Version 3.0

Defra

Foot and Mouth Disease

Contingency Plan

FOREWORD

This Contingency Plan takes forward the Government’s commitment to implement the recommendations of the Inquiries into the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001. The Lessons Learned Inquiry stressed the importance of contingency planning, the need to react with speed and certainty, and the importance of clear and consistent communication with interested parties.

The plan sets out the structures and systems that would be immediately implemented in an outbreak and describes the capability that would enable the speedy provision of resources to bring into operation the Government’s control policies. It has been developed with input from stakeholders and acknowledges the importance of greater engagement with operational partners, particularly local authorities, both in developing emergency preparedness and dealing with a disease outbreak.

Defra published an interim Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan in March 2002 which codified the immediate lessons learned from the 2001 outbreak. Following the publication of the Reports of the Official Inquiries, a revised version was published on 6 November 2002 at the same time as the Government responded to the Inquiries’ recommendations. This Plan replaces that version following consultation, policy development and further work.

The purpose of publishing this Plan is to make transparent the way in which FMD control policies would be implemented in the event of an outbreak. In this sense it is an operational plan. Future developments in policy such as those that may result from the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy and the implementation of new legislation such as the current draft FMD Directive will be reflected in future revisions as part of a commitment to regular updating and stakeholder involvement. This Plan is intended only to indicate how Defra and its partners would implement the agreed policies. It will be subject to regular review.

The Plan fits into the framework of the EU approved Contingency Plan and is augmented by the detailed SVS instructions dealing with operational disease control and the particular local aspects of the control operation that are contained in plans maintained by each Animal Health Divisional Office.

This Plan will be brought into use not only in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, but also to provide the structures, frameworks and systems that would be necessary for the control of other exotic diseases. They have been developed against the background of the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak and may be modified and developed during future operations. They are the initial framework for managing an outbreak in a structured way, but they are not intended to constrain the way the control operation develops. The Plan provides at present a clear and public operational plan which would guide Defra and those with whom it works in dealing with an outbreak of exotic disease and informs the public and all those who might be affected by the control measures.

The Plan sets out how the disease would be controlled were there to be an outbreak tomorrow. It is however, the Government’s view that there needs to be a fairer balance between farmers and tax payers in meeting the costs of animal diseases. The view is supported by the Curry Commission, the Lessons Learned Inquiry into FMD 2001 and the PAC report. A Defra-led working group comprising stakeholders from the livestock and insurance industries has been exploring policy options for this. The group completed the initial phase of this work in 2002. It is likely that a combination of a levy and voluntary top up insurance could provide a basis for a way forward and work is continuing with the view of launching a wide ranging consultation exercise in summer 2003. This will affect compensation for animals slaughtered in the disease control operation or under a livestock welfare scheme, and the costs of secondary cleansing and disinfection.

Since the last version of the Plan was published it has been considerably augmented. It now makes reference to the availability of detailed instructions on procurement and commercial contracting and on financial management of the outbreak. It explains the provision of a register of Defra staff available for service in an emergency and how further personnel would be engaged. It explains how the new register of independent valuers would be employed and the call up of monitor valuers. It outlines the key regional operational stakeholder capabilities and encourages the greater involvement of Defra, both nationally and locally, with its operational partners to ensure a better integrated approach to disease control and with all those affected to provide a better understanding of what the effect disease control measures would have.

It includes a new section on the role of the Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group - encouraging liaison with volunteer and charity organisations who could offer support. Finally the Plan reflects the provisions of the Animal Health Act 2002 by reference to emergency vaccination and the Decision Tree for disease control strategies, the disease control slaughter protocol for the use of the pre-emptive cull and refers to the revised biosecurity guidance which is out for consultation.

This version of the Contingency Plan takes into account comments received, operational additions to the plan and lessons learned from exercises. It has been the subject of considerable consultation with stakeholders and reflects as far as possible the comments that have been made. As a living document it will always be open for further comment.

7 The latest version of the Contingency Plan will be displayed on the Defra website at all times with a box for comments allowing ongoing opportunity for comment.

7 Timely meetings will be held with stakeholders so that views can be included in the process of the development of the Plan.

7 Any proposals for significant changes of policy affecting the Plan will be subject to separate consultation exercises. Consultation letters will explain that the end result will form part of the Plan. To avoid consultation ‘fatigue’ we will not always consult on the whole Plan when only these policy changes are incorporated. However, interested parties will be written to in order to let them know of the changes to the Plan and we will also place a clear message on the Defra website;

7 Where changes of factual information relating to Defra operational arrangements occur, appropriate written consultation exercises will be carried out.

7 Regardless of any separate consultations on particular issues, a full written consultation on the Plan will take place at least annually.

Operational Instructions to carry out the requirements of this contingency plan are contained within the State Veterinary Service Instructions - VIPER (Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines) Chapter 3. This is available to the public in the Defra library, Room 320A, Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR and may be viewed by appointment by telephone: 0207 238 6575 (please allow 24 hours notice).

A project to consolidate the existing version into a web based document, capturing and collating experiences gained during 2001 to provide a consistent response based on best practices identified during and following the outbreak is under way. The revised re-presented chapter should be completed and publicly available on the Defra website in the summer.

CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

	Page
Section 1 - Background, Structures and Policies
1.1 Background	13
1.6 Outline of Command Structures	14
1.12 Outline of Policies	15

Section 2 - Alert System & States of Alert
2.2 AMBER - Action on Suspicion of FMD	17
2.13 RED - Initial Action on Confirmation of FMD	20
2.15 Policies to be applied on confirmation of FMD	21

Section 3 - Resources
3.1 Involvement of the Armed Forces	23
3.5 Human Resources	23
3.5 Veterinary Personnel	23
3.8 Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and Divisional Operations Managers (DOMs)	24
3.12 Administrative, Field and Technical Personnel	25
3.23 Legal Services	26
3.26 Vaccination Teams	27
3.28 Involvement of Stakeholders and Operational Partners	27
3.31 Training & Exercises	28
3.31 Veterinary Training	28
3.33 AHDO training	28
3.34 Induction Training	28
3.37 Media Training	29
3.38 Contingency Planning Exercises	29
3.39 Health & Safety & Staff Welfare	29
3.44 Accommodation	30
3.48 Information Technology & Data Systems	31
3.57 Procurement	32
3.57 General - Procurement & Commercial Contracting Contingency Plan	32
3.64 National/Regional/Local Call-off Contracts & Supply Contingency Arrangements	33

	Page
3.69 Financial Control	34
3.69 NDCC Head of FMD Finance	34
3.70 Finance Managers, LDCCs	34
3.71 Role of Finance Officers	35
3.75 Equipment and Stores	35
3.75 National Minimum Stocking Levels	35
3.76 Divisional Minimum Stocking Levels	35
3.77 Stores to Supply Vaccination Teams	36

Section 4 - Key Operations

4.1 Emergency Vaccination	37
4.6 Animal Welfare	38
4.11 Valuation	38
4.15 Restricted Infected Areas	39
4.16 Biosecurity Guidance	39
4.18 Disposal	40
4.36 Serology	43
4.47 Cleansing & Disinfection of Affected Premises	44
4.49 Rodent Control	45

Section 5 - Management Information & Communications

5.1 Management Information & Disease Control Information	46
5.5 Communications	46
5.5 Media	46
5.7 Website	47
5.9 Helplines	47
5.10 Central Co-ordination	47
5.12 Notifiable Disease Awareness Programmes	48

Section 6 - Strategic Level Plan

6.1 Background and Scope	49
Structures and ‘Battle Rhythm’	52
Key Strategic Structures and roles	53
Strategic Level Roles	68

Section 7 - Tactical Level Plan
7.1 Background & Scope	73
7.7 Activation	73
7.9 NDCC Team Tasks	74
7.23 Stakeholders	78
7.24 Co-ordination	78
7.27 Corporate Communications	79
7.28 Meetings	79
7.29 Administration	81

	Page
Section 8 - Operational Level Plan
8.1 Background & Scope	83
8.3 Objectives	83
8.7 Activation	84
8.8 Process	84
8.12 Involvement of Stakeholders & Operational Partners	84
8.15 Administration	85

ANNEXES

Annex A	Veterinary Guidance for Initial Action on Suspect Cases
Annex B	Decision Tree
Annex C	Slaughter Protocol
Annex D	Emergency Vaccination Arrangements
Annex E	Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way Closures
Annex F	Contacts List
Annex G	Regional Operations Directors and Divisional Operations Managers - Emergency Contact Details
Annex H	Communications - Action by Communications Directorate
Annex I	Organograms of Key Structures - NDCC
Annex J	Organograms of Key Structures - LDCC
Annex K	Format of FMD Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
Annex L	Health & Safety Plan
Annex M	Biosecurity Advice and Guidance
Annex N	Key Stakeholders - Capabilities
Annex O	Devolved Administrations - Scotland - Wales

Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACVO	Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer
AHDO	Animal Health Divisional Office
AHO	Animal Health Officer
AHWD	Animal Health and Welfare Directorate
AMED	Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division
ASD	Accounting Services Division

BCMS	British Cattle Movement Service
BEMD	Building and Estates Management Division

CA	Countryside Agency
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
CCC	Civil Contingencies Committee
CCC(O)	Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials)
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office)
CD	Communications Directorate
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
Comms	Communications
CP	Contiguous Premises
CSA	Chief Scientific Adviser (Defra)
CSD	Corporate Services Division
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer

DARDNI	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland
DC	Dangerous Contact
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DCS	Disease Control System Database
DCVO	Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Director Vet Policy
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DG	Director General
DGLS	Director General Legal Services (Defra)
DG LURA	Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs (Defra)
DG OSD	Director General Operations and Service Delivery (Defra)

