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ROYAL AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

"An effective national animal disease strategy is dependent on frequent objective review, and the allocation of appropriate resources to carry out that strategy," taking Foot and Mouth disease in the UK in 2001 as a case in point.

Christopher Stockdale

Supervisor: JOHN ALLISTON

This dissertation is submitted in part fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in MSc. of the Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester

The copyright of this dissertation belongs to the author under the terms of the United Kingdom Copyright Acts. Due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this dissertation.
I declare that the dissertation embodies the results of my own research or advanced studies and that it has been composed by myself. Where appropriate, I have made acknowledgement to the work of others.

Signed

Christopher Stockdale

Dated 7^th May 2003

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"An effective national animal disease strategy is dependent on frequent objective review, and the allocation of appropriate resources to carry out that strategy," taking Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK in 2001 as a case in point --
Christopher Stockdale, International Rural Development, (Sustainable Agricultural Systems), 2002-3.
Between 20^th February 2001 when Foot Mouth Disease (FMD) was confirmed in an abattoir in Essex, and 30^th September that year when the last case was diagnosed, the UK was at the epicentre of a Western European incursion of the virulent and globally pandemic 'Pan Asia' Serotype 'O' strain of FMD. After almost 20 years free of the disease, and even longer since the previous major outbreak in 1967/8, agricultural, veterinary and civil service awareness of and provision for such was found sorely wanting.

However, it transpired that warnings, both from European and World experts in FMD, including our own world-leading experts at the Institute for Animal Health and the World Reference Library (for FMD) at Pirbright, and, indeed, even from within the State Veterinary Service itself, had been given but only partially heeded!

Furthermore, the disease impacted upon a society markedly different to that of three decades previously. Fewer farmers worked larger farms with larger flocks and herds but less labour. Stock travelled greater distances to fewer abattoirs. Most especially, a greater proportion of the populace were urban, including, essentially, the elected Government, which latter appeared to be disinterested or even antagonistic to agriculture, farmers and rural Britain.

Increased environmental awareness had changed perceptions of (large) burning pyres, and BSE contra-indicated on-farm burial of stock. Vaccination, which had played a major role in ridding Europe of FMD was discussed, considered, but never used, as were several other recent technological developments.

It was apparent after a few weeks of 'war' with this virus that Ministerial and official pronouncements were often at very great variance to the perceived reality outside the window.

Following the loss of my stock to FMD on the 31^st of March 2001, and having spent many hours on the telephone seeking the Truth about the outbreak and this virus, I enrolled at the Royal Agricultural College in October 2001 to refresh and renew my education, credentials and qualifications to further pursue this quest.

This study is therefore a staging post in that process, doubtless incomplete but as thorough as the word limitation and time allowance permit, and will form the basis for ongoing work 'in the field', in both literal and figurative senses.

I resolved to approach my unanswered questions through the hypothesis "An effective national animal disease strategy is dependent on frequent objective review, and the allocation of appropriate resources to carry out that strategy," taking Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK in 2001 as a case in point.
The research Methodology has been part desk-top study, part 'gum-shoe' research, utilising newspapers, academic papers, journals, magazines, books and Parliamentary documents, Radio 4 ('Farming Today'), Television and Video recordings, private conversations and interviews, both by telephone and in the flesh, attending lectures, meetings and Conferences, by virtue of representing a stakeholder body to Smith Square, and by extensive use of the Internet, the www.warmwell.com website as a starting point in particular.

My primary findings are:-

Progressive socio-political de-prioritisation of agriculture coupled to political demand for ever-cheaper food were likely to combine at some point in such a way, or worse, and may again.

Vigilance, and the resources to achieve such, were allowed to fall prior to 2001; this must not be allowed to happen again.

In the scenario above, of diminishing resources, the leading personnel responsible should be superlatively perspicacious and resourceful in their attempts to prevent an exotic disease incursion becoming a disaster. Contingency Plans should have been rehearsed and updated, the recommendations of the Drummond Report implemented in full or the Permanent Secretary or Minister informed that they were not and why. Such did not happen.

A semantic failure in Senior Scientific circles has allowed vaccination to become equated with 'an admission of endemicity', an inaccuracy or prejudice of appalling consequence.

A highly professional, modernising and progressive administration requires farmers to professionalise, and yet deals primarily with the National Farmers Union, a trade Union representing one third of farmers in the market-place -- not a professional Council or Representative body.

The conclusion I have drawn from analysis of the 2001 FMD epidemic, is that indeed an effective animal disease strategy is dependent on frequent objective review, and the allocation of appropriate resources to carry out that strategy, as has been similarly recognised by the requirement that Parliament review the Contingency Plans annually, the Prime Minister personally every three years and so on. However, last April, when this Dissertation was proposed, these issues were still under official review and potentially contentious (and the certainty that independent academic work was examining this topic may have helped sharpen the analysis). The challenge now will remain in ensuring that the plethora of other recommendations are carried out, that further needed research (particularly with regard to the Carrier state), and seminars (especially on modern vaccines, NSP-tests and Rapid--Diagnostic Technology) take place; and ensuring that vigilance, at local, regional, national, European and global levels are maintained into the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without --

www.warmwell.com

----------------------

www.farmtalking

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A.R.R.I.A.H. - All Russian Research Institute for Animal Health,

B.L. or B.S.L. -- Bio-Security Level

B.S.E. -- Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis

C.A.I. -- Concerted Action Initiative

C.I.A. -- Concentrated Immunogenic Antigen.

C.O.B.R. -- Cabinet Office Briefing Room

C.R.P. -- Coordinated Research Programme

C.S.F. --Classical Swine Fever

C.V.O.- Chief Veterinary Officer.

D.C. -- Dangerous Contact

D.E.F.R.A.- Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

D.F.S.- Disease Free Status

D.I.F.S.- Disease and Infection Free Status

ELISA -- Enzyme-Linked Immuno-absorbent Assay

EMPRES -- Emergency Prevention System (of the FAO)

E.C -- European Community

E.U. -- European Union

F.A.O. --Food and Agriculture Organisation

F.M.D. -- Foot --and --Mouth Disease

F.S.A. --Food Standards Agency

G.I.S. -- Geographical Information Systems

G.M. -- Genetically Modified

G.P.S. -- Geographical Positioning Systems

H.S.E -- Health and Safety Executive

H.Q. -- Head Quarters

I.A.E.A. --International Atomic Energy Authority

I.A.B. --Institute of Biologicals

I.A.H. -- Institute of Animal Health (Pirbright).

I.P. - Infected Premise

M.P - Member of Parliament

M.E.P. -- Member of European Parliament

M.A.F.F. -- Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food

M.L.C. -- Meat and Livestock Commission

N.F.U. -- National Farmers Union

N.S.P. -- Non -- Structural Protein

O.I.E. -- Office International des Epizooties

P.C.R. -- Polymerase Chain Reaction

R.A.S.E. -- Royal Agricultural Society of England

R.C.V.S. -- Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons

S.A.T. -- South African Territories

S.O.S. -- Slaughter On Suspicion

S.P.S. - Sanitary and Phytosanitary (Measures )

S.V.S. -- State Veterinary Service

T.A.D.'s -- Transboundary Animal Diseases

UK- United Kingdom

U.S.A. - United States of America

W.R.L. -- World Reference Library

W.T.O. -- World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW.

The management of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (F.M.D.) in the UK in 2001 has been variously described as a 'minor triumph' (Margaret Beckett, Minister of State for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, in the House of Commons, [approximately] 30th June 2001) or as "a disgrace to humanity" (Professor F. Brown, O.B.E., F.R.S., giving evidence to the European Union [E.U.] temporary Standing Committee on FMD, Brussels, (Uhlig 19/6/02). Over 11,000,000 animals were slaughtered in the control of the outbreak (Dobson 2002), despite protestations from many quarters urging the use of vaccination. (Unknown) numbers of people committed suicide and may still do so as a result of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome, further damage was done to the already fragile rural infrastructure, and the Treasury received a bill for billions; the Institute of Directors estimated a total cost to the country of £20 billion, the National Audit Office came to a lower figure of £8 billion on finding that a lot of moneys apparently lost to the economy were actually displaced, to the detriment of individual businesses but spent elsewhere within the country. Whatever the actual total, which will not be examined in depth in this Dissertation, the sum, including tax foregone, damage to the Tourism industry, increased importation of meat, loss of export markets and the ongoing cost of maintaining landfill sites, is huge.

When Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was first diagnosed in an abattoir in Essex on February 19^th 2001, it was its first (recorded) incursion onto these shores for over twenty years. The major outbreak of 1967/8, which itself had affected but not infected large parts of the country, was little more than a distant memory (if that) to the majority of the population, and very few of those responsible for dealing with that outbreak were still active. Lead members of the farming community, however, had not forgotten either the outbreak itself or their fathers' received wisdom about FMD, namely that :-

Vaccination does not work.

Stock valued at the start of the '67/8 outbreak were undervalued in comparison to stock slaughtered later, as fears of restocking shortages drove prices higher; therefore in 2001 prices began high.

'Selfish, misguided or spineless individuals would try to derail the cull policy, suggesting alternatives such as Homeopathy, vaccination or even allowing natural resistance to occur'; therefore the role of the Chief Veterinary Officer (C.V.O.) and his allies at the National Farmers Union (N.F.U.) would be, as in previous outbreaks, to resist such 'blandishments' at all costs.

The 2001 epidemic had all the makings of a tragedy- a populace mostly divorced from and not understanding the nature of farming, sufficiently well educated and experienced, post-B.S.E. (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), to distrust both politicians and 'experts', but thereby easily panicked by media scare stories into potentially irrational behaviour; a government not in sympathy with, and distrustful of, agriculture -- composed of politicians who either could not understand why people would work for so little return and therefore felt there must be fraudulent practices on a large scale, or that farmers were over-subsidised wealthy men featherbedded at the taxpayers expense, who were ripe for the same treatment that the previous Administration had meted out to the miners, shipbuilders and printers.

This attitude struck a deep chord across many sectors of the electorate, comprising not only 'working class' resentments but also middle class and meritocratic taxpaying resentment, compounded by two further factors:-

1) Public Relations, supposedly on behalf of farmers, from the National Farmers Union, which roughly translated to the public eye as 'I'm rich, get off my land, you will have genetically modified (G.M) crops whether you like it or not, now buy me a new Range-Rover'.

2) Government reluctance to incur match-funded expenditure for agriculture given the high United Kingdom (UK) cost (81% of such UK borne) following Margaret Thatcher's rebate agreement at Maastricht, the low priority accorded all UK production industries vis a vis the perceived high value skills and knowledge-based service sector, and the declining significance of the non-tourism rural commodities sector, both in terms of employment and as a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product.

Throughout the course of the epidemic, it was widely postulated that the State Veterinary Service (S.V.S.) had been progressively run down to the point where it was scarcely able to satisfactorily fulfill its remit. Whether this was so, and a great many other questions, remained unanswered at the end of the epidemic. These fall into the following five broad categories:-

A. Contingency Plans
B. Vaccination,
C. First Cause -- Origins,
Other.
E. Ethical considerations; the Future.

The Questions

A) Contingency Plans.
1) Why the apparent lack of urgency in stopping all movements? (This has now been met by Ministerial assurance that such was a mistake and will not recur).

2) Prior to Feb. 20^th 2001, did the UK have a strategy for dealing with an outbreak of FMD, whether small-scale or large, single or multi-focal, natural, deliberate or accidentally released, and if so, were these Contingency Plans published, who received copies and were they rehearsed?

