirements, but most require the co-operation of the person concerned; for example, in providing biometric data, information about friends and family, or even attending an interview. It is a lengthy process and we want to start it as soon as we can.

If a person does not co-operate with the provision of this information or provides information that is false or incomplete, a travel document is unlikely to be issued and the person may not be removed from the United Kingdom, potentially indefinitely. So there is a strong incentive for non-compliance. The provision refers to taking specified action only if the Secretary of State believes that that action will enable a travel

27 Apr 2004 : Column 725

document which will facilitate the person's removal from the United Kingdom to be obtained. That is made clear by subsection (1).

We would therefore not usually require actions to be taken with the prospect of criminal action until after an initial decision has been made. For those with asylum appeals outstanding, we believe that many of the listed actions are ones that we can reasonably expect a person to take. It is rare for a person to be required to attend an interview at an embassy at this stage but, if we do require this, we make it clear to the person that he is not required to answer any questions relating to any asylum application that he may have made.

The offence provided for by Clause 20 is committed if a person fails to take action without a reasonable excuse. Thus we would be unlikely to prosecute those who had a reasonable excuse for not undertaking the actions required. This should ensure that someone who may have been requested to do something that in his particular circumstances could be deemed to be too restrictive would not have committed the offence. Restricting this offence would, we believe, mean that some of its efficacy would be lost. As the Committee will know, obstructing redocumentation is a serious barrier to removal and undermines immigration control, so we need to be robust about the measures to combat it.

Amendment No. 36D seeks to specify what should normally be considered a reasonable excuse for failure to co-operate with an interview or other information gathering procedure. First and foremost, we do not consider this offence to be the type of offence for which it is appropriate to include a list of reasonable excuses of which people could avail themselves. It is for the prosecution to prove that the person did not take the step and does not have a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. It is something better left to the circumstances of each individual case and eventually to the courts to decide whether or not it has been made out.

There are no means of determining what the minimum level of information required for identification or redocumentation, or both, would be. The purpose of the interviews to which the amendment refers is satisfactorily to establish identity and citizenship or nationality. Requirements will vary from country to country and with each individual. As a result the type and depth of information required is judged on the details of each individual case.

In relation to the verbal notice, we do not currently give verbal notice of the timing and purpose of any redocumentation interviews that a person may be required to attend to establish identity and nationality or citizenship with a view to issuing a travel document that will facilitate his deportation or removal from the United Kingdom. Knowledge of the nature of questions to be asked at the interview is not crucial since the person attending will know its general purpose and what he is there to do. Where, for example, a person is asked at such an interview to provide written material of which they were not

27 Apr 2004 : Column 726

forewarned it would be reasonable for that person not to hand them over then but to provide them after the interview once they had had the chance to obtain them.

I turn to Amendment No. 36E, which seeks to limit the actions that a person can be required by the Secretary of State to take for the purposes of this clause to the eight actions specified in subsection (2). We think that such an amendment is unnecessary because it would hamper the effective use of the provisions of this clause in the future. There is no way that we would seek to ask for a blank cheque to be given to the executive and we do not think that this provides one. As I have explained, subsection (1) limits the scope of the clause and any specified action not covered by subsection (2) could be requested for the purposes of this clause by the Secretary of State only where it was consistent with the scope.

Amendment No. 36F would require statutory guidance, subject to the affirmative order procedure. We think that this amendment is unnecessary. Several of the actions listed are not ones for which detailed guidance, let alone detailed statutory guidance, is appropriate; for example, completing a form accurately and completely, attending an interview and answering questions accurately and completely or making an appointment. These are very basic matters for which we think that guidance would not be helpful. These are the sort of requirements that are susceptible to a common-sense assessment.

Where a person is not complying with a process that we consider he should be complying with, our efforts will go first and foremost into persuading the person to comply. So there is no risk of someone being landed with a criminal charge out of the blue. We will make clear to him what we expect to be done and the consequences of failing to do it. If a person is charged with this offence, it will be for the prosecution to prove in the usual way that he has failed to take the action required. The prosecution authorities would need their own guidance for implementing this offence, as they do for other offences.

I hope that I said, "We do currently give verbal notice". There is some concern that I might have said, "We do not currently give verbal notice". If I did, I did not intend to. We do currently give verbal notice of the timing and purpose of any redocumentation interviews. It was a slip of the tongue if I did not say that earlier.