DHSM	Departmental Health and Safety Manager
DHSU	Departmental Health and Safety Unit
DOH	Department of Health
DOM	Divisional Operations Manager
DOT	Department of Transport
DVM	Divisional Veterinary Manager
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions

EA	Environment Agency
EC	European Commission
EDG	Emergency Direction Group
EFRA	Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Select Committee)
ESA	Environment Services Association
EU	European Union

FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FSA	Food Standards Agency

GICS	Government Information and Communication Service
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GNN	Government News Network
GOs	Government Offices in the Regions

H&S	Health and Safety
HASANS	Defra Departmental Health and Safety Notices
HOD	Head of Division
HMT	Her Majesty’s Treasury
HQ	Defra Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
HsVS	Heads of Veterinary Services in Defra Regions
HVS	Head Veterinary Services

IAH Pirbright	Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright
IP	Infected Premises
ITD	Information Technology Division

LA	Local Authority
LACORS	Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services
LASSA	Licensed Animal Slaughterers and Salvage Association
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre
LGA	Local Government Association
LSDG	Legal Services Directorate General
LURA	Land Use and Rural Affairs
LVI	Local Veterinary Inspector

MOD	Ministry of Defence
MPs	Members of Parliament

NAO	National Audit Office
NCC	News Co-ordination Centre
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NFU	National Farmers Union
NWMT	National Wildlife Management Team

ODPM	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OD SEC	Cabinet Office Overseas & Defence Secretariat
OD(W)	Operations Director Wales
OGD	Other Government Department
OIE	Office International des Epizooties
OSD	Operations and Service Delivery
OST	Office of Science and Technology

PCD	Procurements and Contracts Division
PERT	Procurement Emergency Response Team
PHLS	Public Health Laboratory Service
PZ	Protection Zone

RCU	Regional Co-ordination Unit (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister)
RDS	Rural Development Service
RIDDOR	Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurances Regulations
ROD	Regional Operations Director
RPA	Rural Payments Agency (Defra Agency)

SAG	Science Advisory Group (Defra)
SAHO	Senior Animal Health Officer
SAPER SEAC	Science Advisory Panel for Emergency Response Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee
SEERAD	Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
Sitrep	Situation Report
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SOS	Slaughter on Suspicion
SVC	Standing Veterinary Committee
SVS	State Veterinary Service
SVSCP	State Veterinary Service Contingency Planning Division

TVI	Temporary Veterinary Inspector

VIPER	Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines (State Veterinary Service Operational Instructions)
VA	Veterinary Adviser
VEXDD	Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division
VLA	Veterinary Laboratory Agency, Weybridge
VO	Veterinary Officer
VRD	Veterinary Resources Division in the State Veterinary Service
VTVS	Vetnet Tracing Verification System

WAG	Welsh Assembly Government
WAG ARAD	Welsh Assembly Government Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department

SECTION 1 - Background, Structures and Policies

BACKGROUND

1.1 This document is Defra’s contingency plan framework for foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks within the structure provided by the existing EU approved contingency plan. It is a working document subject to regular review and update.

1.2 The Plan follows guidance produced by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and Defra’s Emergencies Unit.

1.3 The Plan is split into sections, which are designed to be removed and used as ‘standalone’ documents giving guidance at differing levels.

1.4 This framework document taken together with the State Veterinary Service operational instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) and local contingency plans form Defra’s FMD contingency plans. The State Veterinary Service operational instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) include detailed guidance and instruction for staff in local Animal Health Divisional Offices (or Local Disease Control Centres) and the National Disease Control Centre. Local plans, prepared by AHDOs, include local procedures and contact lists to allow the implementation of VIPER Chapter 3 instructions and the National Contingency Plan. This ensures a consistent national approach whilst allowing necessary adaptation to local circumstances. This framework contingency plan does not re-iterate VIPER Chapter 3 and local instructions. This Plan provides a clear view of the structures, roles and responsibilities required at strategic and tactical levels in order to support the operations on the ground.

1.5 The Plan is based on established veterinary procedures and also incorporates some of the control policies that developed during the 2001 outbreak. It codifies the experiences and operational lessons learnt from that outbreak and reflects the recommendations made by the Official Inquiries.

OUTLINE OF COMMAND STRUCTURES

Command and Control

1.6 The response to a disease alert will be controlled using a Strategic, Tactical and Operational command structure.

Strategic Command

1.7 Purpose: To provide high level command and control at all stages of an animal disease outbreak, enabling a cross departmental response which gives clear strategic direction. Initially Defra Management Board, but rapid establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC and/or CCC(O)) which will include Ministers (both Defra and other Government Departments), Defra Permanent Secretary, Defra Directors General (including the Chief Veterinary Officer), Directors of: State Veterinary Service and Defra Communications Directorate and senior officials from other relevant Government Departments (as below).

1.8 Representatives from No. 10, Devolved Administrations (SEERAD, WAG ARAD), Cabinet Office (Civil Contingencies Secretariat), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Regional Co-ordination Unit), Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, Department of Health, Home Office (and Association of Chief Police Officers), Ministry of Defence, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Department for Transport, HM Treasury, Food Standards Agency, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Trade and Industry.

Tactical Command

1.9 Purpose: Twofold.

1) To provide a co-ordinated response to the direction received from the Strategic Group and provide operational feedback.

2) To devise tactics for operational implementation.

Emergency Direction Group and National Disease Control Centre (NDCC). Includes representatives from other Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, executive agencies and key operational partners including the local authorities and Defra Directors (FMD Operations, Communications, Veterinary Policy, Animal Health and Welfare (and Livestock Strategy Division), Corporate Services, Finance, Environment Quality and Waste, Rural Economies and Communities and Legal Services A).

Operational Command

1.10 Purpose: Twofold.

1) To implement contingency plans, working with stakeholders to ensure effective control of the disease outbreak.

2) To receive tactical guidance and implement it in liaison with other local responders and provide regular feedback.

Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) under Regional Operations Director/Divisional Veterinary Manager control; to include representatives from relevant agencies, local authorities, other key stakeholders and operational partners (see Annex N).

1.11 N.B. This Plan covers operations in England. Annex O sets out outline details of the contingency plans for Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland also has a separate contingency plan, details of which are not outlined in this plan as the island of Ireland is treated as a separate epidemiological entity.

OUTLINE OF POLICIES

1.12 These policies will be applied if FMD is confirmed

(Note: The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)

7 A GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place immediately.

7 Export licences for animals and animal products will be withdrawn.

7 Diseased and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled as soon as possible, within 24 hours of report. Dangerous contacts will be culled as soon as possible.

7 Emergency Vaccination will immediately be considered as an option based upon emerging epidemiological and logistical factors. If emergency vaccination is used it would be on the basis of vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

7 A Protection Zone will be imposed with a radius of 3km around the Infected Premises. Regular veterinary patrol visits of all premises with susceptible livestock within this area will take place.

7 A Restricted Infected Area will be declared with a minimum radius of 10km around infected premises. This will require increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection (C&D) for vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms and movement controls for animals, animal products, feed and bedding.

7 Disposal by incineration would be implemented immediately with rendering as the next option and other disposal routes being available as an additional resource subject to environmental, land use planning and public health considerations.

7 Footpaths would only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex E).

1.13 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree (Annex B) will be followed in deciding what action to take.

1.14 Additional strategies include:

7 culling of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and

7 pre-emptive or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals not on infected premises, not dangerous contacts or not necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

SECTION 2 - Alert System & States of Alert

2.1 A standard alert system has been adopted as a basis for planning the response to a disease outbreak. Alert states of ‘Amber’ (in the case of suspicion of disease) and ‘Red’ (on confirmation of the first case of disease) will be called.

AMBER - ACTION ON SUSPICION OF FMD

2.2 Any suspicion of FMD must be reported to the local Animal Health Division Office (AHDO) of the State Veterinary Service who will take action according to SVS instructions. In outline this means that:-

7 movement restrictions will be imposed on the affected premises whilst investigations are carried out;

7 if initial examination of the suspect animal by an official Veterinary Inspector cannot rule out the existence of FMD, samples will be taken and sent for laboratory analysis;

7 as a precautionary measure, movement restrictions will also be imposed on all livestock holdings within an 8km radius of the affected premises;

7 key local stakeholders will be notified as soon as practicable.

2.3 Responsibility for providing and communicating information on a suspect case of disease, including laboratory results, lies with Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division (VEXD) who use form ND1 to notify key veterinary and policy personnel in HQ and the regions, including the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Director of the State Veterinary Service. The Director of the SVS will put the relevant ROD & DOM on alert.

2.4 Out of Hours notification is the responsibility of the Duty Veterinary Adviser and Duty Press Officer.

2.5 In some cases where laboratory confirmation is awaited and the veterinary assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting, the Chief Veterinary Officer may take the decision to move to red alert before final confirmation is received. In this case all action indicated as required under ‘Red’ alert will be immediately initiated.

Communications Protocol - Laboratory Test Results on a suspect case

2.6 This protocol governs the distribution and timing of release of information on test results, both internally and externally.

2.7 Information should be made available as soon as possible. To ensure that communications aspects can be dealt with as quickly as possible, a discussion, normally by conference call, should take place with the CVO or his nominated representative leading and those listed below participating.

CVO

DG OSD

Director SVS

AHWD - Director or Head of Division

LSDG - Director of Head of Division

CD (and GNN)

Private Offices

No. 10

SVS Contingency Planning

DVM

Civil Contingencies Secretariat

News Co-ordination Centre

2.8 The arrangements for convening the conference call will be undertaken by CD (out of hours the duty press officer will be notified by the Duty Veterinary Advisor in AHWD). A list of contact names and numbers for internal principals and their deputies will be maintained by AHWD and available from the Defra Duty Officer and the SVS Home Duty Clerk.