3) Assuming such plans existed, were they implemented, did they work satisfactorily and did they comply with Agenda 21 criteria?

4) Were the E.U. Contingency Plans and the UK Plans compatible, if there were differences, which was to predominate, and who was in charge of implementation?

5) The UK had prior notification that this Serotype, Pan Asia O, was approaching, given its monitored and reported spread Westwards and EU correspondence urging vigilance. Additionally, the outbreaks of Asia 1 in Greece in 2000 reinforced the message that FMD was in Europe and just one dealer-to-dealer transfer away from our shores.

6) Did this precipitate any Contingency Plan revision or exercises, desk-top or otherwise, in slaughter, disposal, vaccination, communications (internal and external), Welfare both Human and animal, or reappraisal of costings in the light of the changed circumstances with regard to Environment Agency directives forbidding the burial of potentially BSE-infected carcasses?

7) Which risk-averse policy maker determined that the sacrifice of nearly 12,000,000 animals was more acceptable than taking a chance on 'unvalidated' new technology, viz, the Cepheid Smart Cycler, and 'virus/vaccine differentiation tests'? The argument that only with hindsight could the true numbers be known does not hold sway as Mr. Roger Ward, NFU regional manager stated that he (and therefore the NFU) were prepared to slaughter all the sheep in the country if that is what it took (witnessed statement given to Janet Hughes in London).

8) Who drove the policy -- the Government, NFU, supermarkets, Cadburys, Nestles, Consumer Associations?

B) Vaccination.
9) The Northumberland Report of 1968 recommended that an international vaccine Bank be established to cover contingencies and allow mass vaccination programmes to be implemented. What was the status and quantity of UK reserve antigen and what other sources of supply were available to the C.V.O. on commencement of the epidemic, and, in the light of Prof. Woolhouse's' statement on "Farming To-day"(BBC Radio 4, 4/10/01), that ''Protective'vaccination ('to live') works but would require a massive vaccination programme which in 2001 we were unable to implement quickly', the question arises, why were we unable so to do, and are we better prepared to do so now?
10) Argentina can manufacture 20,000,000 doses of vaccine per month. Is this technology especially suited to a developing country?

11) Are the inherent vaccinology risks associated with this vaccine in any way more extreme (in terms of human ingestion via meat or milk products) than the other 32 vaccines in use in British agriculture at the time (figures, Soil Association).

12) Why were farmers repeatedly told that 'vaccination doesn't work', despite its success in eradicating FMD from Europe prior to 1992, and its successful deployment by the E.U. in Albania, etc., etc?

13) Is it surprising that farmers were wary of using a vaccine when it was proposed?

14) Why were farmers not told that the EU had made provision for drop in value of vaccinated stock and could compensate for such?

15) Which 'anti-vaccinologist' proposed to the OIE in March 2001 that the time period to return to Disease Free Status (DFS) if all vaccinated animals were not slaughtered be increased to two years?

C) First Cause.
16) If illegal infected meat imports lie at the root of the problem, with its massive implications for human as well as animal health, why have the government taken so few steps, so slowly, to avert a reoccurrence or worse?

17) Why was Dr. Colin Fink's offer to produce a rapid viral assay initially accepted in the eye of the Press at Westminster, but then overruled by a representative of MAFF, Mr. F. Landeg, (Question for written answer to Her Majesty's Government from the Baroness Mallalieu, Q.C., dated 9/5/01, and an open letter from Dr. Fink); and why was Biosecurity Level (BL) 4 required for this virus when the Institute of Animal Health (I.A.H.) Pirbright had been working on genetic modification of FMD at BL 2, 3 and 4 and the Health and Safety Executive "papers on the work describe the DNA insert as of 'human origin', and expressed concern should a leak of experimental material occur as it could be 'environmentally persistent'" (Bird, 2001).

18) When is the Government going to reply to the question of the Right Honourable Paul Keetch, (Lib/Dem), Member of Parliament for Hereford, regarding a 'missing phial' of FMD virus, (Hansard, 21/03/01, and personal correspondence with Paul Keetch M.P.).

19) The question of the Genetically Modified (G.M.) oral vaccine trial gone wrong (Prof. Joe Cummins' theory) -- that the outbreak was triggered by a problem arising with a G.M. oral vaccine trial gone wrong, whereby an in-lamb ewe overfed the vaccine- carrying feed could give birth to a 'Typhoid-Mary' type, asymptomatic but infectious carrier.

20) Were two strains of FMD circulating? The clinical symptoms were sometimes said to be obvious and unmissable, on other occasions extremely difficult to diagnose even for experienced Veterinarian Clinicians. This same suggestion arose during the 1967/68 outbreak (private correspondence and the Northumberland Report).

21) Why did the French Government find 7 out of 21 samples positive by Virus Neutralisation test, only later to 'accept' that Pirbright's subsequent negative ELISA (Enzyme-Linked Immuno Assay) re-tests were more accurate, if not only to save losing their Disease Free Status (now 'Disease and Infection Free Status' [DIFS]), and how can the differing Dutch and UK government positions regarding 'Start' dates be reconciled?

D) Other.
22) As national PR what did the cull policy communicate about our Scientific capabilities to the world, in terms of our ability to innovate, implement change, and adhere to a transparently ethical and progressive path?

Is this an image we would wish to repeat?

23) Why were acknowledged experts like Prof. (Fred.) Brown O.B.E., F.R.S., Dr. Simon Barteling, Dr. Sutmoller and Dr. Ruth Watkins sidelined and ignored?

24) Why did Cleansing and Disinfection assume such surreal proportions, far exceeding those deployed in 1967-8?

25) Why have the Government refused to allow a full Public Inquiry, despite all the allegations of a cover-up?

26) The role of the Modellers in delivering politically expedient but morally repugnant policies, and the influence of the General Election timetable for the Prime Ministers 'Historic' Second term in Office on Veterinary Science?

27) Questions of Ecological Economics -- what valuation placed on Human deaths, Environmental pollution, possible long--term health consequences of smoke inhalation, Dioxin ingestion, stress, loss of employment, further degeneration of the fabric of rural society, and erosion of trust and confidence in policy makers and the political process.

E) The Future -- Ethical considerations.
28) Has the Department for Food the Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), successor to the late Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF), embraced the explicit inclusivity requirements of Sustainability criteria post-Agenda 21 ('Rio'), will Stakeholder Consultation be a real two-way process or purely a window-dressing exercise, will DEFRA co-operate in permitting Stakeholder 'Innovation Monitoring' and 'Communication' Groups to work alongside and with themselves in the interests of transparency in the Total Food Chain, and if so, can we expect rapid influx of new technologies, from updating GIS and GPS technology, through Real-time Diagnostics, on-line Data up- and download, better internal IT and active Stakeholder participation?

29) Our responsibilities for livestock are clearly defined, but our responsibilities to them are not mentioned, as if they are of no consequence other than economic. Is this attitude compatible with the 21^st century, and if so, what does this tell us about ourselves?

30) What signs are there of progress, whether of actual cures for FMD, of proven prophylactics, or steps to minimize the trade restrictive nature of the present policy?

-----------------------

Her Majesty's Government have decided that a Public Inquiry would be too time consuming and expensive a course of action to take, despite the recent description of the 2001 epidemic as "one of the worst social and financial catastrophes to befall peacetime Britain" (Booker and North, 2001). Many parties throughout the outbreak experienced Truth as being the first casualty of the 'war' waged on this virus, and many questioned whether the damage done, not least to official credibility and parliamentary Democracy, was a price worth paying to salvage a relatively minor export industry, (especially considering the externalised costs; pollution and the damage to the Tourist industry). In his Chapter 'Foot-and-Mouth Disease' in 'Diseases of Sheep', Dr. Donaldson stated "The identification of the origin of an outbreak is especially important for a country that is normally free of FMD so that preventative measures can be taken to ensure that the risk of a repetition is eliminated, or at least greatly reduced". These factors, plus a determination to understand the scientific, trade and political complications arising from this particular 'high morbidity, low mortality' virus, and concern should a 'high mortality, high morbidity' exotic virus gain a foothold on these shores, have led me to question the state of national preparedness either to prevent or to deal with such an event.

In the course of this Dissertation, I would therefore like to examine the unanswered questions through the following hypothesis:

"An effective National animal disease strategy is dependent on frequent objective review, and the allocation of appropriate resources to carry out that strategy," taking Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK in 2001 as a case in point.

Strategy proposed to address the hypothesis.

I propose to assemble and study as much relevant data, via the methods listed below, as can be obtained in the time available, and then interrogate and analyse that data, to create a framework from which logical conclusions can be drawn. I have to date attended three national and one major international Conference(s) on the topics of FMD and Contingency, containment and eradication policies worldwide, and have read around the topic, consulted with various experts in the field, and elicited invitations for further contact. I am also (as of January 2003) attending 'DEFRA Stakeholder FMD Policy Meetings' on behalf of a national Organisation, which although Confidential, are enabling me to engage in dialogue with more of the relevant persons and other Stakeholders.

Proposed Research Methods.
The method proposed for deriving the necessary and relevant data is to search the databases in order to examine all or most of the following:-

The National Audit Office (N.A.O.) Report.

The Report of the 'Lessons Learned' Inquiry.

" " " " Royal Society " .

" " " " " " of Edinburgh Inquiry.

The Reports of the three Regional Inquiries -- Devon, Northumberland and Cumbria.

Various submissions and annexes to the above.

Hansard.

EU Contingency plans- various.

UK " " " .

Other national Contingency Plans, and rehearsal documentation i.e. Australia and the U.S.A..

Historical literature, i.e. The Northumberland Report, etc..

Contemporary literature regarding exotic and Transboundary Animal Diseases (T.A.D.'s), virology, vaccinology, Rabies, Tuberculosis, international initiatives in the field of disease control etc..

Newspaper, Magazine and Journal articles.

Radio transcripts and recordings.

Television and video recordings.

Internet websites.

Unpublished articles, Doctoral theses, etc..

Public correspondence.

Private correspondence.

Conference and Meeting Abstracts, Minutes and Notes.

In addition:-

Notes from personal conversations, in the flesh, by telephone or dialogue by e-mail, or, in a few exceptional instances, formal face to face interview.

Structure of the Dissertation.

The Dissertation has eight Chapters, plus two Appendices. The Chapters take shape as outlined on the Contents Page.

In addition, this Dissertation will contain the usual Reference and Bibliography sections, constructed according to the Harvard Referencing system.

Conclusion.

In this Introductory Chapter I have stated the many disparate questions arising from the 2001 UK F.M.D. epizootic and attempted to marshall them into a format that will permit of useful analysis.

The third Category of Questions, namely those relating to the 'First Cause' of the outbreak will not be dealt with in this Dissertation for two reasons:-

1) to better focus on forward-looking proposals, strategies and Policies and outcomes - however the epizootic began, we got it.

2) I am in any case not empowered to demand access to the Documentation, Personnel, etc., necessary to truly penetrate to the heart of this mystery, without which all inquiries, in the absence of evidence, become mere speculation.

By excluding this 'First Cause' category, I will focus on the three remaining (broad) areas, namely

Contingency Planning,

Vaccination, (state of readiness both 2001 and at present) and the rationale behind resistance to its use and

Recent technological innovations.

By so doing I hope to be able to ascertain whether or not our Exotic Animal Disease strategy was then or is now subject to frequent objective review and to gain insights into whether the resources available to those attempting to implement it were and are sufficient. I will then conclude with a brief Chapter expressing avenues and reasons for hope for a better future with regard to U.K, E.U., and global FMD policy.

