Evidence not included in Hutton's report

11 August

"As probably the most senior intelligence community official working on WMD, I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessments were being presented in the dossier that I was moved to write ... recording and explaining my reservations.

"The existing wording is not wrong but has lots of spin on it." - Martin Howard, chief of Defence Intelligence, on what a senior official had written.

14 August

The inquiry heard of Tony Blairís request to bring back David Kelly from a training day before a trip to Iraq for a second interview. Geoff Hoon overruled Sir Kevin Tebbit and ordered Dr Kelly should appear in public before the Commonsí foreign affairs committee because a private hearing would be "presentationally difficult". Sir Kevin had said there should be "some regard for the man himself" (Dr Kelly). "He is not on trial."

John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, said Dr Kelly should face a "security-style interview", evidence which went against claims that normal MoD disciplinary procedures were followed.

Memo from Sir David Omand, Cabinet Office intelligence and security co-ordinator ... "recorded the Prime Ministerís view that before we decided on the next steps that should be taken, it would be sensible to go into a bit more detail into the difference between what Dr Kelly had said and what Andrew Gilligan had claimed."

18 August

An e-mail of 5 September, 2002 showed Alastair Campbell ordered a "substantial rewrite" of the WMD dossier after a meeting with Mr Blair.

Jonathan Powell, Mr Blairís chief of staff, later wrote of the dossier: "The document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat, from Saddam."

Tom Kelly, one of the Prime Ministerís spokesmen, wrote in an e-mail: "This is now a game of chicken with the Beeb - the only way they will shift is if they see the screw tightening."

19 August

In a memo to Alastair Campbell, John Scarlett said that changes had been made to the text (of the dossier) "as you proposed": "We have strengthened the language on current concerns and plans, including the executive summary."

An e-mail from Philip Basset, one of Mr Campbellís advisers: "Very long way to go, I think. Think weíre in a lot of trouble with this (the dossier) as it stands now."

20 August

Alastair Campbell floated the idea to Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, that Dr Kellyís name be leaked to a friendly newspaper - he was later persuaded this was not a good idea.

Sir Kevin Tebbit said: "I was told the Prime Minister was following this very closely indeed ... the intelligence was that he wanted something done about the individual (Dr Kelly) coming forward."

26 August

An e-mail showed Downing Street made a desperate final plea for stronger evidence for the dossier: "No 10 wants the document to be as strong as possible within the boundaries of the available intelligence. this is therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that the agencies think can and should be used."

27 August

Geoff Hoon, having heard an official had admitted talking to the BBC, said: "It did appear that this perhaps was an opportunity to demonstrate that unauthorised contacts with journalists would be looked at seriously."

1 September

Janice Kelly, Dr Kellyís widow, said the Ministry of Defence told her husband he would not be named and he felt betrayed when he was.

3 September

Dr Brian Jones, head of the Defence Intelligence Staff analysing WMD, said the "shutters came down" before the reservations about the dossier in the intelligence community - especially the 45-minute claim - had been discussed. "Our reservations about the dossier were not reflected in the final version."

Dr Jones also said a chemical weapons expert said there was a "tendency to over-egg certain assessments".

4 September

Geoff Hoonís special adviser, Richard Taylor, said Mr Hoon was present at a meeting to discuss a "naming strategy" for Dr Kelly. Mr Hoon had not mentioned this in his evidence