2.9 The agenda for the communications teleconference call would comprise (with a report from bracketed party)

1. Situation Report - National (CVO nominated representative)

- Local (DVM)

2. Timescale (CVO nominated representative)

3. Risk assessment (CVO nominated representative/DVM)

4. Communications objectives (Director of Communications)

5. Stakeholder Handling (national and local) (AHWD, DVM)

6. Agreed lines to take/press notice (Director of Communications)

7. Time of release and action points (CVO Nominated representative)

2.10 The following then take responsibility for informing externally at an agreed time:

- DVM: individual farmer (DVM to alert CD/regional GNN as soon as the individual is told and before informing other external groups);

- DVM: Emergency planning departments of relevant local authorities, local police force and the Environment Agency;

- DVM: local stakeholders and farmers;

- AHWD: NFU

- DG OSD: CCS, RCU and EA

- CD/GNN: media, website, helpline, intranet (and other internal communications to Defra staff), GNN

2.11 News Releases are drafted by AHWD in conjunction with CD and must be sent to all internal principals (particularly the DVM) before being released externally.

2.12 Questions about test results and timing of their delivery should be addressed to the CVO nominated contact.

RED - INITIAL ACTION ON CONFIRMATION OF FMD

2.13 If the suspected case is subsequently confirmed by the CVO as having disease or if the risk assessment indicates, the alert state will immediately be raised to ‘Red’ and the following action will take place:-

7 the Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division will notify Defra Ministers and senior officials, other government departments, devolved administrations and agencies and organisations directly affected;

7 the DCVO (policy) will inform the European Commission, OIE, and national veterinary organisations;

7 the Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and the National Disease Control Centre. SVS Instructions contain detailed plans for their establishment and resourcing;

7 the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify all DVMs and Heads of Veterinary Services, nominated heads of NDCC cells from within Defra, those who will be invited to be represented in the NDCC, and nominated RODs and DOMs;

7 the Head of SVS CP Division will alert the vaccination contractors and put them on stand-by, subject to further direction from the Strategic Group. As soon as the FMD strain responsible for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the available vaccines will afford protection, the Head of AMED Division will instruct the relevant contractor to formulate vaccine;

7 an Emergency Management Board will be convened as soon as possible and will take a decision on triggering the Civil Contingencies Committee on the basis of emerging information about the disease;

7 other Government Departments, the Armed Forces, operational partners and key local stakeholders such as local authorities will be notified as soon as possible.

NB. Detail of who should contact whom is set out at Annex F.

2.14 Action to be taken to establish the NDCC and relevant LDCC and to control the disease is set out in detail in the SVS instructions and the AHDO contingency plans.

2.15 The following policies will be applied on confirmation of FMD:

(Note: The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)

7 A GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place immediately.

7 Export licences for animals and animal products will be withdrawn.

7 Diseased and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled as soon as possible, within 24 hours of report. Dangerous contacts will be culled as soon as possible.

7 A Protection Zone will be imposed with a radius of 3km around the Infected Premises. Regular veterinary patrol visits of all premises with susceptible livestock within this area will take place.

7 Footpaths would only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex E).

2.16 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree (Annex B) will be followed in deciding what action to take. The Animal Health Act 1981, as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002, lays a duty on the Secretary of State to consider vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of the disease. Wherever possible this would be on the basis of emergency vaccinate-to-live. Consultation with interested parties is currently underway, in the context of negotiations on the EU FMD Directive, to address technical, commercial and communications issues around emergency vaccination. The reasons for a decision not to vaccinate would be explained before further measures were introduced.

2.17 Additional strategies include:

7 culling of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and

2.18 The “Decision Tree” for disease control strategies against FMD sets out the factors the Government will take into account in deciding which strategy to adopt in order to control and eradicate the disease. The Decision Tree is at Annex B.

2.19 There is also a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol for use in the event of a pre-emptive cull as at Annex C.

This protocol sets out the requirements that must be followed if a pre-emptive cull is to be undertaken.

Further Action

2.20 Once FMD is confirmed the main elements of this plan are brought into action.

Section 3 sets out the resources that would be deployed;

Section 4 describes the key operations that have a central input;

Section 5 sets out the main elements of the Communications Plan;

Section 6 describes the strategic organisations and structures;

Section 7 the tactical organisation; and

Section 8 the operational plan.

These last two are augmented by the SVS instructions and the local office contingency plans.

SECTION 3 - Resources

INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

3.1 Immediately a case of FMD is confirmed, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery will contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat in order to notify them of the outbreak so that, if necessary, aid can be sought with the minimum delay. If it were decided that it was necessary to seek aid from the armed forces, aid would be provided under the ‘Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’ (MACA) arrangements, subject to other Armed Forces commitments. The Armed Forces may provide assistance with logistic capability and it may be appropriate to deploy at both tactical (Tactical command) and operational (Operational command) levels.

3.2 Contact details for MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat can be found at Annex F.

3.3 The Armed Forces will have their own command and control structure with overall co-ordination of their effort being controlled by Armed Forces HQ Land. It is not appropriate for regional staff to approach Army Brigade headquarters directly. All requests for initial assistance must be passed through NDCC.

3.4 Brigade Commanders will take direction (but not commands) from RODs/DVMs and will need to be given clear aims and objectives. The local military commander will decide how best to use their troops based on these aims and the directions received. Military Liaison Officers should be posted to LDCCs to take on a local strategic co-ordination function.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Veterinary Personnel

Identification of UK government veterinary personnel

3.5 On authority from the Director SVS individual veterinary staff will be alerted with immediate effect and deployed as instructed by Divisional Veterinary Managers. (SVS instructions and local office contingency plans expand on these arrangements). In addition, vets from the following sources will be contacted by VRD with a view to securing additional assistance:

7 Retired veterinary staff

7 Veterinary staff from Defra agencies and other government departments.

Identification of non-government veterinary personnel

3.6 The great majority of private vets who worked for Defra during the FMD epidemic of 2001 did so as Temporary Veterinary Inspectors (TVIs). The Department has temporarily stopped appointing TVIs pending the introduction of a new flexible employment contract. In the interim, practising private vets in Great Britain would be engaged as Local Veterinary Inspectors (LVIs) to increase the numbers of LVIs that are already engaged. These arrangements are likely to be refined following the current Review of LVIs. Other private veterinary surgeons in GB and abroad would be engaged as casual veterinary staff.

Identification of overseas government veterinary personnel

3.7 If overseas government veterinary resource is deemed necessary following risk assessment and epidemiological advice, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will send a formal request to the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve countries. The CVO will also send a formal request to EU Member States if necessary. Induction briefing for incoming veterinary surgeons will be arranged at London HQ through the Veterinary Resource Division. Training will be provided at Local DCCs.

Identification of Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and Divisional Operations Managers (DOMs)

3.8 Members of the Senior Civil Service will be appointed for three years as contingency Regional Operations Directors (RODs) to take up post in the event of an outbreak and lead the LDCCs. They will be allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. SVS Contingency Planning Division will maintain a list of RODs (Annex G).

3.9 When an Amber alert is declared the Director of the SVS will alert the Head of Veterinary Service for that SVS Region to be on immediate standby to take up post as ROD. The contingency ROD for that region will also be alerted to replace the HVS as soon as possible to lead the LDCC so that the HVS can be transferred to strengthen veterinary management at HQ.

3.10 Grade 6s (or Grade 7s on temporary promotion) will be appointed for three years as contingency Divisional Operations Managers to take up posts in the event of an outbreak and work beside DVMs to manage the administrative (non-veterinary) part of the operation. Like RODs, they will be allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. Upon confirmation of a case, a DOM for the relevant region will be alerted by SVS CPD to take up post as soon as possible. SVS CPD will maintain a list of DOMs annexed to this plan (Annex G). Similar arrangements are being set up in Scotland and Wales.

3.11 During their period of appointment, the contingency RODs and DOMs will spend 5 days a year training, developing effective links with AHDOs, DVMs and key regional stakeholders and taking part in contingency planning exercises.

Key Administrative, Field & Technical Personnel

3.12 The National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) will require access to middle managers who are able to take up key positions immediately on confirmation of disease. Key posts have been identified in the NDCC & LDCCs, together with job descriptions and Day 1 tasks.

3.13 The Director SVS, through HR Services Division, will maintain a list of Defra staff who have the required skills and experience to take up key positions in the NDCC. These individuals will be called upon as soon as disease is confirmed and are expected to take up post as soon as possible (within 24 hours of request).

3.14 Staff in an AHDO in which an LDCC is being set up, and in the SVS more widely, will be the first to be called upon if FMD is confirmed. They will be expected to take up post as soon as possible while further staff resources are called in.

3.15 Key administrative personnel will be expected to take part in contingency testing exercises. This should be written into their job descriptions and work objectives.

General field, technical and administrative personnel

3.16 The NDCC and LDCCs will require immediate access to general field and administrative staff to support key personnel and veterinary colleagues in the eradication of disease.

3.17 The Director General of Operations and Service Delivery will seek Management Board authority to require the release of staff from Defra and Defra Agencies to work on emergency sites. The Management Board will provide clear direction to Divisions, Agencies and work groups, in order that non-essential staff can volunteer their services and be released quickly. First call will be on those staff on the Defra Emergency Volunteers Register.

3.18 Human Resources Services Division will co-ordinate action on the redeployment of administrative staff from the Emergency Volunteers Register, and other staff, to the NDCC and to LDCCs. The NDCC Personnel Cell will maintain an overview of numbers, provide terms of appointment for administrative staff in the regions, liaise with DWP and act as a central point, in close liaison with the SVS Personnel Unit at Worcester, for HR issues both in London and the Regions.

3.19 The SVS Personnel Unit will advise on Human Resource services for LDCCs and will provide one or more HR trained personnel to assist in setting up local HR teams. They will also maintain quality control and provide policy guidance to local managers and HR teams on HR issues. They will also be responsible for liaising with the LDCC personnel points, monitoring national field-based resources and co-ordinating national veterinary recruitment exercises.