I hope that the noble Lord will feel that I have given a sufficient response to his concerns to satisfy him that the amendments that he seeks are unnecessary. However, I understand why a proper explanation in relation to these matters was sought, because they influence what is done.

5.30 p.m.

The Lord Bishop of Chester: Before the Minister sits down, can she respond to the issue concerning children that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, raised. As I understand it, this clause will create a new criminal offence that will apply to those above the age of criminal responsibility and therefore to children.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 727

There are some cases of unaccompanied children who are asylum seekers. It must be a desperate and difficult situation. I also understand that, until recently, the policy has been not to seek to repatriate such people until they are 18 but that the Home Office is now trialing some repatriations of children under the age of 18.

As things stand, a criminal offence punishable by two years' imprisonment or a fine will be inserted into that dynamic. It is difficult to imagine that there would be any circumstances in which such people would pay a fine. I wonder whether the mere existence of this threat will not unnecessarily complicate the very difficult dynamics of assessing a child with a view to repatriation. The Minister said that only in the most extreme cases would one want to prosecute but sometimes the threat of prosecution can hang in the air and colour the atmosphere. I wonder whether it would not be much better if this new offence were limited to those who are 18 or older.

Earl Russell: I am most grateful to the right reverend Prelate for making that point. I am handling a case of this sort at the moment, which has a big risk of a possible infringement of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights like, I imagine, a number of these cases. It is the case of two brothers, one of whom is under age and the other of whom is of age. So one of them is in a position where he can stay and the other is not. This has the effect of separating each of them from the only surviving relation they have in the world, so far as they know. If that is not an infringement of Article 8 of the European convention I would like to know what is. Some relaxation of this policy might save the Government a good deal of legal trouble.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I apologise for not directly answering the question from the noble Lord, Lord McNally, about the application of Clause 20 in relation to children. I hope that I can reassure the right reverent Prelate the Bishop of Chester and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, that although we do not think that there is a need for statutory guidance, we will be publishing guidance on how Clause 20 is to be applied. That guidance will cover any issues specific to children that we think is necessary. I should emphasise that the most important aspect of this process is to gain the full co-operation of those whom we are proposing to remove so that we can make the process as humane, painless and appropriate as we can.

Lord McNally: I am particularly grateful for the intervention by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester. It is interesting to read in the brief that we received that:

"The threat of prosecution and imprisonment proposed in this clause is in direct contradiction to the best interests principle of Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Scotland) Act 1995".

I thank him for his support and underlining of that concern.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 728

As always, the Minister gave a very detailed reply that we will study. One of her complaints against the amendments was that they would restrict the effectiveness of the legislation. Of course, that was the precise intention of the amendments. We and those advising us think the clause too broadly drawn. However, she gave some very interesting assurances about interpretation that we will study. We may well return to how the clause will apply to children on Report, but in the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 36C to 36F not moved.]

Clause 20 agreed to.

Clause 21 [Electronic monitoring]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal moved Amendment No. 36G:

Page 20, line 44, leave out "and"

The noble Baroness said: In moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 36H. Clause 21 provides for electronic monitoring of people who are granted temporary admission or release, or who are released on immigration bail by a variety of bodies or persons empowered to grant such bail. However, as introduced, the power would not be available where bail was granted by SIAC—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

SIAC's caseload raises different issues from normal immigration casework, and in most cases the person is detained because that is necessary in the interests of national security. Although electronic monitoring technology provides a means of mitigating the risk that an individual will abscond, it may be less useful where the risk is not primarily that the person will abscond if released, but that they may be involved in other activities which pose a threat to national security. For that reason, we initially took the view that the measure would be of little practical application in such cases.

We have reviewed that position in the light of events since the Bill was introduced, particularly the comments by the Newton committee following its review of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, and the decision in principle by SIAC in January to grant bail in an individual case subject to the person concerned agreeing to be tagged. We have concluded that, although electronic monitoring may not be a solution in every case, it might be a useful tool in certain circumstances, and it was unnecessary to forgo the possibility of using it where it is considered appropriate.

As I said, SIAC decided in January to grant bail subject to the person concerned agreeing to be tagged. In so doing, it relied on the provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act. However, not all the cases before SIAC relate to ATCS detainees. The amendments will make the position absolutely clear for all SIAC's cases. I beg to move.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 729

5.45 p.m.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I support the government amendments. When we debated the report commonly known by the name of my noble friend Lord Newton, I expressed some scepticism on the value of tagging. I subsequently had a conversation with my noble friend, who pointed out that the committee had talked more about electronic monitoring than tagging. I am therefore rather intrigued on two bases.