By virtue of its nature, as the Planet's most contagious virus, Foot and Mouth Disease control Policies tend to pioneer the response to other exotic animal disease incursions, forming a template which, with minor relevant adaptations can be utilised for other diseases; for this reason FMD will predominate in this Study.

The ever-present prospect of Bio-terrorism, reinforced since '9/11', has impacted slightly on the free availability of certain information, particularly with regard to security-sensitive issues which I shall therefore not recite here.

Before examining the Topics above, it will first be useful to look at the background. In Chapter Three I will outline the History of this disease, its impact on International Trade and the delineation of the different phyto-sanitary grades of product. Before that, in the next Chapter, I will examine the Epidemiology of this Epizootic.

Chapter Two -- the Epidemiology of the UK 2001 epizootic in the context of the global epidemiology of this Pan Asia O and other strains.

In the previous Chapter I listed some of the questions outstanding at the end of the FMD outbreak and outlined those which I could reasonably investigate in this short work. In this Chapter I propose to outline the epidemiology of the outbreak, to provide a background from which to examine the disease, its prevention, control and elimination and to facilitate the subsequent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the UK Contingency Plans of 2001, in Chapter 5.

Foot and Mouth Disease -- Background.
Foot and Mouth Disease, a class 'A' disease as classified by the Organisation International des Epizooties (O.I.E.) in Paris, notifiable in the UK under the Animal Health Act, 1981, is caused by the Picornaviridae Apthovirus, and is an "extremely contagious, acute viral disease of all cloven-footed animals … characterized by fever and vesicular eruption in the mouth and on the feet and teats" (Radostits, Blood & Gay 1994: 965-974), and is "probably the most contagious virus known in mammals" (Royal Society 2002:18), affecting more than 33 species. Due to its enormously damaging impact either directly on production or, perhaps more significantly, arising both from its control and trading implications, a great deal of scientific endeavour has been expended on attempting to deepen our knowledge of this enigmatic life-form, the better to combat it in the field. Much has been learnt but far more remains as yet a mystery.

Symptoms in affected stock vary from species to species, in time taken for onset of both sub-clinical and clinical infection, in severity of illness, with regard to the post-infection 'Carrier' status, and depending on how large the infectious challenge the animal has been exposed to. Additionally, this will vary from 'serotype' to serotype, of which 7 have been identified - O, A and C, and Asia 1 and the three 'South African Territory's' serotypes, known as SAT's 1-3; and from 'topotype' or sub-type within each serotype, of which about 80 have been identified (Radostits 1994: 965-974). Furthermore, the virus will continue to evolve in the field, usually at a gentle pace but occasionally with great rapidity. A creature can be infected with more than one strain (serotype or topotype), and immunity to one strain, whether naturally acquired or via vaccination, may not provide protection against challenge from a new strain.

Vaccination, whether Prophylactic or Emergency, is not a universal panacea. Prophylactic vaccination, successful in ridding Europe of endemic FMD, was dropped in favour of the British 'stamping-out' method in 1991, as vaccination (in conjunction with slaughter of proven infected stock) had attained the point where such an approach, coupled with the superior Pan-European trading possibilities thereby opened up, appeared more cost-effective (although 'it was always assumed that any major incursion would be dealt with by emergency vaccination' - Dr. Simon Barteling, personal communication, 13/6/01). Emergency vaccination presents additional complications -- assuming correctly administered doses of pure and inactivated vaccine, even with a high-potency, high-payload dose, immunity is neither instant nor permanent and progeny of vaccinated stock will lose their inherited maternal protection after several months, leaving 'rents' in the fabric of seamless protection unless immunity is conferred sufficiently early -- perhaps at two months, as was the practice in Germany.

More significantly, present vaccines do not 'induce sterilizing immunity in the respiratory tract of sheep and cattle,' (Donaldson and Woolhouse 2001: 515-6) resulting in the presently unquantified, albeit low, risk of creating 'carrier' animals, that is asymptomatic but potentially infectious, apparently healthy, vaccinated, (recovered or sub-clinically infected) stock.

This 'carrier' status is the major impediment to the use of vaccination, as countries holding the cherished 'Disease Free Status -DFS' (now 'Disease and Infection Free Status- DIFS') are extremely averse to losing such, and are therefore most unwilling to take any risk of importing FMD by means of any of its vectors, with all the consequent waste, loss, damage and misery such entails; in addition and conversely, the opportunity to 'make hay while the sun shines', exploiting their non-trading partners' discomfiture to increase their own market share, is an economic reality of global trade. However, a great deal of circularity ensues in this argument, predicated upon the unproven infectiousness of the 'carrier', the unquantified risk from which continues to inhibit trade in vaccinated animals and products therefrom (although see Chapter 6 and 7). For many years, the Developed World has had little incentive to attempt to ascertain the actual risk 'carriers' entail, as the perception of such suited 'first world' producer and trader criteria, by presenting a legitimate phyto-sanitary distinction and gradation of product (see Chapter 3) which maintained high 'home' producer prices yet allowed the importation of cheaply purchased commodity products following rigorous sanitation procedures. Calls for this risk to be better ascertained are now being heard in Europe, (J.R. Crowther of the International Atomic Energy Authority, Vienna, and formerly of Pirbright, W.R.L., called for such at the Conclusion of the International Conference on FMD, Lyon, 2-5 June, 2002), although funding for said work is presently unsourced.

Given its ready potential to cause actual or economic damage to a countries' overall economy, and given the drastic measures required to 'stamp it out', it is little surprise both that farmers dread the disease, and that Governments are perennially concerned lest such should be used against them in a deliberate bio-terrorist attack, the response to which, would of course, depend on the relative merits of elimination versus acceptance and rapid developments in diagnostics and cure.

Foot and Mouth Disease -- Characteristic Symptoms and Effects.
To quote again from the Royal Society Report (page 18),

"Cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and buffalo are the most important susceptible species among farmed animals. The disease is characterised by a short fever, loss of appetite, dullness, vesicular lesions and lameness. The lesions of the mouth, tongue and feet are especially severe in cattle, as are foot lesions and lameness in pigs. In smaller ruminants, such as sheep and goats, the disease often takes a milder form in adult animals. In young animals, especially lambs and piglet, the virus can cause an acute myocarditis resulting in sudden death. Survivors are left in a weakened state and can succumb at a later stage. During the outbreak of 2001 lamb death was sometimes the presenting sign that FMD virus (FMDV) was present on a farm".

FMD is often regarded as a high morbidity/low mortality disease, although on specific occasions mortality in young-stock has been known to be high -- 90, 50 and 25% respectively in lambs, pigs and calves, (Royal Society 2002:19) (although what complicating factors, such as poor nutrition, bad management or poor husbandry were associated with these statistics is not recorded). Mortality in adult stock is low; UK statistics are of necessity old, and perhaps cast little light on the present system. Parts of the world where FMD is endemic furnish us with more current information, albeit information which cannot necessarily be transposed directly onto a Western European context. The Royal Society Report continues:-

"Ellis and Putt estimated the effects in those areas of Kenya where commercial cattle rearing was important. Mortality rates varied from 2% in unimproved Zebu cows to 5% in improved dairy cattle. Abortions occurred at a level of 8%, and there were delays in conception of some 8 weeks. If a lactating cow became infected there was a 50% decrease in milk yield that was not recovered during that lactation. Growth of young animals was badly affected, delays of six months on reaching maturity not being uncommon."

Table 1. Epidemiology and Chronology of the 2001 outbreak in the UK.
[Please note -- entries in bold are my emphasis, and highlight issues of critical importance].

[13^thFebruary. Clinical symptoms apparent in a contact herd within 500 metres of a staging post for imported stock from the UK and Ireland. FMD and anti-body positive sheep, ex UK, confirmed by Virus Neutralisation test in France. (Representatives of the CVO's of the France and the Netherlands, (2001): 27, and 34-5)]

19^thFeb. FMD suspected at Cheales Abattoir, near Brentwood, Essex.

20^th Feb. FMD confirmed by the World Reference Laboratory (WRL), Pirbright.

Army alerted to possibility of need for assistance.

21^st Feb. FMD serotyped by Pirbright as the pandemic serotype 'O', "(now named the 'Pan Asia' strain )" (Knowles., et al. [2001]: 258).

E.C impose a temporary ban on all exports of live animals, meat, fresh milk and other animal products.

23^rd Feb. FMD Disease Declaratory (Controlled Area) Order 2001 (the 'Movement Ban') made for England and Wales and identical legislation made in Scotland -- movement of susceptible animals and carcasses banned for seven days, (except under licence) plus fairs, markets, shows or other gatherings of animals.

FMD confirmed at a farm near Heddon -- on -- the Wall which had supplied pigs to the abattoir in Essex; according to MAFF, infection at this farm appeared to have been present for 'two or three weeks'. (Anon., [3/3/01] Veterinary Record. 148(9): 254-256)

This came to be regarded as the 'Index Case'.

Minister of Agriculture Nick Brown urges members of the public to assist by staying away from livestock farms.

26^th Feb. CVO reports that sheep from the Devon dealers' farm (0007) had been exported directly to Germany on Feb.12^th. All such slaughtered.

27^th Feb. Movement ban extended until midnight on Friday March 16^th.

Horse racing suspended.

28^th Feb. 11.00am, 22 cases confirmed, in 10 counties (Essex 4, Devon 4, Northumberland 3, County Durham 2, Herefordshire 2, Wiltshire 1, Anglesey 1, Lancashire 2, Northamptonshire1, Powys 2).

1^st March. First outbreak declared in Northern Ireland.

First cases confirmed in Scotland, Dumfries and Galloway.

6^th March. By 19.00 hours:- 80 outbreaks confirmed, (plus one in Northern Ireland).

"The agriculture minister reiterated that the government was determined to stamp out the disease by limiting movements of animals and slaughtering infected and in-contact animals and destroying their carcasses; having embarked on that policy, it intended to see it through to its conclusion.". (Anon. [10/3/01] Veterinary Record. 148(10): 286).

The EC Standing Veterinary Committee met, recommended an EU-wide suspension of Markets etc., disinfection of tyres of vehicles entering from the UK , and considered vaccination but rejected it as being inappropriate "for a number of reasons, including the limited excretion of virus by infected sheep and consequently the very limited windborne spread of the disease…" (Anon. [10/3/01] Veterinary Record. 148(10):286).

'Ad hoc' group comprising Sir John Krebs, the Imperial College 'Modellers' et al meet at the FSA.

11^th March. Disposal problems becoming clear: 40,000 carcasses lying on the ground in Cumbria alone (Anderson 2002: 79).

Minister of Agriculture emphasised (on BBC TV'S 'Breakfast with Frost') that he was "absolutely certain" that the disease was under control.

13^th March. 200+ outbreaks confirmed.

First outbreak confirmed in France (Mayenne).

15^thMarch. 3 Kilometre-Firebreak cull announced.

Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme announced.

16^th March. Epidemiological Modellers express concerns regarding 'R o ', the case-reproduction number, or average number of new cases generated by one current case.

17-18^th March. Two army Officers despatched to MAFF HQ to assess needs and feasibility of assistance.

19^th March. First military logistic deployment to Devon.

21^st March. First cases announced in Holland --Gelderland and Overijsel.

Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) opened, Prime Minister assumes personal control.

22^nd March. First case announced in Ireland, County Louth.

23^rd March. Agriculture Minister 'not ideologically opposed to vaccination', reluctant to use such but would consider it 'if it could make a positive contribution to resolving the crisis' (Anon. [31/3/01] Veterinary Record. 148(13): 392).