3.20 Additional support staff may need to be drafted in from other government departments. Use of the protocols set out in a central Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Aid and the Redeployment of Human Resources will be triggered if necessary, and the Director General Operations and Service Delivery, through the Permanent Secretary, will contact the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to request assistance with additional staffing. Concurrently, Regional Operations Directors will liaise with Government Office Directors to seek additional assistance in locating further staff.

3.21 Having first sought clearance from the Director General Operations and Service Delivery [or Director SVS], RODs may contact Regional Directors of Pluscentreplus (Department for Work and Pensions) in order to recruit staff directly on short-term contracts. In this instance, guidance on contractual arrangements should be sought from the personnel cell in the NDCC and the personnel expertise that may be available in the LDCC. The Operational Support Secretariat of Jobcentre Plus (Department of Work and Pensions) may assist in brokering these arrangements and will be invited to send a representative to the NDCC. (See Annex F - Contact List for details).

3.22 Additional technical staff from the following sources will also be considered:

7 Retired SVS technical staff

7 Veterinary students from veterinary colleges

7 Agricultural students

DEFRA LEGAL SERVICES

3.23 Legal Services Directorate General must be instructed at the start of an outbreak. It is important to have an established system for the handling of claims for matters such as compensation for slaughtered animals and unintentional damage to premises.

3.24 A Legal Liaison Unit will be immediately established in the NDCC to co-ordinate actions and evidence gathering between LSDG and the NDCC and the LDCCs. Additionally, a Legal Liaison Officer will be posted in each LDCC. Administrative staff will fill both the NDCC Legal Liaison Unit and the Legal Liaison Officers posts. LSDG will provide lawyers to the NDCC on a rota basis.

3.25 LSDG hold all templates for Orders and must be approached immediately a Declaratory Order is required.

VACCINATION TEAMS

Vets and team members responsible for vaccination

3.26 Upon confirmation of disease, ADAS, the current contractor responsible for emergency vaccination will be notified by the Head of SVS CP Division to set its plans in action to establish the required numbers of vets and team members within the agreed time.

Lay Vaccinators

3.27 To ensure that emergency vaccination could be implemented without delay in any future outbreak, Defra is currently making arrangements, subject to public consultation, for the use of lay vaccinators to be permitted by orders made under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 and the Medicines Act 1968.

INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

3.28 High level involvement of other government departments, executive agencies and stakeholders is defined in Section 6 - the Strategic Level section of this plan. This will be confirmed by the Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) and may change as necessary. The Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will ensure that representatives of other government departments, operational partners and those affected by the disease and measures taken to control it are invited to form part of the NDCC.

3.29 DVMs will engage with local stakeholders as part of their routine emergency-preparedness arrangements and, where possible, include them in the planning and implementation of regular local exercises. DVMs must establish strong links with their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all key local agencies as the co-ordination point for emergency response. It is also essential that DVMs have established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers, Trading Standards Officers, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency. All these agencies must know and understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an outbreak. It is also important that all those that would be affected an outbreak including representatives of the farming industry, rural businesses, local community groups and those concerned with promoting tourism are engaged and involved, as appropriate in exercises.

3.30 The regular animal health stakeholder meetings will be upgraded in the event of an outbreak under the chairmanship of the Animal Health Minister [or as necessary by the Chief Veterinary Officer or the Director Animal Health deputising for him] and meet more frequently. Representatives of key stakeholder organisations from outside the agriculture and the food sectors will be invited to attend in order to embrace wider countryside interests. The possibility of having separate sub-groups to look at particular issues in greater depth (e.g. trade, countryside access, tourism, etc.) will be kept under review, according to the scale of the outbreak.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Veterinary training

3.31 All new veterinary entrants to the SVS attend a one-day course on exotic viral diseases at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, in addition to general and specific training related to all their work areas. This includes training in notifiable disease procedures. Selected individuals also attend specific post-graduate training, e.g. in epidemiology. Courses are held, as required, to ensure adequate numbers of trained people across the country.

Private Sector Veterinary Training

3.32 The current review of Local Veterinary Inspectors (LVIs) referred to at paragraph 3.6 is considering the enhanced training of LVIs both in everyday and emergency situations.

AHDO training in key emergency procedures

3.33 DVMs will identify individual Animal Health Divisional Office (AHDO) staff to undertake key emergency roles in line with the job roles outlined in SVS instructions. They will ensure these staff are fully trained and equipped to undertake their respective roles and that their ‘everyday’ objectives include reference to the key responsibilities required.

Induction training

3.34 Managers must ensure that new staff recruited into LDCCs or the NDCC during an outbreak receive induction training covering at least their roles and health and safety procedures. The Director SVS and DVMs will ensure their permanent staff are familiar with this contingency plan, the relevant local office contingency plans, SVS instructions, and business process maps.

3.35 For key personnel, this will centre on the job descriptions within this plan. Desk instructions for key posts will be available in AHDOs. For other individuals recruited to support an LDCC, a brief outline job description must be drafted. Managers must take time to describe the jobholder’s duties, offer support and review the job role regularly. Managers should consider establishing a ‘buddying’ system, whereby new recruits work alongside existing jobholders to learn their job.

3.36 ADAS will train vets and team members recruited to carry out vaccination in on-farm procedure and bio-security procedures. Additionally, specialised training in vaccination, tagging and data recording will be provided. All external contractors will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity Protocols. All local recruits to vaccination teams must meet, and sign that they comply with, specified criteria including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the programme, during the programme and for 3 days after completion.

Media Training

3.37 DVMs/RODs/HsVS should already have received appropriate media training, in order to deal effectively with the intense media interest surrounding an outbreak. If not, a short two day course, organised by Communications Directorate in conjunction with an outside training company, uses broadcast journalists and a film crew to enable participants to deliver professional standard broadcast interviews.

Contingency Planning Exercises

3.38 This plan and the detailed instructions and local plans will be regularly tested at both local and national levels through simulation exercises using the key personnel identified. Stakeholders will be involved in these exercises. It is intended that all stakeholders should be aware of Defra’s emergency procedures and be fully involved in their on-going development.

HEALTH AND SAFETY AND STAFF WELFARE

3.39 The Defra Departmental Health and Safety Unit (DHSU) and VRD Safety Team are the key safety professionals who must be involved in all aspects of operational planning. They will ensure that all LDCCs have a named safety professional to provide competent advice at all stages of operations; as far as is operationally possible this individual will be located in the LDCC and it is expected that provision will be made for this. DVMs and RODs must ensure that the competent safety person is included as part of their management team.

3.40 The Departmental Health and Safety Manager will operate as part of the Operations Cell in the NDCC, providing health and safety advice at the strategic level.

3.41 All staff should be made aware of Defra’s Welfare Service which can provide support and guidance in individual cases of stress of hardship.

3.42 A strategic health and safety plan in support of these arrangements has been produced by Defra and is detailed in Annex L of this document. All relevant personnel must follow these arrangements.

3.43 As part of the management of the vaccination operation ADAS (as the current contractor) will establish a Health and Safety Team. This will consist of a Manager and 2 other trained H&S consultants. This team will produce risk assessments for pre-vaccination visits by vets, for farm vaccinators, on handling facilities and maintain the necessary documentation to accompany this. ADAS will comply with best practice and all relevant provisions, whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and safety at work.

ACCOMMODATION

Access to accommodation, IT and telephony infrastructure

3.44 DVMs will identify and regularly review the availability of potential LDCC sites in liaison with BEM Division. BEMD has in place Facilities Management Contracts covering all of England and Wales through which temporary and other accommodation can be provided. DVMs should also maintain details of suppliers and contractors of temporary accommodation.

3.45 Additionally, a range of suitable sites are currently being investigated for use as vaccination centres. In doing so, consideration will be given to the following factors:

7 good road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible, within the target area;

7 appropriate security systems (day and night);

7 parking;

7 office accommodation for management and administrative staff;

7 appropriate IT and telecoms facilities;

7 secure refrigerated storage facilities for vaccine;

7 storage facilities for equipment (vaccination kits, personal protection equipment, footbaths, buckets, tagging and inspection equipment, etc.;

7 facilities for mixing, storage and safe disposal of disinfectant;

7 suitable area for plunge disinfection of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and subsequent drying;

7 suitable area for vaccination team dispatch.

3.46 Modular office accommodation will also be made available, depending in circumstances, on a call off basis for use as vaccination centres if required. It is envisaged that each vaccination centre will be accompanied by smaller satellite centres that will exist on a smaller scale.

3.47 The National Disease Control Centre will be in London. A room in Defra’s building at 1A Page Street is equipped with the necessary facilities needed to establish the control centre immediately an outbreak is confirmed. However, it is realised that in the event of a rapid escalation of an outbreak it would be necessary to have access to more space. In this event, BEMD could relocate the NDCC to the 7^th and 8^th floors as they have the requisite infrastructure in place. BEMD will therefore be kept fully informed of the likely escalation of the disease in order that they can enact plans for the relocation of staff and the provision of adequate desking, telephony, etc.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DATA SYSTEMS

3.48 The provision of IT hardware and corporate software (Defra EDEN) is the responsibility of Information Technology Directorate (ITD). Additional hardware and software can be quickly supplied through arrangements with Defra’s IT partners. ITD also has detailed plans to ensure IT resilience and Business Continuity.

Disease Control System (DCS)

3.49 The FMD Disease Control System (DCS) is the key Management Information System to be used in the event of an outbreak in the near future. It provides the system for recording all actions taken to control the disease in relation to each premises affected and for providing reports on the progress of the disease and its management. DVMs will ensure that all their AHDO staff are familiar with the functionality of DCS, requesting additional staff training from SVS IT Branch as appropriate.

