|Memo To: Sen. Carl Levin [D MI]|
From: Jude Wanniski
Check Out David Kay
Iíve heard that you are planning to have the
Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee investigate Iraq, as
Chairman John Warner does not seem very enthusiastic about turning over
any rocks on this subject, fearing what may crawl out. While you are at
it, I would hope you might check out David Kay, who has been named by CIA
Director George Tenet to head up a team that will now fan out over Iraq in
search of those elusive weapons of mass destruction. On the surface, at
least, it seems to me that Kay has already been compromised -- if he worked
for the CIA at the same time he was a UN weapons inspector some years
back. Here is a column that appeared over the weekend on worldnetdaily.com
by Dr. Gordon Prather, who has had his eye on David Kay for several
months, wondering how he ever got to be an inspector in the first place.
As far as I can tell, Prather is the only observer who seems to know
whatís going on here. He is a nuclear physicist who was the army's chief
scientist in the Reagan years.
Hans Blix' Swan Song
June 28, 2003
watched Hans Blix on TV this week, either being interviewed by Charlie
Rose or on C-SPAN. You need to hear what Blix says with your own ears. The
media elite frequently perhaps deliberately incorrectly reports what he
Some had it that Blix, retiring this month as chairman of
the U.N. Monitoring and Verification Commission on Iraq, had blasted the
Bush-Cheney administration in those interviews.
Blix didn't blast Bush-Cheney, even though he justifiably could
"High level officials" -- in both the Bush-Cheney and
Clinton-Gore administrations -- and their media sycophants have been
waging a jihad against Blix for years, mostly for his stewardship from
1981 until 1997 as director general of the U.N. International Atomic
Because those officials wanted above
all else to depose Saddam Hussein, and they knew that most of us wouldn't
support a pre-emptive strike against Saddam unless we believed he was
about to nuke us in our jammies.
But, before leaving the IAEA,
Blix had reported that Saddam had never come close to producing enough
fissile material to make even one nuke and that his multi-billion-dollar
nuke-development program had been utterly destroyed, either in the Gulf
War or by the IAEA in the years thereafter.
So, the warhawks had
to discredit Blix. Incompetent. Hadn't discovered that Saddam Hussein had
an illicit nuke program before the Gulf War. Hadn't discovered, much less
destroyed, all the elements of it after the war.
ferreting out illicit nuke programs is not the IAEA's job. That's a job
for our "intelligence community," and their nuke assessments were as wrong
on the eve of Bush-Quayle's Operation Desert Storm as they are turning out
to be for Bush-Cheney's Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Which brings us
to attempts by David Kay to discredit his former boss, Hans Blix.
David Kay was a U.N. bureaucrat -- an IAEA section chief -- from
1983 until 1991. Then he served briefly, from April 1991 until January
1992, as deputy director of the IAEA Iraq Action Team.
the televised Iraqi-IAEA standoff in the parking lot?
There were reports that Kay was "fired" soon after "because of his
connections with the U.S. intelligence community."
interviews, Kay admitted that he made what he called a "Faustian bargain"
with the intelligence community:
"Once you were dealing in a
clandestine, competitive environment, you needed access to satellite
photography, access to signals intercept, access to measurements of
[radioactivity] leakage and contamination from the programs, so you could
identify where it is.
"Access to defectors -- who, after all, were
not defecting to the U.N.; they were defecting to national governments --
to use them.
"So, from the very beginning, you needed that
expertise; but I can say for myself personally -- and I'm really only
comfortable talking about myself -- although a number of us discussed this
in the early days, I realize it was always a bargain with the Devil --
Although Blix publicly denied that Kay was "fired,"
it's very clear that Blix would never have countenanced such "Faustian"
bargains by one of his underlings.
How did Kay repay Blix for
defending him? Well, he repeatedly testified before congressional
committees in the months preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom as to the
ineptness of Blix and the U.N. inspection regimes. Kay argued that Saddam
certainly had "weapons of mass destruction" that the UN inspectors would
never find and that it would ultimately be necessary to invade and occupy
Iraq to find them.
Wait a minute. Isn't that the same David Kay
that CIA Director Tenet has just put in charge of finding those WMDs that
even the U.S. occupation force has been searching for and can't find?
Yes, it is.
And didn't Kay just claim to have found an
important cache of nuke stuff that Blix and ElBaradei missed? Engineering
drawings for a "sub-critical" gas centrifuge, buried in 1991 before the
IAEA got to Iraq?
Yes, but Blix knew the Iraqis hadn't given him
all the drawings, and noted in his 1997 report:
the IAEA has assessed as credible Iraq's claim to have successfully
developed and tested a single cylinder sub-critical centrifuge machine
which could have been exploited to produced highly enriched uranium in
weapon-significant amounts, the recovery of the drawings would do little
to change the assessment of Iraq's capabilities in this area."
what was that assessment?
That Saddam had never come close to
producing enough fissile material to make even one