The 'ad hoc Science Group' met with the Chief Scientific Officer and the Chief Veterinary Officer.

Government Chief Scientific Officer, Prof. David King recommends more stringent action.

24^th March. Contiguous Cull announced.

Slaughter on Suspicion Policy (SOS) announced.

Government Chief Scientific Officer formally warned that the disease was "out of control".

Prof. Brownlie, (Professor of Veterinary Pathology, Royal Veterinary College), is published stating that "new proposals currently being considered" (by the OIE inferred) "would extend the time period to two years if all vaccinated animals were not slaughtered" (Brownlie 2001: 358-360).

1100 Vets in the field (source, CVO)

25^th March. Industrialisation of slaughter at Great Orton airfield announced.

26^th March. 'Ad hoc Science Group' now formalised as the 'FMD Science Group' (sometimes renamed 'the Modelling sub-committee' rather than a full FMD Science Group), under the Government Chief Scientific Officer, Prof. King (Anderson [2002]: 91)

27^th March. 668 cases confirmed.

1235 SVS Vets in the field. (Source, Minister N.Brown)

Minister of Agriculture proposes the banning of swill-feeding to pigs.

28^th March. 693 cases confirmed.

30^th March. 1313 SVS vets.

Epizootic peaks, at 50 IP's/day.

2^nd April. Local elections, planned for 3^rd May, postponed.

4^th April. 1,000 cases.

Permission obtained from EU Standing Veterinary Committee for use of emergency vaccination of cattle in Cumbria and Devon (Anon. [7/4/01] Veterinary record. 148(14): 421).

By April 7^th. 20-Day Standstill -- permanent imposition discussed.

8^th April. Average of new cases per day for the week ending April 8^th was 32, compared with 43 for the week ending April 1^st -- a "cautiously encouraging … flattening out" of the epidemic, according to the Chief Government Scientist, Prof. King (Anon.[14/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(15): 458).

10^th April. "Scientific Group unanimously recommended vaccination of the housed cattle in Cumbria" (Anderson 2002: 125).

12^th April. Maundy Thursday -- Summit meeting called by the Prime Minister at Chequers.

14^th April. Two further outbreaks in Northern Ireland.

Prof. Brownlie reported in the 'Veterinary Record' as stating that 'introducing a policy of general vaccination would be to accept that the disease was endemic' (Anon. [14/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(15): 460-1).

18^th April. 'Vaccination of housed cattle in Cumbria and Devon an attractive option' -- Prof. King and CVO Scudamore (Anon. [21/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(16): 490).

The public 'totally bemused' by the vaccination debate (Anon. [21/4/01] Veterinary Record.148(16): 489)

19^th April. The disease now "fully under control" -- Prof. King (Anon. [28/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(17): 517).

April 20^th. President of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (R.C.V.S.) Roger Eddy, writes to the Prime Minister requesting that greater account be taken of local circumstances when deciding which animals should be included in the Contiguous Cull (Anon. [28/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(17): 519).

Westminster Central Hall, Soil Association press conference on Vaccination and the consumer.

23 April. First animals caught up in Surveillance Zone sent for slaughter for use in the human food chain.

Local Veterinary Risk Assessment permitted.

24^th April. Press Conference and Meeting in the House of Lords, Prof. Brown and members of the Science Group.

26^th April. Contiguous cull 'refined', following 'Phoenix the calf' incident; cattle may be spared; rare breeds and hefted sheep to be exempted from the (automatic) contiguous cull.

3^rd May. "We are now on the home straight" -- Tony Blair, Prime Minister.

Announcement of total ban on swill-feeding with effect from 24/5/01.

9^th May. 1569 cases.

19^th May. Settle cluster Jim Scudamore noted that 11 cases confirmed in the Settle area since 10^th May, plus 1 in Clitheroe (Anon. [28/4/01] Veterinary Record. 148(17): 519).

Vaccination again considered.

27^th May. Weekly average number of cases up to 5 per day compared with 3 per day the previous week (Anon.[2/6/01] Veterinary Record. 148(22) :674).

30^th May. The "fluctuating phase" towards the end of the epidemic (J.Scudamore). Strategy unchanged, although more animals being blood tested (Anon. [2/6/01] Veterinary Record. 148(22): 675).

3^rd June. Weekly average number of cases 6 per day (Anon. [9/6/01] Veterinary Record. 148(23): 704)

4^th June. MAFF issued a statement denying plans for a mass cull after the Election.

7^th June. Post election, MAFF replaced by DEFRA, Nick Brown replaced by Margaret Beckett. Creation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

10^th June. Weekly average number of new cases falls to 5 per day.

21^st June. Margaret Beckett announces relaxation of Movement Restrictions (Anon. [30/6/01] Veterinary Record. 148(26): 795).

4^th July. DEFRA launch Biosecurity video.

7^th July. 'Idiopathic mouth ulcers in sheep' -- letter plus supporting documentation in the Veterinary press (De la Rua,Watkins and Watson 2001:31)

10^th July. Thirsk 'hotspot'; danger of spread to the 'virus factories' (pigs) of North Yorkshire, Humberside and East Anglia, (quoting Fred Landeg, of Page Street, SVS HQ). Vaccination seriously considered again. "Ministers made clear … that the potential impact on disease control" (of vaccination)… "was so great as to override all doubts about vaccination" (Anderson 2002:128).

23^rd July. Lord Whitty announces the 'Blue Box' (enhanced Biosecurity provision) in North Yorkshire (Anon. [28/7/01] Veterinary Record. 149(4):100).

7^th August. 'Blue Box' extended to Penrith, Cumbria.

9^th Aug. Margaret Beckett announces that there will be three separate inquiries, but no formal 'Public Inquiry'.

12^th Aug. Weekly average number of new cases down to 3 per day.

19^th Aug. Weekly average number of new cases down to 2 per day.

28^th Aug. Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme extended (from Sept.3^rd) but payment reduced to£10/ head for light lamb.

Greater volume of movements to be permitted (Anon. [1/9/01] Veterinary Record. 149(9):255).

2^nd September. Weekly average number of new cases 3 per day.

11^th Sept. Scotland designated disease-free (91 days).

17^th Sept. Thirsk 'Blue Box' lifted.

Autumn Livestock Movement Scheme begins (slowly).

23^rd Sept. Weekly average number of new cases 1 per day.

30^th Sept. Last case confirmed.

8^th October. Devon Inquiry, Chaired by Prof. Mercer, begins.

31^st Oct. Publication of proposed Animal Health Bill (Act), giving wider powers to cull, including 'Firebreak' culling, for entry onto farms for vaccination or serology, and to allow reduced compensation for farmers following poor Bio-security practices (Anon. [10/11/01] Veterinary Record. 149(19): 570).

Restriction on exports begin to be relinquished, county by county.

7^th November. DEFRA removes 'Infected Area' designations from large areas; Hexham, Penrith and Skipton remain.

27^th Nov. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, states that the cost to the government of the FMD epizootic has been to date £2.7 billion (Anon. [8/12/01] Veterinary Record. 149(23): 693).

28^th Nov. Last 'Infected Area' designation lifted.

1^st January 2002. Last big cull -2067 sheep slaughtered in Northumberland either as "dangerous contacts as a result of sero-positive blood samples or slaughter on suspicion cases" in which "no evidence of foot and mouth virus has been found" (Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Elliot Morley, in answer to a question [41685] from Mrs. Anne Winterton, June 2002).

15^th Jan. All counties FMD-free.

22^nd Jan. OIE Meeting confirmed UK's international FMD --free status.

5^th February. EU Standing Veterinary Committee lift the remaining export restrictions.

11^th March 2002. Final (one) animal (ovine) killed following serosurveillance in North Yorkshire.

The Global Context.

In one of his two chapters in the recent OIE Scientific and Technical Handbook, Yves Leforban of the EUFMD Commission and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO Rome) enumerates the incidence of FMD within Europe in the decade prior to 2001 (Leforban 2002; 549-556). Upon the cessation of Prophylactic vaccination in 1991, experts had predicted that the EU would experience 13 primary outbreaks, leading to 20 secondary outbreaks apiece over the decade -- a total of 273 outbreaks therefore being envisaged. In practice, the virus was introduced 21 times, but with an average of only 15 secondary outbreaks, leading to a total of 343 outbreaks. The conclusion drawn was that although the number of incursions was higher than predicted, this should be off-set against expansion of the EU during that period.

In September 2000 a gathering of experts in FMD were asked to assess the risk of FMD entering Europe, and although envisaging that such would happen, considered the UK "to be a low-risk country" (Leforban 2002: 552) (because FMD has usually entered modern Europe from the East). However, this must be set in the context of a global awareness of the advance of the 'Pan Asia' O strain across the globe from East to West, and the experts would doubtless have assumed that the recommendation below would have been heeded:-

"At the end of 1999, and in early 2000, the Executive Committee of the EU FMD Commission warned member countries of the accrued risk of introduction of FMD into Europe and asked them to reinforce their preventive measures…" (Leforban & Gerbier 2002: 477-492).

The World Reference Laboratory at Pirbright is not part of DEFRA (formerly MAFF), nor of the State Veterinary Service; however, links between the three are close, and it is inconceivable that awareness of impending FMD problems at Pirbright should not have reached Page Street (H.Q of the SVS). In quick succession, 'Pan Asia O' had ravaged the economies of Taipei China (1997 and 1999), Korea, and Japan (2000), (countries which had been free of FMD for 68,66 and 92 years respectively), as well as Mongolia and Far Eastern Russia (also 2000).

Indeed:-

"The World Reference Laboratory (WRL) for FMD in the UK (Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory), which provides a service that enables classification of FMDV's into related groups based on the results of nucleotide sequencing, confirmed that the type O viruses isolated in Japan (O/JPN/2000), the Republic of Korea (O/SKR/2000) and Mongolia (O/MNG/2000) were members of the Pan-Asian O lineage" (Sakamoto & Yoshida 2002: 459-464)

From the time of the first manifestation of this new 'O' lineage of FMD in India in 1990, through its initial spread westwards into Saudi Arabia (1994), then via the Middle East to Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece (1996), and eastwards via Nepal (1993) to China (1999), Korea, Taiwan and Japan, the experts at Pirbright would have been aware of its extreme virulence, a virulence the more effective due to an adaptive capability, whereby a range and variety of pathogenicities were observed, including Taiwanese Yellow cattle that were able to transmit infection to other stock (Chinese Yellow cattle) without showing clinical symptoms themselves, and atypical, mild, almost asymptomatic presentation such as was diagnosed by the astute (and later, officially commended) veterinarian who first identified FMD in Japan by sole reason of the rapidity of infection (Sakamoto & Yoshida 2002: 459-464).

In September 2000, South Africa suffered an incursion of Pan Asia 'O', the same month in which top experts from Pirbright presented a paper at Borovets entitled 'Emergence of a pandemic strain of foot-and--mouth disease virus serotype 'O'' (Knowles et al 2000). However, even as they met, the attention of the CVO of the UK was directed towards the eradication of another exotic animal disease, similarly known to commonly spread from improperly-treated swill fed to pigs (or via [Artificial Insemination] semen), namely, Classical Swine Fever (or Hog Cholera). Sadly, the outcome of this precursor to the events of 2001 was not to sharpen wits and defences but to further preoccupy and exhaust those diminished number of SVS vets and resources not already absorbed into TSE-related duties. I shall return to this topic in Chapter 5.

Conclusion.