3.50 Preventative contingency measures for system failure of FMD DCS are in place at the national level. These include the use of a cluster server which enables mirroring between two web servers and databases. This will ensure that should one fail, the second will take over. In addition, the back up routine that is in place means that the risk of data loss in cases of total failure is minimal.

3.51 A system for the tracing of animals - VTVS, updated and enhanced during the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease to take account of vehicle and personnel movements, is used for tracings required on a day to day basis. A project to review further tracings work has been initiated, with a view to encompassing both endemic and exotic diseases.

3.52 An improved Exotic Disease Control System (ExDCS), that will enable the task of dealing with any serious animal disease outbreak to be undertaken as efficiently as possible and which will support procedures to assist the veterinary surveillance team in proactive measures, is being developed.

3.53 The goal of the ExDCS project is to create a system to collect, collate and validate animal disease data. The system will facilitate the process of exotic notifiable disease management and control, provide reliable management information to users at all levels and inform Government policy on animal health and welfare. The system is being designed to deal with more than one concurrent disease.

3.54 The ExDCS project aims to interface with other Defra projects currently under development ensuring reliable and non-duplication of data.

Financial System

3.55 A project team is developing a generic financial system which will ensure that financial information is collected in the most efficient manner to meet accountancy requirements and the requirements of auditors. This system will be operational during ‘peacetime’, therefore ensuring staff familiarity, with the facility to ramp-up during an emergency. An interim facility will be in place by summer 2003 and in the event of an outbreak could be brought into use before then with the new system being developed thereafter.

3.56 The new system will be part of the Defra Corporate Finance System and will be installed in all AHDOs to be used in peace time for normal business.

PROCUREMENT

General - Procurement and Commercial Contracting Contingency Plan

3.57 Detailed instructions and guidance on procurement and commercial contracting covering the acquisition of goods, works and services; and the role of the Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD) can be found in the PCD Contingency Plan which is available for internal use.

3.58 PCD are responsible for ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods, services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic examination.

3.59 The PCD contingency plan provides contact details for all nominated PCD personnel. The Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify the Director of Purchasing and Supply if alert state AMBER is declared so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby. Sources of supply for these procurement personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency situation.

3.60 The PCD contingency plan sets out the procurement resources that will be mobilised at tactical level to form Procurement Emergency Response Teams (PERT) under the direction of Defra’s Director of Purchasing and Supply or his/her nominated representatives. PCD will provide a procurement cell in the NDCC within 8 hours.

3.61 PCD will ensure that best practice guidance is available to AHDOs and LDCCs covering the requirements from the period from confirmation of the outbreak until the PERT team arrives, including the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and letting.

3.62 Within 72 hours PCD will provide a PERT team in an LDCC to manage the procurement and commercial activities for that office. The PERT unit will include a Commercial/Procurement Manager, Contracts Manager, Purchasing Manager, Quantity/Claims Surveyor, Field Store Manager and Field Manager. Forensic accountants will be engaged prior to receipt and approval of supplier/contractor invoices.

3.63 All contracts and commercial arrangements put in place after declaration of an emergency situation will be let in accordance with delegated authorities determined by Defra’s Director of Finance in consultation with Defra’s Director of Purchasing and Supply.

National/Regional/Local Call-Off Contracts and Supply Contingency Arrangements

3.64 PCD and AHDOs will put in place national/regional/local contingency contracts and supply contingency arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency. These suppliers will be vetted and subjected to regular review and appraisal by PCD to ensure their validity in the event of an outbreak.

3.65 These contracts and arrangements will be comprehensive in coverage of all the relevant supply chains and include slaughter and disposal, shepherds and gatherers and ancillary equipment; carcass pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification and mobile detoxification units; slurry treatment, management and disposal; lagoon and environmental protection measures; electrical works and technical services associated with discrete supply chains; e.g. dairy engineers. A list of call-off contracts and contingency supply arrangements is available for internal use.

3.66 Supplementary lists of preferred and vetted suppliers for use in an emergency situation are available for internal use. These suppliers are a back-up to the contingency contracts already in place and are likely to be engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in number of outbreaks or geographically. The PERT team will be responsible for putting robust contracts in place with these suppliers should the extent of the outbreak require additional supply.

3.67 For each AHDO a list of transport companies is provided indicating the number and type of vehicles that the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies’ ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

3.68 Details of contracts placed and preferred vetted suppliers available to AHDOs is on the PCD webpage for internal use. DVMs should liaise closely with PCD to ensure timely, scaleable and appropriate supply arrangements in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak. PCD emergency contacts and their details are available for internal use.

FINANCIAL CONTROL

NDCC Head of FMD Finance

3.69 NDCC Head of FMD Finance will be appointed by the Defra Finance Director immediately following confirmation of disease to be responsible for establishing the FMD Finance Team in the NDCC and for the provision of a Finance Manager to each LDCC. They are also responsible for issuing guidance, in accordance with departmental policy, on accounting policies, financial databases, audit trails, desk instructions and checklists on financial controls including:

7 Roles and responsibilities of Finance Managers (LDCC and NDCC) - and reporting responsibilities which are set out in SVS instructions;

7 Authorisation levels for payments, delegations, management checking, write-off, over payment procedures in accordance with the department’s Finance Manual and Government Accounting;

7 Policy on the retention of records;

7 Chart of accounts, cost centre codes and objective codes;

7 Fraud guidelines in accordance with the department’s policy including the process of dealing with allegations of fraud;

7 Budgeting, estimates and the monitoring of expenditure;

7 Liaison with the National Audit Office (NAO), European Union (EU) and internal auditors;

7 Liaison with the Procurement Team;

7 Liaison with Defra’s Accountancy Services Division (ASD) and Director of Finance and HM Treasury;

7 Provision of regular financial information.

Finance Managers, LDCCs

3.70 LDCC Finance Managers are responsible for managing all financial activity in the LDCC and for providing financial advice to the Regional Operations Director (ROD) and Divisional Operations Manager (DOM) including:

7 Authorising certified contractor invoices for payment;

7 Ensuring suitable records are maintained relating to all financial transactions;

7 Authorising travel & subsistence claims, accommodation costs, other requests for re-imbursement of staff costs and TVI fees;

7 Arranging financial procedures training of finance staff and managers within LDCC;

7 Initial Scrutiny of Compensation Claims for slaughter and for items seized and destroyed.

Role of Finance Officers

3.71 NDCC Head of FMD Finance will ensure close communication between FMD Finance, Accounting Services Division, Defra Finance Director and HM Treasury. There will be regular meetings of all appropriate members of FMD Finance, ASD and Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD). These meetings are the forum to raise issues (e.g.- Overpayments, VAT) which require financial policy and procedural advice.

3.72 On confirmation of an outbreak, Head of FMD Finance will submit a request for funding to HM Treasury via Financial Management & Information Division (FMID) and the Finance Director. Both Finance Director and HM Treasury will be provided with a financial report on actual expenditure incurred on a regular basis.

3.73 During an outbreak, there will be initial meetings with the National Audit Office, EU Auditors and Defra auditors to:

a) inform them of the role and responsibilities of the teams involved in the eradication process;

b) explain the approach to tackle the emergency situation.

3.74 FMD Finance is responsible for providing regular reports to the auditors on actual expenditure incurred during the outbreak and for responding to audit reports as appropriate, submitting EU claims for reimbursement of costs (in accordance with the EU Regulations) and communicating with EU auditors as and when required.

EQUIPMENT AND STORES

National minimum stocking levels

3.75 Minimum contingency stocks, designed to cope with the stores requirements of 100 Veterinary Inspectors, will be held at VLA Weybridge. Under the terms of the Service Level Agreement, these items can be provided where required within defined time limits.

Divisional minimum stocking levels

3.76 Each AHDO is required to hold or have immediate access to sufficient equipment to deal with up to 10 disease outbreaks in the first 48 hours, including provision for equipping up to 20 additional Veterinary Inspectors. Stock levels are managed by designated local staff, who have day to day responsibility for monitoring availability and serviceability of stores. They will be responsible for using the generic stock control database, once it has been rolled out.

Stores to supply vaccination teams

3.77 Stores of equipment to supply vaccination teams and vaccination centres are maintained equally between two sites. At present, there is enough equipment to supply 50 vaccination teams (each consisting of a 1 vaccinator, 1 ear tag reader/tagger and 1 ear tag recorder) - the initial number of teams required to be provided by ADAS under the terms of the present contract with provision for this number to be ramped up depending on circumstances. Call-off contracts are in place to obtain additional equipment (e.g. additional vaccine guns and needles). This equipment will be subject to quality control checks in accordance with a quality management protocol by stores managers.

3.78 Call off contracts for mobile cattle/sheep/pig handling facilities are currently being put in place.

3.79 Upon the establishment of vaccination centre(s) Defra will arrange, through its contract with a transport firm, for sufficient equipment to be dispatched to the vaccination centre for use by ADAS by the fourth day after the first case has been confirmed.

SECTION 4 - Key Operations

EMERGENCY VACCINATION

Introduction

4.1 There are various drivers which will contribute towards the decision on whether to adopt an emergency vaccination strategy against FMD, and if so whether the animals should subsequently be killed or not. The Government’s preferred approach is that emergency vaccination should be on the basis of ‘vaccinate to live’ wherever possible. The full range of options and the factors which the Government will take into consideration in the event of a future outbreak are contained in full in the Decision Tree. This covers the consideration to be given to rare breeds and zoo animals.

Current operational arrangements

4.2 During the 2001 Foot and Mouth disease outbreak ADAS were commissioned to develop a programme for the emergency vaccination of cattle in parts of Cumbria and Devon. ADAS has since been retained to provide operational support for emergency FMD vaccination (vets and vaccination teams working under State Veterinary Service direction) until such time as Defra is able to let a formal contract to cover this operation - probably in early Autumn 2003. The following arrangements therefore provide an interim framework for implementation, which can be amended to form a specific implementation plan dependent on each set of circumstances as necessary.

