May 1 2007 The Final epidemiological report referred to in Mr Bradshaw's answer - and see below for the pages referred to (in fact, pages 15 - 17 )
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070501/text/70501w0001.htm#07050141000018
Avian Influenza: Disease Control
Mr. Peter Ainsworth: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs whether the testing of live poultry for avian influenza in the protection and surveillance zones in Suffolk referred to in his Departments submission to the European Commission on 5 March was completed before permission was granted to reopen the Bernard Matthews plant in Suffolk; what type of live poultry was tested; what the location was of each of the premises that were tested; and how many birds were tested in each. [134493]
Mr. Bradshaw: During the outbreak, the State Veterinary Service (SVS, now Animal Health) carried out extensive surveillance in the restricted areas working closely with local authorities in Suffolk and Norfolk and other agencies. A full breakdown of the type and numbers of poultry tested along with a map of their locations can be found on pages 16 and 17 of the final epidemiology report into the outbreak we published on 19 April. Copies are available in the Library of the House.
This testing of live poultry within the protection and surveillance zones was completed by 26 February. The Bernard Matthews slaughterhouse plant in Holton was re-opened on 12 February. However, this was a separate premises from the site of the outbreak (although adjacent to it) and was placed under appropriate restrictions only while it was used to cull the birds. The meat processing plant which was also adjacent to the infected premises was never placed under restrictions. Once culling was completed, it was re-licensed to operate only after being thoroughly cleansed and disinfected and inspected by the SVS and Meat Hygiene Service so that it could not pose any disease risk to either poultry or humans.
From pages 15 - 17 of the final epidemiological report
referred to in Mr Bradshaw's answer
Investigation of Potential Spread Tracings
51. As indicated above live poults arrived from a single GB source, a company owned hatchery the eggs for which were all sourced from the companys own breeder sites, on 8 December. This was therefore outside the tracing window.
52. As indicated above in paragraph 29, two of the personnel working on the site had visited another site owned by the company at Ellough some 9km to the north-east of the infected premises. This was considered a high risk tracing despite the biosecurity precautions in place for the staff. The site was used only as turkey finishing unit and comprised 12 houses. The site was visited and placed under restriction for 14 days. At the visit the birds were inspected clinically and the production records examined. There was no evidence of disease from these examinations. Oro-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs together with blood samples were taken from a sample of 20 birds from each house for virological and serological testing. All laboratory results were negative and at the revisit to lift the restrictions did not reveal any evidence of clinical from an inspection of the birds and production records.
53. Biosecurity precautions were in place for the collection of dead birds (see above). However, the transport of potentially infected birds to other farms, turkey finishing units under the same ownership, during the collection route was considered to present as sufficient risk to require tracing. Four farms were, placed under restrictions and visited and the turkeys inspected clinically and the production records examined for signs of poor production. All investigations proved negative.
54. Other vehicles, delivering wood shavings, feed and gas supplies and those used by maintenance companies considered as potential means of causing the spread of infection, were discounted as they presented a negligible risk because of the degree of contact with potentially infected material and birds and the fact that the appropriate biosecurity measures were in place.
Surveillance of Domestic Poultry
Within the Protection Zone (PZ: 3 Km radius around the IP)
55. Awareness of the disease by flock owners in the PZ was raised by messages relayed on the Defra website and on the local and national media and text messages to registrants of the GB Poultry Register (GBPR) who had provided a mobile telephone contact number.
56. Seventy-eight flocks were identified in the PZ, from existing records contained within the GBPR and the Diseases Control System, and from the results of "door-to-door" patrols to identify the smaller, non-commercial flocks.
57. All (78) of these flocks were visited to inspect the birds clinically and examine production records, where the latter were appropriate (see Figure 6).
58. Twenty-one of these 78 flocks contained ducks and/or geese. Oro-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs were taken for virological examination from a sample of 20 ducks and/or geese, unless the total flock size (of ducks and geese) was less than 20, when all ducks and geese were sampled. In addition, a blood sample was taken from the sampled birds. The laboratory results were negative for H5N1 infection.
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59. All 78 flocks were revisited on 26 February to inspect the birds clinically and examine the production records. No suspicion of disease was found.
Within the Surveillance Zone
60. Awareness of the disease by flock owners in the SZ was raised by messages relayed on the Defra website and on the local and national media and text messages to registrants of the GBPR who had provided a mobile telephone contact number.
61. All 70 flocks in the SZ were visited to inspect the birds clinically and examine production records, where the latter were appropriate (see Figure 6).
62. Twenty-three of these 70 flocks contained ducks and/or geese. Oro-pharyngeal and cloacal swabs were taken for virological examination from a sample of 20 ducks and/or geese, unless the total flock size (of ducks and geese) was less than 20, when all ducks and geese were sampled. In addition, a blood sample was taken from the sampled birds. The laboratory results were negative for avian influenza, including H5N1 infection.
Figure 6: Surveillance of domestic flocks in the Protection and Surveillance Zones
Surveillance of Wild Birds
Background Surveillance
63. Since late October 2006 there has been a targeted surveillance programme for the detection of avian influenza including H5N1 in wild birds in GB. This has a number of components and is targeted to those species of
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