In this Chapter I have outlined the key points and the chronology of the epidemiology of the outbreak and this 'Pan Asia' O serotype in its global context. In the following Chapter I will set this outbreak in the context of the history of the disease in the UK, concluding with the International trading arrangements in place on 19^th February 2001 and those at present.

CHAPTER 3. The History of Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) in the UK, the significance of fmd in International Trade, and the ORGANISATION INTERNATIONAL DES EPIZOOTIES' (oie's) phytosanitary grades of production.

Introduction.
In the previous Chapter I outlined the key events in the epidemiology of the 2001 United Kingdom (UK) epidemic. In this chapter I will give a brief summary of the history of FMD in the UK, and the trading rules that have evolved around that position. This is necessary, as I shall show, for a full understanding of the disease control and Contingency Plans, which I will detail in the following Chapter and discuss in Chapter 5.

The History of Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK.
Foot and Mouth disease is not endemic to the UK -- hence its definition as an 'exotic' or foreign disease. The first known instances of FMD were those recorded by Fracastorius writing in 16^th Century Venice, the disease first reaching the shores of the British Isles in 1839, whereupon it rapidly spread amongst a 'naive' population to became an 'accepted …indeed expected occupational hazard' (Woods 2001), a troublesome but relatively minor condition in the overall canon of disease to which stock were then exposed. In 1869 State control of FMD by movement restriction was appended onto legislation to control Cattle Plague, a far more serious disease; "many veterinarians, farmers and MP's rejected the need to control FMD, upon the basis that firstly the disease was not severe enough and that losses due to legislative 'cure' would outweigh those inflicted by the disease itself" (Woods 2001: 2).

However, the drive for eradication was led by influential Pedigree breeders, many of whom were well-placed as Members' of Parliament (MP's), members of the Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE) or both; Pedigree breeders losses were greater than those of Commercial producers, as their potential returns were so much the greater. (It has also been suggested that more highly-bred stock may be more susceptible to or suffer worse from, FMD). Thus in 1871 the disease became 'Notifiable', fears of meat shortages for the urbanised factory work-force following empirical but unsubstantiated estimates of the production losses contingent upon FMD, leading to calls from the (Capitalist) Captains of Industry, in common cause with the Pedigree Breeders, for State controls.

The severe disruption occasioned by Movement and Marketing Restrictions created the reality that FMD was a major nuisance of deep economic significance, increasingly dreaded by the Agricultural community, so that by the 1880's farmer acceptance of the need for State interventions to control and prevent FMD, (including the prohibition of livestock imports and the isolation of infected and contact animals, as well as market cancellations and Movement Restrictions) was widespread. Due to a combination of whichever factors, the period from 1884 until the end of the 19^th Century was very little troubled by FMD.

Thus the introduction of the 1892 Act (Northumberland et al.1968), enabling local authorities to slaughter for FMD, met little resistance, coming as it did at a time of minimal FMD occurrence, so that although slaughter was "only implemented once in the next twenty years", (Woods [2001] who cites 1884 as the date of this Legislation), the framework of our Present 21^st century policy was established. The introduction of import controls by the UK led many other FMD-free countries to follow suit, especially the United States of America (USA) and Australia. This affected the British exporters, almost exclusively the Pedigree Breeders who had begun the process, who's stock now had to demonstrate the same freedom from infection they had required of third parties, and yet ironically, whose stock could often be spared the slaughter, not least as the compensatory purchase price was so great (Woods 2001:4). This group, whether acting out of altruism, self-interest, or a combination of the two, therefore prevailed upon the Ministry of Agriculture to persuade commercial farmers that a slaughter policy was for the good of all.

In 1898, Loeffler and Frosch had discovered that FMD is caused by a filterable agent, news of which landmark discovery had presumably reached the UK by 1908, when foreign hay and straw were first banned from importation after an outbreak was linked to the same - demonstrating an increased understanding of the contagious nature of the virus, which it was previously thought could only be passed on by infected creatures.

From the turn of the century until 1920 discriminate slaughter rapidly eliminated new incursions of FMD, arguably justifying the original rationale behind slaughter. However, in 1922, the disease spread through an infected market (following delayed notification) and became widespread. This…

"… was an entirely new context for the application of slaughter and certainly not one which the original framers of the slaughter policy had foreseen or intended" (Woods 2001:4),

and, following a particularly severe and long- lasting outbreak, triggered a revolt by farmers against the cull, (Woods 2001, citing information drawn from the 'Cheshire Observer' and 'Crewe Chronicle', newspapers, December 1923 - February 1924, located in the Cheshire Public Records Office [P.R.O.]), so much so that in some specific instances farmers were permitted to isolate rather than slaughter infected stock. The 2^nd Duke of Westminster's stock at Eaton Hall, Cheshire, (November 1923), were a case in point. The surrounding stock having been mostly slaughtered, the Duke, who opposed the slaughter policy, opted, (at his own expense and at risk of forfeiting compensation should slaughter become necessary), to treat his stock, primarily with saline solution, Stockholm tar, copious fresh bedding, 24 hour a day stockmanship, warm mash and soft hay; mortalities were no worse than an average year, milk yield returned to normal the following lactation, and all classes of stock bred as normal the following year. At the Royal Show of 1924 several previously infected dairy cows won prizes, a draft sale at Eaton that same July saw 77 lots of cattle achieve excellent prices, and Galloway steers who had been treated also made excellent carcasses (Whitlock 1969).

Subsequently, the 1920's saw an increasing panoply of legislation to help prevent either the incursion or onward spread of infection -- the Prohibition of Continental meat imports , (following the realisation that carcasses and meat could act as a vector for infection), stringent controls of Argentinian imports by means of the 'Bledisloe arrangements', (determining stock health management ante-, post- and during slaughter), and the imposition of the requirement to boil pig-swill (Woods 2001: 9, citing 'FMD' (1965) in Anon, Animal Health, a Centenary).

"At the same time, human movement in 1922-24 was linked to disease spread between farms" (Woods: 9, citing the Report of the 1924 Pretyman committee on FMD), raising awareness of the standards required for inter-farm hygiene or 'bio-security' as we know it now. Furthermore, the 'Animal Virus Research Institute' at Pirbright, Surrey, (now the Institute for Animal Health [I.A.H]) was established in 1924, to pursue research into all animal viruses, but especially the FMD virus and vaccines, although it has often been noted that the restriction of this work to this sole Institute has "made it impossible for independent researchers to investigate the disease and formulate alternative measures for its control" -- preventatives, treatments or cures (Woods: 10, citing the FMD Research Committee minutes, 1924-39, which 'reveal the repeated rejection of external requests to investigate FMD').

Throughout the 1920's and ongoing into the 1930's researchers investigated the role of wildlife, including birds, in epidemiological spread. Considerable sums of public money were put into research to find vaccines against FMD, and while representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (M.A.F.F.) publicly "expressed hopes that a vaccine would emerge from Pirbright…. in private the Chief Veterinary Officer stated that vaccines would find no application on British soil" (Woods 2001:10, citing CVO letter [7/1/24] to W. Leishman [Major General, Army Medical Services] PRO file MAF 35/217).

The feeling was that vaccines were a good second-best, suitable for use on the Continent due to their 'inferior' health status, where a slaughter policy was not financially feasible; additionally, assisting Continental neighbours and third parties to reduce their circulating viral load would help in reducing imported virus.

This position de-prioritised vaccine research in the UK, which only received a boost pre-World War 2, when both the real threat of FMD as a bio-terrorist weapon and the realisation that potential food shortages would contra-indicate slaughter, injected urgency to the task (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt 1: 72). Consumption of apparently healthy condemned stock had ceased in 1927, resumed during the war, but was subsequently condemned by the Gower Committee Report of 1954, which categorically linked such to onward transmission of the disease.

1951 saw a severe outbreak and agricultural expectations that after thirty years of public finance, the work of the Pirbright team would have yielded a usable vaccine, a sentiment to be repeated, and meet the same response, fifty years later, when similar expectations were similarly dashed on the basis that for technical reasons vaccines were not suitable for use on UK soil.

The major epidemic of 1967-8, however, saw MAFF preparing to relinquish their anti-vaccination stance. 500 vets were identified willing to implement a plan to ring vaccinate; monovalent 'O 1' vaccine was acquired and the plan assumed that "full scale vaccination could be started within four days of a decision being taken to vaccinate and that about two million animals could have been vaccinated in ten days" (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt 1: 72-3). In the event, the plan was shelved as the disease waned immediately prior to implementation.

In 1968, research from Scandinavia suggesting the role of the wind in spreading FMD was accepted, paving the way for the input of Meteorological data in epidemiological modelling.

A small incursion of FMD occurred in Scotland in 1974, efficiently closed out.

1981 saw the 'famous' incident where the modellers' prediction that the prevailing wind would blow FMD across from Northern France to the Isle of Wight was borne out, which successful epidemiology enabled veterinary teams to await and 'ambush' the virus as it arrived, limiting damage done - although recent observations that the true vector may have been yachtsmen' s' feet is now hard to investigate, (but relevant in the context of the empirical nature of Modellers data).

This outbreak also saw the genetic determination of origin of the strain (by Pirbright WRL) as being the 'O Lausanne 1965' strain used in the preparation of vaccines- much to Continental embarrassment, as this pointed to either a laboratory escape or an improperly inactivated or contaminated vaccine as the source (King et al, 1981: 479-80).

In 1991, the EU ceased prophylactic vaccination and adopted the UK (FMD-free without vaccination) position.

Table 2. Significant Dates of FMD outbreaks in the UK.

1839 -- First outbreak, thought to be from infected imported animals.

FMD then more or less endemic for remainder of the 19^th Century, although 1884 --1900 were remarkably untroubled by FMD and then, though not endemic, occurring on at least one occasion most years in the 20^th Century, with the exceptions of 1917, 1963 and 1964, until 1969.

1900 --1920's. Discriminate slaughter of infected stock rapidly eliminated new invasions of FMD.

1917 No FMD in the UK.

1922-4 Disease spread through an infected market, following delayed notification, leading to widespread FMD and a particularly severe and long-lasting outbreak, which triggered a revolt by farmers against the cull in Cheshire.

1922-5 Isolation of affected herds occasionally practised as an alternative to slaughter, ie the Duke of Westminster's stock at Eaton Hall.

[1928 'Bledisloe arrangements' for veterinary inspection and sanitary criteria for imported meat from countries with endemic FMD implemented. (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt 1, Appendix 6: 128)]

1951-2 Disease elimination took almost a year.

1963-4 No FMD in the UK.

I966 An outbreak in Northumberland, serotyped O1 , began with atypical lesions and negative laboratory tests, followed by clinical symptoms two days later (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt 1: 40 [see also p.54]).

1967- 1968 Serotype O 1. Worst epidemic of FMD prior to 2001; 211,825 cattle, 108,345 sheep, 113,766 pigs and 51 goats slaughtered between 25/10/67 and 4/6/68 (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt 1:60).

[1968 Bledisloe arrangements reworked to require only thoroughly vaccinated animals to be imported. (Northumberland Report 1968 Pt1, Appendix 7: 129).]

1974 Scotland.

1981 Isle of Wight.

2000 UK participates in quadrilateral vaccine trials under secret (non-disclosure) terms (North 2001).

Health and Safety Executive (H.S.E.) papers warn MAFF that manipulating FMD virus under Biosecurity (BL) level 2, though 'mainly safe', is not secure, (but also listed were trials under BL 3 and 4), and these HSE papers "describe the DNA insert as of 'human origin', and expressed concern should a leak of experimental material occur, as it could be 'environmentally persistent'"(Bird 2001:6) and that the consequences of an escape from such would be upon their heads.