Timing

4.3 The present arrangements provide for a 9 day lead in time, although arrangements are in hand for this to be reduced to a 5 day lead in. As emergency vaccination is to be considered as an option from the start of any future FMD outbreak, ADAS will be placed on standby by the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division as soon as disease is confirmed, at which time they will recruit, train and locate teams to be ready to commence vaccination. Within this time period, the particular strain of the FMD virus would need to be identified (up to two days) and the vaccine would need to be formulated (four days) ready for dispatch to the vaccination centres.

4.4 Veterinary advice to Ministers will be based on epidemiological evidence and it is unlikely to be immediately available. It is probable that the time necessary for veterinary assessment of epidemiological data, the use of the Decision Tree and the development of advice on the strategic deployment of vaccination means that it is unlikely that vaccination will start five days after the first outbreak.

Operational Process

4.5 This is set out in full at Annex D.

ANIMAL WELFARE

4.6 Consideration will be given to setting up, at earliest opportunity, an animal welfare forum, chaired by a Minister, with representatives of the RSPCA, Compassion in World Farming and the Humane Slaughter Association. This would enable points of specific welfare concern to be brought readily and quickly to Ministers’ attention and Ministers to explain the implications for welfare of their disease control policies.

4.7 Provisions for ensuring the welfare of animals on-farm, at markets or in transit (at the time of movement controls being imposed) are detailed in SVS Instructions Chapters 31-34. Slaughter or killing must be carried out in accordance with the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 (Inset 31 refers). Provisions for emergency slaughter on farm for poor welfare are detailed in SVS Instructions, Chapter 32.G. Procedures for slaughter/killing for disease control purposes are detailed in SVS Instructions Chapter 3 Section L.

4.8 Animal Movement Licensing Unit hold suitable licence templates for the movement of animals and instructions for their issue and use if movement restrictions are imposed. Animal Welfare Policy Division holds copies of advice to stock-keepers to assist them in maintaining welfare if movement restrictions are imposed.

4.9 The needs of animals and their welfare will be given early consideration in the event of a disease outbreak or emergency.

4.10 Where possible animals should be kept alive and healthy where they are. This is first of all the responsibility of the farmer, but there may be a need for Government assistance possibly in the form of a fodder scheme and/or licensed movement scheme. Any animal welfare disposal scheme would be an option of very last resort as it is clearly undesirable to slaughter animals unless absolutely necessary. The Government would not offer compensation for animals slaughtered under such a scheme, but would provide free collection and disposal. The Head of Livestock Strategy Division in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare Policy Division and Animal Welfare Veterinary Division will examine the options for such schemes and looking at plans for implementing them.

VALUATION

4.11 Since 2001 a new list of valuers has been approved to undertake livestock valuations on behalf of Defra. This list is maintained by the SVS and reviewed annually. Each valuer has been sent instructions for carrying out valuations. In the event of an outbreak of FMD, a letter will be sent to all these valuers notifying them of the outbreak and enclosing the latest version of Defra’s instructions for carrying out valuations.

4.12 LDCCs would contact individual valuers on the list as necessary to deal with each premises where compulsory slaughter is to take place. No other valuers will be used.

4.13 In the event of an animal disease outbreak, Animal Movements and Exotic Disease Division will call upon the services of the four Monitor Valuers who have been appointed (these appointments will be reviewed regularly, at least every 3 years). Initially the Monitor Valuers will attend Defra offices in London to advise on further instructions and guidance to issue to valuers (reflecting species affected, area etc.) to try to ensure uniformity in valuations and fairness to both livestock owners and taxpayers. Depending on the extent of the outbreak the Monitor Valuers could be situated in London or in/near LDCCs.

4.14 A review of all the animal disease compensation arrangements is being undertaken with a view to rationalisation and simplification. Part of this process will be to look at the case for compulsory standard valuations. This would remove the need for individual valuation in many or most cases. Such a system would help speed up the slaughtering process and would ensure a greater degree of uniformity in animal valuation.

RESTRICTED INFECTED AREAS

4.15 A Restricted Infected Area (RIA) will be declared with a minimum radius of 10km around infected premises. This will require increased levels of biosecurity on farms, C&D for vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms and movement controls for animals, animal products, feed and bedding. Guidance on establishing a RIA, location of cleansing and disinfection sites, etc. is being developed with EA and local authority input for inclusion in SVS instructions.

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE

4.16 Anyone coming into contact with livestock or their waste runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.

4.17 Revised Biosecurity guidance which reflects the provisions of the Animal Health Act 2002 is currently out for consultation and can be found on the Defra website at:

www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/biosecurity/guidance.pdf

DISPOSAL

Disposal Hierarchy

4.18 The current disposal hierarchy is:-

1. Commercial incineration (not air curtain incinerators)

2. Rendering

3. Licensed commercial landfill (may need direction from the Secretary of State)

4.19 This is a change from the Department of Health guidelines (published 24/04/2001) which set out an agreed disposal hierarchy as follows:-

1. Rendering

2. Commercial incineration (not air curtain incinerators)

3. Licensed commercial landfill

4. Pyre burning

5. Mass burial at Defra-owned sites and On-farm burial

This is because of policy developments and increasing environmental constraints.

4.20 Decisions on disposal options will take into account assessments of risks from TSEs and latest SEAC guidance.

4.21 A number of strategies, such as emergency vaccination, are now in place which could reduce the numbers of animals to be disposed of in any future outbreak and this should mean that these three disposal routes would be sufficient. Although mass pyres will not be used in the future, the use of alternative methods of disposal routes such as on-farm pyres and on-farm or mass burial cannot be completely ruled out if demand exceeds the capacity of the preferred options of incineration/rendering and licensed commercial landfill. Any decisions to utilise these disposal routes will be taken in consultation with key stakeholders and appropriate environmental and public health assessments will be made at each disposal location.

4.22 Defra recognises that there are a number of factors that may impact on the disposal hierarchy in the future. These include the implementation of possible new environmental or waste management legislation and changes to capacity and accessibility of the disposal outlets. The hierarchy will be regularly reviewed, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to take account of these issues. New technologies and facilities will also be reviewed on a regular basis.

Incineration

4.23 Agreement in principle has been obtained with nine animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and Wales, to dispose of FMD carcasses. Contractual arrangements are being completed.

4.24 Incineration capacity is limited and will only be able to deal with small isolated outbreaks for the first few days of a new outbreak or disease recrudescence.

4.25 As soon as a decision to slaughter has been taken, or where slaughter is likely, the DVM or LDCC Disposals Manager must telephone:-

7 The disposal team in SVS Contingency Planning Division (which will become part of the NDCC);

7 The Rural Payments Agency (RPA) who, in consultation with the disposal team, will allocate the disposal outlet taking account of location, number and type of stock and spare capacity at each plant - see contacts below;

7 The national transport co-ordinator (If the call-off agreement for transport is to be used - see transport section below) who can, in the interim, manage the transport required (available at 24 hours notice).

4.26 The recipient DVM (for the disposal site) must be informed before the transport leaves the IP.

- Transport must not leave the slaughter site until it has been fully cleansed and disinfected. All areas must therefore continue to have access to detox units.

- In the event of problems, a member of the Disposals team should be contacted - see contact details below.

- Any queries related to biosecurity at disposal sites can be dealt with by Vet Ops based in the NDCC who will consult Veterinary Policy teams within HQ in consultation with the DVM.

- The sending DVM must ensure that vehicles are properly cleansed and disinfected and that the haulage contractors and accompanying personnel follow strict biosecurity procedures. All vehicles used must be sealed and leak-proof and accompanied by an escort.

4.27 DVMs will liaise with the relevant local authorities and EA (or SEPA) to agree access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

Rendering

4.28 A call-off agreement with a major rendering company has been agreed to ensure a minimum lead-in time should there be an outbreak of disease. Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak, using the RPA as brokers. Total weekly capacity in the order of 15,000 tonnes per week could be made available. Transport will be provided separately through regional contractors with hauliers, renderers and the knacker industry.

4.29 DVMs will ensure they are aware which rendering facilities are available to them in the event of an animal disease outbreak. The recipient DVM (for the disposal site) must be informed before the transport leaves the IP.

4.30 The arrangements and requirements in 4.19 and 4.20 above regarding liaison, communication, biosecurity and transport must also be followed.

Licensed Commercial Landfill sites

4.31 EU Animal By-Products regulation may preclude this option in 2003 and beyond, or limit the number of suitable landfill sites, although Defra is currently discussing a number of derogations with the European Commission. The disposal team are discussing, in consultation with the EA, SEPA, ESA and local authorities, structured agreements and national operational protocols for the use of licensed landfill sites. The Secretary of State may seek powers of direction for the use of commercial landfill sites in the event of an emergency. Waste Management Division is responsible for drafting the necessary statutory instruments.

4.32 DVMs will ensure they are aware which licensed landfill facilities are available to them during an animal disease outbreak and liaise with EA (or SEPA) and local authorities to discuss access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

On-Farm Burial

4.33 If incineration and rendering capacity has been exhausted it may be necessary to consider on-farm burial. In this event Defra will consult with EA (or SEPA) to ensure that no burial is undertaken until an appropriate risk assessment has been completed and that any burial is undertaken in accordance with the relevant EU and national regulations so as to minimise the risk of environmental and public health impact.

Pyre Burning

4.34 Pyre burning would not normally be considered and only in exceptional circumstances. If it is decided that pyre burning has to be utilised on a limited basis, Defra will follow the guidelines developed by the Department of Health in 2001 together with the SVS instructions. In preparing for pyre burning, Defra will consult with local authorities, the Health Protection Agency and EA (or SEPA), to ensure environmental and public health impacts are minimised.