First, the Minister appears to talk about tagging and electronic monitoring as the same thing. Will she confirm that they can be very different? Secondly, I certainly became aware after further conversations with my noble friend that electronic monitoring could be of great use if bail were granted. All has been thrown into sharp relief as a result of last week's events. I appreciate that, where a person is under house arrest, electronic monitoring can be of great value. The Minister says that the person may not wish to or be able to abscond, but they may be able to carry out activities that are not conducive to the safety of the public of this country. Will the Minister say a little more? Is she talking about tagging and electronic monitoring separately, or does she consider them to be the same thing?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The noble Baroness is quite right. Electronic monitoring and electronic tagging can be different things. However, the latter is sometimes subsumed within the former. One could say that one method or species of electronic monitoring may be electronic tagging. As she knows, we greatly questioned the utility of the measure, but she is right to say that recent events have put that in sharp relief. We have taken the view that it should not be excluded. It may be of use, so it is appropriate for us to have the power for it to be used in those circumstances where it is deemed appropriate.

Earl Russell: It is a great and unexpected pleasure to be able to welcome an amendment by the Government to the Bill, or to any Bill on the subject. The conflict between the Home Secretary and the committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, is an important and genuinely difficult one. I have known the noble Lord since long before he first stood for president of the Oxford Union. I do not think that he has ever been accused of being a woolly minded idealist; he is a thoroughly practical person, and his words deserve attention.

Where we have the clash between the basic principles of evidence and the basic interests of national security, we have a conflict in which both sides of the case deserve a serious hearing, and in which it is therefore unwise to give automatic priority to one side over the other. To make provision for the possibility of bail in such cases is therefore a very welcome recognition that one case will not be like another, that one set of priorities will not be like another, and that the civil liberties arguments will bear a greater proportion of the weight in some cases than in others. In fact, we should treat cases on their merits, which is how they ought to be treated.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 730

Baroness Scotland of Asthal moved Amendment No. 36H:

Page 21, line 1, leave out "or by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission)." and insert—

"), and
(iii) bail granted by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 21 agreed to.

Clause 22 agreed to.

Clause 23 [Immigration Services Commissioner: power of entry]:

Baroness Scotland of Asthal moved Amendment No. 36J:

Page 24, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 4 on page 25 and insert—

"(c) a reference to material—
(i) includes material subject to legal privilege within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60),
(ii) does not include excluded material or special procedure material within the meaning of that Act, and
(iii) includes material whether or not it would be admissible in evidence at a trial."

The noble Baroness said: I shall speak to government Amendments Nos. 36J, 36K, 36L and 36M. Clause 23 enables the Immigration Services Commissioner, subject to obtaining a court warrant, to enter and search premises. The commissioner will then be able to seize and retain material for which the search was authorised. The current draft of Clause 23 includes the categories of "excluded" and "special procedure" material among the categories of material that the commissioner may seize. The Committee will know that concerns were raised about this issue by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We have consulted the commissioner on the need for him to be able to seize these categories of material. We have concluded that excluded and special procedure material would not be of value to his investigations. As a result, we propose to amend the Bill to remove these categories from the list of material the commissioner may seize using this new power. I hope that will give even further pleasure to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, in relation to this matter. On that basis, I beg to move.

Lord Renton: The use of the word "material" in this or any context is rather rare in legislation. It may be my forgetfulness, but has the word "material" which is used here previously been used in a context of this kind?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I believe that it has. The category of excluded material will of course have included material such as personal records—those relating to a person's health, human tissue and so on. It can also be used in relation to journalistic materials. The category of special procedure material includes information acquired or created in the course of business. That is subject to a statutory restriction or undertaking of confidentiality

27 Apr 2004 : Column 731

given to a third party. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Renton, will not be disappointed to hear that it is not, I believe, the first time that it has been used in this way.

Lord Renton: I am grateful for that explanation, but I do think it would be worth while between now and Report stage for the noble Baroness, whose penetration we much admire, to have a look at precedents for this. She may be able to improve on it.

Earl Russell: The noble Baroness has given me pleasure. It is possible she might have been able to give me a little more, but she has certainly given me some.