Sept. FMD allegedly discovered in an abattoir. Journalist covering the story relocated and will not speak on the topic.

Apocryphal unvalidated accounts of vets apparently seeking for FMD in stock, Powys, autumn.

Farmers and vets in Cumbria reporting suspicions of FMD, negative on laboratory analysis. Such stock, from Dumfries and Galloway, sent for slaughter at State Veterinary Service (S.V.S.) recommendation to Cheales Abattoir, Essex, November (Snape, W., personal communication).

December- FMD present in Cumbria, all evidence buried (apocryphal police account - the source was unable to speak on the record having signed the Official Secrets Act).

Apocryphal reports of travellers from UK to Antipodes being especially thoroughly searched because 'we have got FMD over here, whether our Government is telling us or not'.

2001 Antibodies to FMD found in UK sheep imported into France.

Clinical symptoms discovered at Cheales' abattoir, Essex.

International Trade regulations.

The incursion of Rinderpest into Europe and the Belgian epizootic of 1920 had led to the establishment by 28 Member Countries of the Organisation International des Epizooties in Paris in 1924 to act as an 'honest broker' to themselves and the world community, as a focal point for all international communications regarding animal health breakdowns, facilitating monitoring and advance notification of forthcoming expected incursions and to provide a body determining the health status or otherwise of the stock of Member nations (or parts thereof). FMD is one of the most significant and voluminous of these tasks.

The legal framework as presently constructed is formalised under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement 1994 on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 'SPS agreement'), under which Member Countries "have the right to adopt protective sanitary measures to the extent necessary to protect human and animal health, provided that the measures are based on scientific principles and are not maintained without sufficient continuing scientific evidence" (Royal Society 2002: 39) - a stipulation designed to prevent countries practising 'protectionist' embargoes behind supposed phyto-sanitary criteria. The SPS Agreement "recognises the OIE as the body responsible for the development and promotion of standards, guidelines and recommendations for animal health and zoonoses"(Royal Society 2002:39).

The OIE (whose primary mission is "to guarantee the transparency of animal health status world-wide"), performs a multiplicity of functions, dealing with 95 diseases categorised as either List ‘A’ (the most serious) or List ‘B’, publishing and updating the 'Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines' from which the international normative standards are derived, listing the global reference laboratories, arranging regular meetings of its three technical commissions, lending support to the organisation of International Conferences, and publishing Proceedings and Scientific and Technical Reviews such as that quoted in the previous Chapter. However, despite the significance of its role, the OIE is essentially a small and poorly funded Secretariat, dependent on its "reference laboratories and other experts to provide the technical input" and "on the reference laboratories for the development of reagents and standards, and for the validation of standards and assays" (Royal Society 2002:39), and with scarce funds of their own are neither able to commission research nor command completion deadlines. The Royal Society suggested that the OIE should "evolve from a part-time reactive organisation reliant on goodwill, to a strong proactive international organisation" (p.39).

'Disease-free status'.

In order to trade freely in livestock or livestock products a country has to be able to demonstrate that it is free of certain diseases. The criteria for such vary, firstly from disease to disease, but also depending on whether the country concerned is a Member which has temporarily lost its Disease-free status (DFS), or an new applicant wishing to join the 'club', for whom the 'probationary' procedures are lengthier although not more onerous. Three essential criteria remain common to all - a country "wishing to obtain recognition of freedom from disease must demonstrate that it has:

· a reliable disease surveillance and reporting system,

· a reliable disease control and eradication programme, and

· a state veterinary service with independence and integrity"(Royal Society 2002:40).

When Foot and Mouth disease was discovered in the UK in February 2001, the UK was classed as 'disease-free without vaccination', the highest health status, giving UK products maximum marketing opportunities (subject to the B.S.E. [Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy] and C.S.F. [Classical Swine Fever] market losses), and gained after a minimum of twelve months free of the disease (or since vaccination was last used- not relevant in the case of the UK where vaccination against FMD has never been used).

OIE gradations of FMD-free product descend from the above through 'FMD-free with vaccination', 'FMD-free zone without vaccination', to 'FMD-free zone with vaccination'. Countries where FMD is endemic may still participate in OIE activities and may sell their products on the open market to any willing purchaser, but that purchasing country will have the opportunity to inform themselves of the exporting nations' disease status.

Disease-free status (DFS) when lost, can be regained after meeting the relevant criteria. For a Country or Zone free of disease without vaccination, (such as the UK); this, in 2001, meant 3 months after the last case (where 'stamping out' and serological surveillance are applied), or three months after the slaughter of the last vaccinated animal (where stamping out, serological surveillance and emergency vaccination have been utilized).

Different criteria apply to countries classed as 'FMD --free with vaccination', which can regain their DFS 12 months after the last case where stamping out and serological surveillance are applied, or 24 months after the last case if serological surveillance is used without stamping out.

Following the European experience in 2001, in which the UK, at great expense in blood and money, refused to vaccinate, the necessity to slaughter vaccinated stock was reappraised. The French had been two outbreaks away from vaccinating , the Germans, Italians, Irish, and probably others were obliged to slaughter stock and suffer the usual costs of a movement standstill. The Netherlands did vaccinate, initially 'Protectively' [to live], but then slaughtered as the outbreak had been so effectively controlled and the economies of loss of DFS were tallied. Many Dutch farmers over a very wide area had volunteered their stock for protection, and were betrayed when their Government changed the policy - a point that needs making as the Dutch experience has often been cited, with flagrant disregard for the science, as a demonstration that vaccination involves killing more animals per Infected Premise than slaughter!

Following these events, pressure from many quarters to establish mechanisms that enable healthy vaccinated stock and their products to resume a normal or near normal life and re-enter the Food Chain resulted in new criteria becoming recognized by the OIE from 28^th May 2002 onwards; that is, provided that the stock are vaccinated with a suitably refined and recognized vaccine that permits post-emergency serological differentiation by analysis of the Non-Structural Proteins (NSP's), (so that, at least on a herd or flock basis, the antibodies in stock can be ascribed as coming from either inoculation or infection), then those stock presenting with antibodies not displaying NSP's can live, and Disease and Infection -free Status (DIFS) be regained some six months after the last case or the last vaccination (whichever latest), provided that the serological surveillance has satisfactorily demonstrated the absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population (and assuming all infected stock slaughtered).

These NSP-tests have been in use in South America since the mid 1980's, but none were validated for use internationally. Recent developments both in Europe and the USA have brought such tests to the point where the OIE are prepared to recognize the category, although definitive work on ascertaining accuracy and cross-compliance between different products and laboratory's is not yet complete. The present situation is thus one of constructive limbo; countries may use the combination of vaccine and NSP testing if they wish, but others may choose not to purchase their products, much as the Japanese, having experienced an atypical and asymptomatic 'O' strain of FMD very akin to that which affected the UK have not resumed porcine purchasing from the UK to date (19/3/03).

UK Trade Position in 2001

When the original Bledisloe arrangements were put in place in 1928, they secured not only the considerable British investment in the processing facilities and infra-structure of Argentina, but the one third of total UK meat consumption derived from South America (Woods, private correspondence).

By the time of the 1967 outbreak, the contribution of South American meat to the UK total had reduced in significance to10% (Northumberland Report Part 1 1968: 79), although that total fluctuated throughout the year, and the preponderance of South American meat in individual outlets varied; primarily, Smithfield market in London took the bulk, ensuring consumption as far removed from most ruminants as possible. In neither instance was the UK a net exporter of meat.

During the 2001 epizootic, we were repeatedly told that the slaughter was essential (and vaccination unacceptable) to protect our very valuable livestock and livestock products' export markets, generally held to be in the region of approximately £500 million in value. However, a considerable proportion of this trade was in live sheep exports for slaughter, to which many people objected on welfare grounds per se. Furthermore, in an article entitled "The Great Food Swap", Dr. Caroline Lucas, MEP, (Member of the European Parliament) described how closely many totals of UK exports and imports matched, immediately prior to 2001; indeed Mick Sloyan of the Meat and Livestock Commission (M.L.C.) stated that the sum total of differences came down to preferences of national taste -- that is to say, we import Danish bacon, and export pork bellies (plus sundry parts) to Germany for sausage production.

In a debate in the House of Lords on the 25^th June 2002, Lord Pearson of Rannoch stated :-

"We now know from the National Audit Office that these … policies

cost the British taxpayer £8,000 million in last year's foot and mouth

epidemic—£3,000 million to our farming industry and £5,000 million

to our tourism industry. Are our meat exports so valuable?

Not according to Written Answers that I received from the Minister on 24th April and 25th March this year. They reveal that the total value of our exports of meat and meat preparations, including poultry meat, amounted to a mere £615 million in 2000, which was before the foot and mouth epidemic started. The Minister also revealed that the value of our corresponding meat imports for 2000 was almost four times greater than our exports, at £2,417 million. The answer that the Government refused to vaccinate and embarked on such costly and cruel mass slaughter to protect our meat export trade does not appear to stand up. I repeat, in a normal year we spend roughly four times as much on meat imports as we get from our meat exports—about £1,800 million more. Rather than going through all that misery and expense again, would it matter if we vaccinated, even at the cost of some of our exports, which we could presumably eat here and import correspondingly less?" (Hansard 25^th June 2002: Column 1281).

It was in this context that a Meat and Livestock Commissioner stated that the real reason we could not vaccinate had less to do with exports and more to do with protecting UK producers from a flood of cheaper vaccinated imports (M.L.C. Commissioner Helen Browning, OBE, speaking at Elm Farm Research Centre's "In Search of the Truth" Conference, Queen Elizabeth 2^nd Conference Centre, Westminster, 13/6/01), a point implicitly recognised by Dr. Anderson when he observed that "failure to control FMD would substantially increase the costs of UK livestock production; possibly by such an amount as to make a large proportion of current livestock production unviable". It is most improbable that Dr Anderson is here referring to a situation of unmoderated endemicity; one can therefore infer that he is speaking of the financial consequences of a protracted or prophylactic vaccination usage.

Such would help explain the bizarre and discreditable dis- and misinformation campaign practised by the anti-vaccination lobby. Concerns arose, reliably attributed to the NFU (letter from Prof. Fenton Robb, personal communication), that consumers might reject vaccinated products, or require such to be labelled, thereby creating a two-tier market. This was a baseless concern, in flat contradiction to the accumulated evidence of decades, of billions of instances of safe consumption of the same, (not to mention the assurances of the Food Standards Agency, Consumers' Association and the Soil Association), which resulted in farmers, supposedly 'led' by the NFU (like lambs to slaughter), rejecting vaccines at precisely the time when British consumers were consuming the very same from abroad (unmarked) -- with no mention of the 32 other vaccines in use in UK agriculture at the time. Indeed, NFU policy appeared to be at the time to do or say anything to thwart a vaccination policy -- which I have since had confirmed that it was.

cONCLUSION

Hopefully I have demonstrated that the cull policy for FMD was rooted in the circumstances of the 19^th century, which, though of relevance and informing our current position, should now nevertheless be seen in its wider historical context, coming as it did, at a time when both needs and capabilities were vastly different -- which point should be borne in mind when preparing 21^st century Contingency Plans.

In the Chapter following, I will examine the Contingency Plans extant on February 19^th 2001, both European Union (E.U.) and UK, then in Chapter 5 discuss their strengths and weaknesses, both with an attempt to take an early view of how History will view them, and to examine whether obvious scope for improvements are thrown into sharp relief.