Transport

4.35 In consultation with the disposal team, the local DVM and disposal manager will decide whether to use local transport contract arrangements or to utilise the transport call-off agreement in place with 2 national haulage companies. The duty officer will deal with requests for transport. On confirmation of an outbreak, a national transport logistics manager, supported by a regional transport manager(s), will be appointed and will take over responsibility for transport logistics and tasking from the local DVM.

SEROLOGY

Serology capacity - Surveillance

4.36 Serological surveillance may be carried out for a number of reasons, such as epidemiology, but its main use is likely to be as part of the surveillance of protection and surveillance zones following an outbreak, prior to declaring them free from disease. Serology surveillance in support of lifting restrictions should not commence until at least 21 days following preliminary cleansing and disinfection of an infected premises.

4.37 Defra has an agreement with the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) that they will provide serological testing capacity for FMD on a contingency basis of 120,000 samples per week at three laboratories. The first laboratory would be ready to start testing within 3 weeks with an initial capacity of 7,000 tests, 20,000 tests in the second week and reaching full capacity of 40,000 in the third week. The second laboratory would be operational within 6 weeks and a third laboratory within 8 weeks with the same capacity build up. Full capacity of 120,000 tests per week would be reached by the 10^th week.

4.38 The Institute for Animal Health (IAH) Pirbright provides the diagnostic testing service for FMD. It also carries out additional tests (i.e. VNT) on positive or inconclusive serology samples submitted by VLA.

4.39 Personnel required to undertake blood sampling will be recruited and trained under the co-ordination of the Veterinary Resource Division. Personnel could be drawn from veterinary/agricultural students and from local Job Centres.

Transport of samples

4.40 DVMs will ensure they have access to the best means of transporting blood samples during an animal disease outbreak as set out in SVS operational instructions.

RURAL STRESS ACTION PLAN WORKING GROUP

4.41 The Department recognises that any future outbreak may result in significant social, economic and personal emotional impact. These issues will be addressed through consultation with the Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group to ensure that:

7 Contingency Plans are drawn up to include the ‘human dimension’ of an outbreak;

7 Provide for appropriate feedback and consultation during an outbreak to address issues that arise;

7 The issues of de-briefing and aftercare, relevant both to the individuals affected and to the staff involved in measures taken to control an outbreak are addressed.

4.42 Contacts will be made via the RSAP Working Group with support organisations at a local level and issues such as referral procedures, confidentiality and debriefing for staff addressed.

4.43 The Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group brings together, under Defra’s chairmanship, representatives of organisations that make an important contribution to the rural support sector, namely the Rural Stress Information Network (RSIN), Royal Agricultural Benevolent Institution, (RABI) Farm Crisis Network (FCN), Arthur Rank Centre (ARC), Samaritans, Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB), National Farmers’ Union (NFU), Tenant Farmers’ Association (TFA), Country Land and Business Association (CLA), Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) and Department of Health (DoH).

4.44 This partnership, or combinations of the membership, is reproduced at the regional and local level to address the needs of the rural community including supporting those in distress. County bases support “groups” are facilitated by RSIN and FCN, whose organisations and volunteer members provide information, signposting and, in some cases, telephone helplines. The groups draw on the expertise of the wider partnerships that the network fosters, and there are various “entry points” for enquiries and assistance.

4.45 Farming Help is the banner under which RSIN, RABI, FCN and Samaritans promote confidential help for all in the farming community, and contact with any of these via the national telephone numbers will offer callers a wide range of guidance, assistance and support.

4.46 Farmers and others in the rural community are increasingly aware of the support network, and some Defra staff (RDS, BCMS, Government Offices and RPAs) have been drawn into RDS’s Rural Support Operational Guidance, part of which is designed to increase awareness of the role of national and local rural support networks.

CLEANSING AND DISINFECTION OF AFFECTED PREMISES

4.47 Government funding of secondary cleansing and disinfection will be subject to review and separate consultation as part of the consideration of the future funding of disease control measures. Primary cleansing and disinfection will remain the responsibility of Defra, and will be charged to Defra.

4.48 Detailed guidance on the procedures for cleansing and disinfecting affected premises is available at SVS Instructions Chapter 3, Section N. The EA or SEPA must be consulted before any disposal of disinfectant or seized material is considered. All disposals will be subject to a prior risk assessment and will be undertaken in accordance with EU and national regulations and guidance.

RODENT CONTROL

4.49 Rodent Control will be carried out on infected premises, on behalf of Defra, until the disease risk from rodents has been minimised (e.g. carcasses and potentially infected feed have been removed during the Cleansing and Disinfection procedures). This control will be by the National Wildlife Management Team (NWMT) and will be co-ordinated nationally with staff operating within, and reporting to, the Biosecurity Unit of the LDCCs. Thereafter responsibility for rodent control will revert to the owner or occupier of the infected place.

SECTION 5 - Key Operations

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND DISEASE CONTROL INFORMATION

5.1 DVMs will ensure that appropriate staff are familiar with the Management Information reports of the Disease Control System (DCS). This will ensure the accurate and timely collation of statistical information for circulation to the NDCC and within the LDCC itself.

5.2 RODs are required to submit daily situation reports (Sitreps) to the NDCC Operations cell that will then circulate them to colleagues as appropriate and draw on them for the daily NDCC Report. These are required by 1800 hours. The sitrep format can be found at Annex K. The NDCC will collate information from the RODs, from DCS and other appropriate sources to produce a daily evening report on the disease and its management and control, for Ministers, the Civil Contingencies Committee and senior officials.

5.3 It is essential that the collection and processing of data within the NDCC and LDCC spheres of command is done without delay. The supply of accurate management information to the tactical and strategic command levels is of critical importance. All personnel involved with the collection, collation and processing of this information should be made aware of this and understand its importance.

5.4 Case Officers must be deployed to ensure that the data required by the strategic and tactical levels is captured on-farm as soon as is practicable. The outline requirements for this are as follows:

- Animals slaughtered;

- Performance against 24 hour slaughter target (if farm is IP);

- Animals disposed;

- Disposal route;

- Cleansing and Disinfection - when primary C&D complete.

COMMUNICATIONS

Media - also Annex H

5.5 News releases will be co-ordinated through Communications Directorate. Defra Press Office will take all national media inquiries, organise press briefings and interviews with Ministers, vets and officials. If a central governmental response is initiated, the NCC will take the lead, working closely with Defra and other departments with a shared interest e.g. Environment Agency and Department of Culture, Media and Sport. The Government News Network will do likewise in the regions.

5.6 DVMs/RODs will work with their local Government News Network (GNN) representative to ensure that accurate and timely briefings are given to the media and stakeholders.

Website

5.7 Defra’s FMD website is a key source of information in the event of an outbreak of disease. Outline pages are being prepared in advance so that an information site can be established as soon as possible in an outbreak. This is the responsibility of the Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Disease Policy Division working in co-operation with the Head of News Media in Communications Directorate.

5.8 The site will include:

7 A full list of Infected Premises (IPs) updated daily. This will not include Dangerous Contact premises (DCs) or premises slaughtered on suspicion of disease (SOS) for data protection reasons.

7 Full details of Infected Areas and Restricted Infected Areas including interactive maps.

7 Full details of disease control measures and restrictions.

7 Advice to farmers, local authorities, and other rural stakeholders.

7 Advice on rural activities.

7 Links to relevant websites (e.g. other Government departments and Agencies, Meat and Livestock Commission, English Nature, National Farmers Union, Open Britain and Local Authorities).

Helplines

5.9 The Defra General Helpline 08459 335577 will be prepared for intense public interest, by providing additional staff resources, establishing supplementary helplines and providing adequate briefing. Plans to escalate capacity are covered in Annex H.

Central Co-ordination

5.10 The Emergency Management Board meeting chaired by Defra’s Permanent Secretary on Day 1 will consider the need to engage CCC. A representative from the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat should attend this meeting to advise on Government-wide co-ordination. If CCC is engaged, it will need to consider whether to activate a central multi-disciplinary Communications Team to co-ordinate between Government departments and agencies. This will depend on an assessment of the scale and possible course of the outbreak and the extent of involvement of other Departments.

5.11 The CCS, in conjunction with OD Sec, will provide, within COBR, a suite of rooms capable of housing a 24/7 operation. Units would include a Crisis Management Unit, a Joint Assessments Cell (SAC) and a Government Liaison Team (GLT) which would include representatives from the main departments involved. CCS would provide the secretariat for CCC and CCC(O) meetings. The NCC, located at 10 Great George Street could provide daily rolling media briefs, take all media calls and centralise all press office functions. It could also contain web and internal communications specialists and would maintain a constant electronic link with the Defra briefing and knowledge network units.

PUBLICITY AND DISEASE AWARENESS

Notifiable Disease Awareness programmes

5.12 Headquarters and DVMs, working with Communications Directorate, are involved in awareness programmes: lectures/demonstrations to veterinary schools, veterinary practices and agricultural colleges; direct mailing to livestock producers and articles in the veterinary and farming press as appropriate; and frequent contact through testing, inspection and advisory visits to livestock producers and those working in ancillary industries including markets, slaughter houses and livestock transport.

SECTION 6 - Strategic Level Plan

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

6.1 Defra is lead Department for the control of Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks. This section relates to the strategic level structures and functions necessary for effective command, control and communications in the event of a disease outbreak.

6.2 The Strategic Plan defines the necessary structures, roles and responsibilities for those involved in the strategic level decision-making process.

6.3 The decision-making processes at strategic level will be focussed entirely on defining, reviewing and refining strategies for disease control, communications, disposal, relief and recovery. (See below for Defra Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee). The Strategic Group will direct the Tactical Group and will receive feedback on operational issues from stakeholders and from the operational command in order to inform further strategic decisions.