On the word "material", I am reminded in this context of the 1558 Act for the militia which, most unwisely, specified precisely what types of weapon everybody coming to musters must bring with them. Fifty years later, every one of those weapons was obsolete. Most of the types of weapons they were supposed to produce had not been invented at the time of the previous Act.

The types of material—and I use the word advisedly— used for the purpose of committing acts of terrorism have changed quite remarkably within my own lifetime, even since I became eligible for the old age pension, which is not a very long time. So I think they needed some kind of general word of this sort.

I am worried by the power to have a general right of search on an arrest, before there is a charge, before anything has been made public, and before there is a defence. It in fact exactly repeats an argument which took place in both Houses in 1628, when it was argued that the King's taking a power to arrest on suspicion and then to search gave him a chance to arrest people against whom he had no evidence whatever and, by dint of the power of search, to create what Sir Thomas Wentworth described as "a springing offence"—one springing solely from what was discovered in a search which would, in any normal circumstances, have been illicit.

I would be very tempted, were I the commissioner, to take some person like Abu Hamza and search his possessions absolutely without the need to prove anything in advance. In fact, I would be itching to do so. However, the more a policeman is itching to exercise a certain power, the more legislators need to think twice about whether he should actually do it. I wonder whether this clause—even with this very welcome restriction—may still on occasion create mischief and, if it does, whether the mischief will or will not be balanced by any good that it might do. How, in fact, where one is measuring a justice against an injustice, does one set about creating tools of measurement? That is perhaps the most difficult question of all.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 732

When this Act is, in the normal course of events, reviewed and reconsidered, I hope that the Government will consider how exactly this clause has worked. Meanwhile, we have received a crumb from the rich man's table, for which I thank the Minister very warmly.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is only for me to say that I beg to move, and to thank the noble Earl for his exposition of the 1628 position.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord McNally moved Amendment No. 36JA:

Page 25, line 7, leave out "or a justice of the peace"

The noble Lord said: I too am impressed at this outbreak of amity between my noble friend Lord Russell and the Government Front Bench. Although it cannot be recorded in Hansard, the heavens seem to be making their own comment on this strange occurrence.

This amendment has been prompted by the opinion of the Law Society of Scotland. It seeks to ensure that in Scotland a sheriff only, and not a justice of the peace, will be entitled to grant the search warrants referred to in this clause. It is the view of the Law Society of Scotland that the powers to grant warrants under Clause 23 should extend to sheriffs only. Often a justice of the peace will not be legally qualified and may be unfamiliar with the criteria needed to grant such warrants. Given that the warrants are to investigate serious offences relating to asylum claims, it is in the interests of justice that these warrants are considered and granted by the sheriff.

A similar point was made in relation to search warrants under Clause 67 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, and it was accepted by the Government that the appropriate authority in Scotland would be the sheriff. The Law Society of Scotland would suggest the position under Clause 23 is analogous to that under earlier legislation and that the appropriate authority to grant these warrants is the sheriff.

It gives me particular pleasure to move the amendment, since the Minister knows full well that I am in total awe of the legal opinions of Scotland.

Lord Renton: I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has moved this amendment because it enables one to express one's doubt, or curiosity at least, as to the use of the expression "justice of the peace" in this context at all.

I must confess that although I was born and educated in England, I am more than half Scotish, and have spent a lot of my life in Scotland. I have noticed that in Scotland not all people who are called justice of the peace ever take part in judicial work. It is a sort of compliment in many cases. Indeed, I have a brother-in-law who has never taken part in any judicial work, but nevertheless is called a justice of the peace. I wonder whether the draftsman, in drafting this subsection, had that in mind. It is a curious position, but we have to get the law right.

27 Apr 2004 : Column 733

6 p.m.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: Justices of the peace in Scotland have functions related to road traffic arrangements and so forth and, as my noble friend said, many are honorary appointments. However, I was a little surprised to see justices of the peace being given this power because I am not aware that they ever do anything of the kind. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McNally, and I would have thought that it was a function of the sheriff. Presumably the clause has been drafted for Scotland, so it will be interesting to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

Earl Russell: I am most pleased that the Government have thought to bring the provision into force. We have an exa

The Rule of Law

3.8 p.m.

4.15 p.m.

4.30 p.m.

4.45 p.m.

5 p.m.

5.15 p.m.

5.30 p.m.

5.45 p.m.

6 p.m.