Chapter 4. Contingency Plans, as obtaining on 19^th February 2001.

The previous Chapter recounted the history and evolution of the present policies and explained the context and development of the WTO-recognised OIE-determined 'normative standards' for trading in livestock and animal products.

In this chapter I will delineate the European Union and the UK Contingency Plans, to facilitate comparison and assess compatibility, attempt to ascertain which model prevails in the event of a discrepancy, examine the consequences if the two fail to mesh and consider the state of readiness of the UK's Contingency Planning for the predicted and predictable events of 2001.

The European Union Contingency Plans.

Jon Dobson's' predicament (see following section) is one this researcher has similarly encountered in attempting to locate archived EU documention, even of relatively recent origin, whether because such pre-date present electronic information systems and have not been transferred, been superceded and renamed, or, confusingly, attributed web addresses which lead to topic- related but different sites. Post 2001, a blinding plethora of 'Contingency Plan ' documentation is everywhere to be found. Ascertaining the situation pre -- 2001, however, is more difficult, as is also the case for the UK.

As a consequence, not having travelled to Brussels to obtain personal access, I have not been able to reconstruct the entire development of the EC Contingency Plans from original documents and so am heavily dependent upon secondary sources, in particular the somewhat elided page 29 of the Lessons Learned Inquiry (for the following few paragraphs especially), and the researched writings of Dr. Richard North, himself a Policy Researcher in Brussels.

The basis for all EC animal disease Contingency Plans is 'Directive 85/511/EEC', in force from 18^th November 1985, (at which time many countries in Europe were still practising prophylactic vaccination), which stated that overall control of FMD was handed to Brussels, and required "compulsory notification of suspicion of FMD in Member States,"(Anderson 2002:29) and that the holding concerned must be immediately placed under official surveillance. All animals of susceptible species must be slaughtered under official supervision, and their carcasses destroyed in such a way as to prevent the spread of FMD.

The Directive then spelled out that "meat, milk and milk products from the infected premises must be traced and destroyed, as must all substances likely to carry the virus. All farm buildings and equipment must be cleansed and disinfected".

On confirmation of infection, a 'Protection Zone' of at least 3 kilometres radius and a Surveillance Zone of at least 10 kilometres radius must be established around the Infected Premises. "Fifteen days after completing preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the infected Holding, the rules in the Protection Zone are relaxed and the rules in the Surveillance Zone apply instead. The Surveillance Zone restrictions may not be lifted for at least 30 days after cleansing and disinfection of the infected holding"(Anderson 2002:29). The Directive required that an inquiry be promptly instituted to establish how long the virus had been present, where it came from, how it spread and approved certain specified disinfectants.

"In March 1991, the European Commission published 'Recommendations or Guidelines for Contingency Plans against Foot and Mouth Disease DGVI/1324/9'. One of these recommendations was that each Member State should ensure that it had, immediately available, sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any one time, up to 10 cases and to maintain surveillance of premises in the 3km protection zone required around each"(Anderson 2002:32). This recommendation, based upon the scale of outbreaks in preceding years in Europe (when prophylactic vaccination was still protecting many stock) was to endure, and remained the guiding principle up to and including February 20^th 2001.

In a Memorandum entitled 'FMD Contingency Planning', Dr. North summarised the legal base upon which EC Member States were more recently obliged, by virtue of Article 5 of Directive 90/423/EEC, to construct their national Contingency Plans (C.P.'s), the criteria for which are set out in Commission Decision 91/42/EEC, "which must be applied" (North 2002:2). (This was when the E.U. abolished prophylactic vaccination). Additionally, the Commission was 'empowered to adopt' certain 'recommendations', setting out explanatory notes on the criteria, which in 1993 were published.

These 'Recommendations', (published on the 26/2/93 and referred to as Appendix 6 (1)) delineated 12 criteria which countries should meet. These required that each Member State should provide the following:- (abbreviated)

Sufficient legal powers to rapidly and successfully conclude a campaign.

Financial provision for access to emergency funds.

Establishment of a permanent national Disease Control Centre, in proximity to the office of the CVO and maintained in a permanent state of readiness, equipped to act as a command and control (communication and data recall) centre.

Establishment of local Disease Control Centres.

Expert teams, experienced in dealing with FMD, to visit initial outbreaks, confirm diagnoses or otherwise, take samples for confirmation or serotyping, investigate, report, and advise on site on immediate biosecurity requirements.

Ensure sufficient trained and experienced personnel are pre-identified and can be readily contacted, both at National and Local level.

Ensure sufficient and appropriate equipment and facilities are immediately available.

Ensure that comprehensive instruction manuals for dealing with FMD are prepared.

Ensure that the services of an FMD diagnostic facility in country or abroad are at all times available (no problem for the UK).

Contingency Plans that ensure that emergency vaccination can be successfully administered, from rapidly available inactivated antigen, through provision of 'cold chain' facilities, needles and trained staff.

All veterinary and support staff should receive regular 'refresher' training, including video updates on diagnosis, procedures at IP's, at Local and National Disease Control Centres, rehearse tracing procedures, record keeping, notification and publicity procedures.

Disease awareness and publicity campaigns for farmers, vets and the agricultural community at large.

'Appendix 6 ( 1 )' then continues with an Annex, 'Emergency actions in non-vaccinating countries', which rehearses the expected 'Notification', 'Investigation', 'Confirmation', 'Infected Premises procedures' etc. (ie fundamentally as above, and as practised in the UK for many years), and includes a section explaining the objectives, mechanism and criteria for strategic 'ring' vaccination "which" (latter) "should include the following":

(An analysis of) "species of animals and their densities in the area.

Predicted risk of airborne virus spread.

Geography and other features of the area and practicability of delineating a strategic vaccination zone.

An assessment of the economic consequences for trade.

The presence of valuable breeding stock in the area at risk.

Environmental and welfare considerations and public opinion"(Appendix 6( 1 ) (1993) - Annex 1).

By July 1993 all fifteen Member States had submitted their Contingency Plans, which were approved on the 23^rd July 1993 (Commission Decision 93/455/EEC), subject to a Veterinary Inspection and evaluation, arrangements for which were, extremely slowly, put in hand. Two further documents followed, VI/5211/95- 'Contingency Plans for Epidemic Diseases', and VI/6319/98: 'Guidelines for FMD Contingency Plans in non-vaccinating countries', now redesignated XXIV/2655/1999 - which latter reference presently leads (7/3/03) to an interesting but unsought Report of a recent EC Veterinary Inspection to Greece (2002).

In 1999 the EC began the process of evaluating the Member States Contingency Plans for action against an incursion of FMD -- presumably galvanised into action by experts who were aware of the global advances of Pan Asia 'O'. In March of that year the EC updated their detailed guidelines on FMD contingency plans, adopting the Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (S.C.A.H.A.W.) titled "Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease" (S.C.A.H.A.W.1999) on March 10^th. This document was in response to a request to a working group to establish the 'criteria leading to a decision to implement emergency vaccination against FMD, guidelines for such a proposal' (and for) 'the subsequent movement of animal and animal products …'. In section 3, 'The rationale for the possible use of emergency vaccination', the rationale for such included :-

1) " Fear that after the introduction of FMDV into a free region, it may spread out of control".

2) The availability of high potency vaccines from which "immunity can be induced… within a few days in both cattle and pigs" (thus confirming efficacy and commending use of oil-adjuvanted high- payload vaccines).

3) The "availability of new tests that will differentiate between infected and vaccinated animals" (in their recommendations this Committee state that non-structural proteins [e.g. 3ABC] should not be present in vaccines, to facilitate this test).

4) " Responding to public opposition to the implementation of total stamping out and the demand for an alternative approach or the impossibility of carcass disposal because of concerns about water (carcass burial) or urban air pollution by smoke of carcass burning."

On page 12 (section 5) of this Report, the Committee discussed criteria and factors affecting the decision to implement emergency vaccination, the primary function and task of this working group. They begin the "rapid and objective assessment of the determining parameters is crucial to the decision to commence a vaccination programme", and continue, "If an analysis of parameters gives a result which supports a programme of protective emergency vaccination then the programme must be implemented without delay". A Table then follows, reproduced below, collating 10 criteria 'for' and 'against' emergency vaccination.

TABLE 3. List of Criteria in Decision-making related to 'protective' Emergency Vaccination.

Criteria

For vaccination

Against vaccination

Population density of susceptible animals

High

Low

Clinically affected species

Significant number of pigs involved

Predominantly ruminants

Movement of potentially infected animals or products out of the protection zone

Evidence

No evidence

Predicted airborne spread of virus from infected premises

High

Low or absent

Suitable vaccine

Available

Not available

Origin of outbreaks (traceability)

Unknown

Known

Incidence slope of outbreaks

Rising rapidly

Shallow or slow rise

Distribution of outbreaks

Widespread

Restricted

Public reaction to total stamping out policy

Strong

Weak

Acceptance of regionalisation after vaccination

Yes

Further on, with regard to post-vaccination NSP-tests, the Committee report that "In spite of the uncertainties with regard to vaccinated herds, the Committee is of the opinion that the application of NSP-tests allows for an earlier lifting of the restrictions on the movement of vaccinated animals" -- as came to be endorsed by the OIE in May 2002. In addition the Committee "recognised that the NSP-tests are not yet validated for use in pigs. Until this is done …. use tests for virus isolation in this species".

However, Dr Soren Alexanderson dissented from the remainder of the Committee forming a minority opinion, which appears to have weakened the collective 'Concluding Recommendations' to little more than a mutually agreeable best-practice 'wish list' . Scientifically the Committee pointed to a lot of 'work in progress'; for policy-makers, however, categorical guidelines are absent, other than the recommendation that "National Contingency Plans should consider the possibility of emergency vaccination and provide an estimate of all logistical requirements such as the number of vaccination teams required in different areas, in order to complete the task as rapidly as possible" (S.C.A.H.A.W.1999: 17-18).

In the section following I shall attempt to examine whether these guidelines had been acted upon in the UK, as indeed were the EC on the occasion of their proposed Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) Inspection, belatedly scheduled (to confirm the 1993 Contingency Plan arrangements) for 2001, when, alas, the epidemic intervened.

UK Contingency Plans.

In a submission invited by DEFRA commenting on their 'Interim Contingency Plans', FMD Forum Research Director Jon Dobson observed that he could not …

"…find any publication in the public domain that relates to the VIPER

document that is referred to in Section 14. Without details of the VIPER

document, it is impossible to give an opinion on whether the procedures laid

out within the document are sound" (Dobson 2003).

Jon Dobson's' difficulty in obtaining details of MAFF's Contingency Plans' for FMD prior to February 19^th 2001 has been a common finding - I have to date had no further success with this search, and am therefore obliged to depend upon apocryphal or secondary sources of information.

Fortunately, the Chair of the Lessons Learned Inquiry was able to demand access to the relevant literature, and so we know from him what the Contingency Plans were. According to Dr. Anderson …

"the contingency plans within MAFF consisted of three main parts: the plans submitted to the EU in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 90/423; the instructions issued to the State Veterinary Service for dealing with an FMD outbreak and contained in Chapter 3 of the State Veterinary Service's Veterinary Instructions, Procedures, and Emergency Routines" (referred to in the Lessons Learned Report as the Veterinary Instructions, elsewhere generally as VIPER); "and the local Divisional plans drawn up by each Animal Health Divisional Office".