6.4 In the event of a confirmed outbreak of disease, Defra’s Management Board will meet as soon as possible (as detailed below) to ensure a rapid and appropriate response. The Management Board will confirm the need to establish the Civil Contingencies Committee. This will be triggered by the Permanent Secretary contacting the Head of Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

6.5 Whilst Defra will retain overall responsibility as lead department, if required the Civil Contingencies Committee(s) [CCC and CCC(O)] will adopt the strategic command and control and the assessment of the wider impact of the developing outbreak. It is responsible for reviewing and developing cross-departmental strategies, and in particular accounting for issues affecting the wider UK economy.

6.6 The Science Advisory Group (SAG) exists to ratify, challenge and guide the development of the control strategies that are implemented by Defra and its agents. It will also need to consider whether SAPER should be involved. The mechanisms for activating SAPER require the departmental Permanent Secretary or Chief Scientific Adviser to write to the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, or, in his absence the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, copied to the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser.

6.7 Stakeholders’ issues and concerns will be raised at separate meetings including the Rural Affairs Forums of the Government Offices in the Regions, and the issues will be tabled at CCC(O) by Defra representatives.

6.8 Tactical issues will be addressed at the daily Emergency Direction Group and by the National Disease Control Centre.

6.9 Operational decisions are devolved, in the main, to the Local Disease Control Centre lead by the Regional Operations Director.

Strategic Aims and Objectives

Aim: In the event of a confirmed case of FMD

To establish rapidly a command structure which enables a cross-departmental response and which gives clear strategic direction to the control effort.

Objectives: Strategic Group (Defra Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee)

7 Defra Management Board must give urgent consideration of the need to establish the Civil Contingencies Committee(s).

7 Gives clear strategic instructions and direction to the tactical level (Emergency Direction Group, daily communications meetings and National Disease Control Centre).

7 Provides strategy for direction of communications, within Defra, across wider Government and externally to the public.

7 Members of Defra Management Board are the principal advisors to Defra Secretary of State, Number 10 and the Civil Contingencies Committee.

7 Defra Management Board must ensure Defra’s business continuity arrangements, in particular the impact on departmental business as a result of the reallocation of staff to the control effort.

7 Defra Management Board must set and review departmental business priorities and give guidance on the reallocation of resources. This must be clearly communicated to managers and staff in the Department.

7 The Defra Management Board is responsible for ensuring the financial integrity of the control and recovery operations by establishing proper procurement, finance and audit procedures, in liaison with HM Treasury and the National Audit Office.

Structures and ‘Battle Rhythm’

Time	Event	Location	Attendees
0730 – 0800	NDCC Birdtable Meeting	NDCC Page Street	Key Strategic and Tactical personnel
0800 – 0830	Daily Communications Meeting	Conference Room LG20 Page Street	Minister, No.10, DG OSD (Chair) CVO, Dirs: FMD Ops, , Comms, DG LURA, [PUS]
0900 – 1000	Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) CCC(O)	COBR	Chair: CCS
1000 – 1100	Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC)	COBR	Chair: Defra Minister
1015 - 1045	Emergency Direction Group (Tactical Command)	Conference Room LG20 Page Street	DG OSD (Chair), Dirs: FMD Ops, Comms, Finance, Legal (A), Rural Affairs,
1130 - 1200	Media Briefing	Nobel House	Defra Minister, CVO, Defra CSA,
1200 – 1230	NDCC Birdtable Meeting	NDCC Page Street	All key Tactical personnel
1430 – 1500	Regional Operations Directors’ Teleconference	Page Street	Dir FMD Ops, RODs
1515 – 1600 (as necessary)	Defra Management Board	Room 806, Nobel House	Perm Sec, MB members,
As necessary	Animal Disease Policy Group	Page Street	Chair CVO
As necessary	Rural Issues Group	Nobel House	Chair DG LURA
As necessary	Science Advisory Group	Nobel House	Chair Defra CSA
1615 – 1715 (as necessary)	2^nd Emergency Direction Group (EDG)	Conference Room LG20 Page Street	DG OSD (Chair), Dirs: FMD Ops, Comms, Finance, Legal (A), Rural Affairs,
1800	ROD Sitreps due	NDCC
1900 - 1930	NDCC Birdtable	NDCC Page Street	All key Tactical personnel
2100 (approx)	NDCC Report compiled & circulated	NDCC	NDCC Management Information Cell

Key Strategic Structures and Roles:

Title	Defra Emergency Management Board
Purpose	The strategic decision-making body in Defra
Meets	Meets as soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease and then as necessary in Room 613, 9 Millbank, London
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or his representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of the Emergency Management Board and to consider the establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee. Thereafter the CVO will notify Management Board members as soon as practically possible (as per the Communications protocol of this plan). Timing: 15.00 as necessary, to avoid clashes with other meetings
Reports to	- Secretary of State and Defra Ministers - Reports forward to the Civil Contingencies Committee
Directs	Defra daily Emergency Direction Group
Core Membership	[Minister], Permanent Secretary (Chair), DG OSD (Deputy Chair) All Defra Directors General, Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, Directors: SVS, CD, Finance, [N.B. A minimum of DGOSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) is necessary]]
Other Members	Other Defra Directors (as invited)
Information received from	Birdtables, NDCC daily report, Animal Disease Policy Group, Science Advisory Group, Rural Issues Group, Civil Contingencies Committee, Emergency Direction Group report, Finance Report (from Director of Finance)
Tools	(Template for meeting provided below), Decision Tree for Control Strategies,
Objectives	- Liaise with Cabinet Office on input to the Civil Contingencies Committee (and who should Chair) - Consider advice/recommendations from Defra Emergency Direction Group - Agree appropriate strategies for disease control and their application, taking into account the impact of these upon the rural economy - If necessary, develop existing strategies in response to the developing disease situation and advice received from policy for a (Animal Disease Policy Group, Science Advisory Group) - Consider representations (via Directors) from Stakeholder Meetings when developing strategies - Horizon scanning for future scenarios that may have an impact on strategies This is NOT the forum for discussion of operational or tactical issues – these should be dealt with at the daily Emergency Direction Group
Output	- Emergency Management Board Report, (notes of key decisions on strategies, including background information) - and/or Minutes of meetings, - Requests for additional briefing, - Reports to Civil Contingencies Committee and Emergency Direction Group (requiring action)
Secretariat	Defra Permanent Secretary’s Office

Defra Emergency Management Board Meeting

Agenda

Chair: Permanent Secretary (or nominee [DG OSD])

Membership: [Minister], (DG OSD - Deputy Chair) All Directors General,

[Environment Agency, Countryside Agency], Directors: SVS, Communications, Finance.

[N.B. A minimum of DG OSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) is necessary]

1. Disease and Epidemiology - current situation.

2. Action taken and its implications.

3. Operational Organisation - current situation; move to CCC.

4. Proposals for future action (including communications internal and external).

5. Parliamentary/Devolved Administration Issues.

6. EU/International Issues.

7. Media/Communications Issues.

8. AOB.

9. Date/Time of Next Meeting.

Template for First Report to Defra Emergency Management Board Meeting

(see also AMED Notification Proforma NDI 1)

Chair: Permanent Secretary (or nominee [DG OSD])

Membership: [Minister], (DG OSD - Deputy Chair) All Directors General, Environment Agency, [Countryside Agency], Directors: SVS, AHW, CD, Finance.

[N.B. A minimum of DG OSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) are required for a quorum]

Issue: Report of Notifiable Exotic Animal Disease

(Suspected/Confirmed/Negative)

Facts: (Possible) diagnosis of-

Name of Disease:

Disease symptoms:

(use layman’s terms)

Samples taken to lab on:

(Diagnosis on basis of clinical symptoms or Lab test):

Name of Proprietor/Owner/Stockholders: (or ‘location’ for data protection issues)

Address:

Decisions taken/decisions to be taken

SVS Division Dealing:

Name of DVM (or their nominee):

Name of SVS Region Head of Veterinary Services:

Names of Policy Leads: - Confirmation of Disease:

- Vaccination:

Name of SVS HQ Lead:

Epidemiology:

Animals slaughtered:

Provide a summary of the disease outbreak:

Implementation of Contingency Plan - what action has been taken so far?

(Provide a summary of restrictions imposed, details of RIA, LDCC ramp-up, etc.)

Likely Scenarios: (Although limited information is likely to be available, should consider likely scenarios and their impact on the issues highlighted below, challenge assumptions, horizon scan for future risks likely to affect current strategies)

Issues:

Outline of Risks:

Are there adequate resources?

E.g. Vets

Administrators

Case Officers

Bleeders

DGs to consider release of (i) key personnel as identified in contingency arrangements, (ii) other personnel as requested

Version 3.0

Defra

FOREWORD

GLOSSARY

Section 1 - Background, Structures and Policies

Section 2 - Alert System & States of Alert

2.2 AMBER - Action on Suspicion of FMD

Section 3 - Resources

Page

Section 4 - Key Operations

Page

Annex A

ACPO

BCMS

BEMD

CA

C&D

CCC

CCC(O)

CCS

CD

CMO

COBR

Comms

CP

CSA

CSD

CVO

DARDNI

DC

DCMS

DCS

DCVO

Defra

DG

DGLS

DG LURA

DG OSD

DHSM

DHSU

DOH

DOM

DOT

DVM

DWP

EA

EC

EDG

EFRA

ESA

EU

FMD

FSA

GICS

GIS

GNN

GOs

H&S

HASANS

HOD

HMT

HQ

HR

HSE

HsVS

HVS

IAH Pirbright

IP

ITD

LA

LACORS

LASSA

LDCC

LGA

LSDG

LURA

LVI

MOD

MPs

NAO