The Committee of Public Accounts (P.A.C.) recently published (March 2003) their Conclusions and Recommendations after examining the National Audit Office account of the 2001 outbreak, having paid particular regard to three issues -- Contingency Plans, the handling of the outbreak and control of the costs of the outbreak; their analysis of the Contingency Plans is of interest here.

The Select Committee confirm that MAFF had indeed "prepared Contingency Plans" which "comprised a national contingency plan for Great Britain; local contingency plans; and standing field instructions for veterinary and other staff" these latter being the 'VIPER' documents referred to above. The Report continues "The plans were approved by the European Commission in 1993 and had been updated in various ways since then."

The 'updating' referred to was probably the consequence of the 'Drummond Report', an internal State Veterinary Service inquiry carried out in 1999 into the state of national readiness to cope with a major exotic disease incursion. This group, under the Chairmanship of the Assistant Director, Veterinary Field Service (North Region), Richard Drummond, "found considerable variations in the State Veterinary Service's readiness to deal with outbreaks of diseases, including foot and mouth", and "expressed concern that a rapid spread of foot and mouth disease could quickly overwhelm the State Veterinary Services' resources, particularly if a number of outbreaks occurred at the same time" (Select Committee on Public Accounts [PAC] 2003:3).

As it transpired, by 2001 detailed instructions for the deployment of emergency vaccination had been drawn up -- "but these had not been distributed to local offices" (PAC 2003: 7). The Select Committee observed that MAFF had proceeded with 27 of Drummond's 34 recommendations when Classical Swine Fever (CSF) infected the pig population in East Anglia, interrupting the full implementation -- although providing both a dress rehearsal and a stark wake --up call for FMD (CSF also being a swill [or semen] spread disease).

Crucially, and "in line with European Commission guidance, the Department's plans were based on the assumption that there would not be more than ten infected premises at any one time"(PAC 2003:6); yet, in oral evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, Chief Veterinary Officer Jim Scudamore agreed that the "worst case scenario was in 1967", which he held to be "unique," because the importation of Argentinian lamb had "seeded into about 26 farms at once" (Select Committee Minutes of Evidence 3/7/02).

With hindsight, we now know that at least 57 premises were infected by the time the first case was diagnosed; but "the plans did not consider any other scenarios, such as a worst case scenario or one based on the last big outbreak in 1967-68" (PAC 2003:1), nor that a farmer (or vet) might fail either to detect or report FMD, nor that disease might spread 'silently' through sheep.

Conclusion.

Giving evidence to the House of Commons 'Environment Food and Rural Affairs' Select Committee, Dr Anderson, Chair of the Lessons Learned Inquiry, stated that "contingency planning as a whole, and all of the things which support contingency planning, was not a priority in MAFF prior to this" (Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Minutes of Evidence of 23/7/02). This, and other failings, along with the strengths of the plans, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5. Strengths and weaknesses of the Contingency plans.

In the previous chapter I delineated the Contingency Plans against Foot and Mouth Disease incursion as drawn up by the EU and the UK, with the intention of facilitating comparison, permitting easy vision of any incompatibilities and to allow any obvious omissions or weaknesses to become apparent.

In this Chapter I intend to analyse and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both sets of Contingency Plans, both for dealing with Foot and Mouth disease and for other exotic disease incursions. However, it must be appreciated that the Contingency Plans, at least as presently constructed, deal only with 'operational' matters and not issues of 'policy'; therefore questions such as "why are some costs externalised from consideration of policy" (Dr. Ruth Watkins, private correspondence), will not be considered here?

Strengths

The decision by the EU, driven by the UK , to abolish Prophylactic vaccination and adopt 'sanitary measures', (that is, the slaughter of infected and 'dangerous contact' animals, combined with Movement restrictions and disinfection), is estimated to have saved the EC in excess of 800 million ECU's (at 1996 prices) in the first 5 years alone (Institute for Animal Health [I.A.H.] 2002:14). Savings were made in direct costs (vaccines), labour (vaccinating), and stock values enhanced (or consumer purchasing economies effected) by easier trans-EU marketing when the unified European market came into operation on January 1^st 1993. Tellingly,

" Before the policy was implemented it was stated that the money saved by ceasing vaccination would be used to strengthen the periphery of the community against the risk of future virus entry, but that did not happen. On the contrary the borders of the community, especially on the east and southeast are much more porous" (I.A.H.2002: 14) (my emphasis).

Nevertheless, from a UK perspective, apart from two brief episodes, (1974 and 1981), the UK had benefited both from freedom from FMD and the trading benefits arising thereby, for a period of 32 years. "The non-vaccination policy has saved the" (total EC) "farming community more than one Billion Euros so far, permitted free intra-Community trade and enhanced competitiveness of the Community on the world market" (Delegation of the E.C. in Canada 2001) explained an EC apologia in Canada shortly after the confirmation of the 2001 outbreak.

To what extent such can be attributed to effective import controls and rapid implementation of Contingency Plans whenever an alert is called , or to what degree pure luck, is impossible to ascertain, especially in the absence of examination of the epidemiological Reports from the (supposedly) 'false alarms'.

More specifically, when tested in the field in 2001, Dr. Anderson observed that the Plans worked well in Dumfries and Galloway, where the Emergency Services had experienced the Lockerbie air disaster twelve years previously, and had learnt then the benefits of agreed, rehearsed, communicated and co-ordinated contingency planning. The County of Staffordshire was also well served by a Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) who had astutely rehearsed prior to the event, and was thus able to let local knowledge prevail over centralised instruction, to considerable and creditable effect. Furthermore, areas where the disease was limited in scale were reasonably well served, and returned to as near-normality as possible in a reasonable time; it was also noted how well many Staff from diverse locations 'blended and bonded' to overcome the epidemic, and MAFF/DEFRA had succeeded both in preventing recrudescence on restocking, and preventing the virus from establishing endemicity.

Weaknesses inherent in the Contingency Plans of 19^th February 2001.

"If the objects of the policy since February this year were … to eradicate the disease quickly, to restore our overseas markets quickly, to minimise damage to farm incomes and the wider rural economy, and to avoid animal suffering, we have failed spectacularly. What is more, we have generated a bitterness, and a resentment, in parts of our countryside in which rumour and disinformation about the origins and the handling of the crisis now flourish"-- Baroness Mallalieu in her opening address to the 2001 British Veterinary Association annual Congress (Anon.[13/10/01] Veterinary Record 149(15): 437)

That there were weaknesses in the Contingency Plans is best confirmed by honest Government supporters such as the good Baroness (above), corroborated by Dr. Anderson, who, in the introductory section of the chapter on Contingency Plans in his Report from the Lessons Learned Inquiry informed us that the …

"...Government's Memorandum to our Inquiry stated that 'comprehensive contingency plans were in place'. We did not find this to be so" (Anderson 2002:32).

Indeed, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, in their evidence submitted to the 'Lessons Learned Inquiry', stated that "There appear to have been no national contingency plans". MAFF, they said, "seem not to have heeded the recommendations of the Northumberland Report, that in the absence of a meat import policy which would substantially reduce the risks of primary outbreaks occurring, the slaughter policy should be reinforced by a ring vaccination scheme, and that contingency plans for the application of ring vaccination should be kept in constant readiness" (Anon. [30/3/02] Veterinary Record 150(13): 393).

Retrospective analysis has revealed a great many faults in the Contingency Plans -- at least a couple of dozen, all significant, some more so than others; 'ranking' in order of severity is neither easy or asked for, nor shall I attempt it. That said, the fact that the Contingency Plans did not automatically trigger a national livestock movement ban was of fundamental significance, for as a consequence the spread of the disease was greatly increased; Professor Woolhouse of Edinburgh University, and a member of the FMD Science Group, "observed in evidence to the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee that:

'If we had imposed a national movement ban on 20^th February, three days earlier, our estimation is that the epidemic would have been between one third and one half that it actually was'" (Anderson 2002: 60).

Given that the first case was found in an abattoir, with over 600 potential sources of infection, (Crispin and Binns 2002:2) located almost anywhere in the UK, that failure appears almost criminally negligent. Hindsight is not necessary to appreciate that the risk faced would be far greater than that had the first case been found on a farm -- by definition, the authorities knew that they did not know where the Index case lay. Therefore, by allowing normal movements to continue, they were allowing that (unknown) Index premise to operate as usual with the certainty that should that farmer move more stock, or contact other stock elsewhere, that that would lead to further dissemination. Crown immunity has protected MAFF from what a commercial enterprise might otherwise be expected to pay for contributory negligence.

Furthermore, actually at the site of the first case (Cheale's Abattoir), the response was unbelievably slow. Following mutually agreed clinical diagnosis reached by midday on Monday the 19^thof February by three vets, of either Swine Vesicular Disease [S.V.D.], or Foot and Mouth Disease, a sample was sent to Pirbright WRL for differential analysis and confirmation, and Pirbright were informed, (towards the end of the working day), of its impending arrival. Unfortunately, this notification was by e-mail (not telephone), and went unread until the next morning. Following a positive test result, MAFF requested a second confirmatory test. Then the pigs (all 106, not a select few) remained extant, so that Dr. Donaldson (of Pirbright WRL,) could observe clinical symptoms and take further samples himself.

As a consequence, these pigs were alive, amplifying and exhaling a virus plume, considerably more than 30 hours after the original clinical diagnosis -- in an abattoir where slaughter could have been almost immediate! These delays were occasioned, accidentally or deliberately, by the very people best placed to understand the need for speed of action.

MAFF's Contingency Plans had followed the EC recommended principle of carrying sufficient staff to cope with 10 simultaneously infected premises (including allowing for surveillance in the 3 kilometre Protection Zone [PZ] around each). In preparing Contingency Plans, the State Veterinary Service had envisaged two scenarios, both of 10 outbreaks each, one of greater severity than the other (due to having potentially more infected premises inside the PZ). As the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee concluded - "The Department had not considered any other scenarios because it felt that the risks of foot and mouth disease were low. This was a serious misjudgement" (Public Accounts Committee 2003:10).

In the event, "at least 57 premises were infected before the initial diagnosis was made" (Anderson 2002:36). The scale of the outbreak was immediately far greater than any that Contingency Planning had envisaged; and yet, no alternative strategies existed. A 'worst-case' scenario had been considered but not defined, nor plans laid for if such occurred. The plans, in short, were insufficiently comprehensive, having failed to consider all 'contingencies'.

In the more severe instance referred to above, it was "demonstrated that the UK would need 235 veterinary officers…. MAFF estimated that in a more extensive outbreak, the number of staff needed might rise to 300" (Anderson 2002:36). However, the 'severe' instance was a fraction of the reality that actually occurred. Thus, the SVS staff and facilities were almost immediately overwhelmed. As Dr Anderson points out (page 36), during the course of the outbreak over 2500 Temporary Veterinary Inspectors (TVI's) were appointed and a further 700 foreign government vets and other secondees assisted on a temporary basis.

In the course of 2002, it became known to the wider community (outside the SVS) that in early 1999, Richard Drummond, Assistant Director of the North Region Veterinary Field Service (ADVFS) , had completed a report commissioned six months previously, investigating "the current state of readiness of the SVS and other involved organisations to deal with outbreaks of exotic notifiable disease" (Drummond 1999:1).

Working in conjunction with half a dozen colleagues, Drummond prepared a questionnaire, anonymity guaranteed, to probe and ascertain the real regional readiness. His report has a prescience akin to hindsight and pointed clearly to deficiencies in staff training, exotic disease awareness, the loss of expertise through natural wastage (aggravated by a high turnover of staff moving on to more lucrative posts elsewhere), combined with an ignorance, if not complacency, born out of many year