Version 4.0
Defra
Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan
FOREWORD
This Contingency Plan takes forward the Government’s commitment to implement the recommendations of the Inquiries into the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001. The Lessons Learned Inquiry stressed the importance of contingency planning, the need to react with speed and certainty, and the importance of clear and consistent communication with interested parties.
The plan sets out the structures and systems that would be immediately implemented in an outbreak and describes the capability that would enable the speedy provision of resources to bring into operation the Government’s control policies. It has been developed with input from stakeholders and acknowledges the importance of greater engagement with operational partners, particularly local authorities, both in developing emergency preparedness and dealing with a disease outbreak.
The purpose of publishing this Plan is to make transparent the way in which FMD control policies would be implemented in the event of an outbreak. In this sense it is an operational plan. It is intended only to indicate how Defra and its partners would implement the agreed policies. It will be subject to regular review taking on lessons learned from exercises, policy developments, the latest scientific advice and comments from stakeholders and operational partners.
The Plan fits into the framework of the EU approved Contingency Plan and is augmented by the detailed SVS instructions dealing with operational disease control and the particular local aspects of the control operation that are contained in plans maintained by each Animal Health Divisional Office.
This Plan will be brought into use not only in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, but also to provide the structures, frameworks and systems that would be necessary for the control of other exotic diseases. They have been developed against the background of the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak and may be modified and developed during future operations. They are the initial framework for managing an outbreak in a structured way, but they are not intended to constrain the way the control operation develops. The Plan provides at present a clear and public operational plan which would guide Defra and those with whom it works in dealing with an outbreak of exotic disease and informs the public and all those who might be affected by the control measures.
The Plan sets out how the disease would be controlled were there to be an outbreak tomorrow. It does not consider the costs of implementation or how these costs are to be met. It is however, the Government’s view that there needs to be a fairer balance between farmers and tax payers in meeting the costs of animal diseases. The view is supported by the Curry Commission, the Lessons Learned Inquiry into FMD 2001 and the PAC report. A Defra-led working group comprising stakeholders from the livestock and insurance industries met several times in early 2002 to explore various policy options, including compulsory and voluntary insurance as well as a levy scheme, to share the costs of future disease outbreaks. The group concluded that a levy scheme would be preferable to the other options. The Government agrees and has decided that a levy scheme is its preferred option for consultation and further development. This work is continuing with a view to launching a wide ranging consultation exercise in mid-2004. This will cover compensation for animals which are compulsorily slaughtered and other disease control costs.
This Plan replaces the version laid before Parliament and published on the Defra website on 28 March 2003. It is drafted to operate under current legislation but also includes references to the potential changes to be made as a result of further anticipated domestic legislation to incorporate the provisions of the new FMD Directive (Council Directive 2003/85/EEC). Annex F provides a diagram of some of the measures, as set out in the FMD Directive, that may be applied in certain areas for disease control purposes.
The Plan reflects changes and developments over the last year and builds on input from key operational partners. It incorporates the Biosecurity guidance which was the subject of a separate consultation, includes guidance on the release of data during an outbreak and anticipates the establishment of a permanent Expert Group, as referred to in the FMD Directive.
The Plan reflects the provisions of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002) by reference to emergency vaccination and the Decision Tree for disease control strategies and the disease control slaughter protocol for use in the event of a pre-emptive cull.
This version of the Contingency Plan takes into account comments received, operational additions to the plan and lessons learned from exercises. It has been the subject of considerable consultation with stakeholders and reflects as far as possible the comments that have been made. As a living document it will always be open for further comment.
. • The latest version of the Contingency Plan will be displayed on the Defra website at all times with a box for comments allowing ongoing opportunity for comment.
. • Timely meetings will be held with stakeholders so that views can be included in the process of the development of the Plan.
. • Proposals for significant changes of policy affecting the Plan will be subject to separate consultation exercises. Consultation letters will explain that the end result will form part of the Plan. To avoid consultation ‘fatigue’ we will not always consult on the whole Plan when only these policy changes are incorporated. However, interested parties will be written to in order to let them know of the changes to the Plan and we will also place a clear message on the Defra website;
. • Where changes of factual information relating to Defra operational arrangements occur, appropriate written consultation exercises will be carried out.
. • Regardless of any separate consultations on particular issues, a full written consultation on the Plan will take place at least annually.
Operational Instructions to carry out the requirements of this contingency plan are contained within the State Veterinary Service Instructions - VIPER (Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines) Chapter 3. This is available to the public in the Defra library, Room 320A, Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR and may be viewed by appointment by telephone: 0207 238 6575 (please allow 24 hours notice).
A project to consolidate the existing version into a web based document, capturing and collating experiences gained during 2001 to provide a consistent response based on best practices identified during and following the outbreak is under way. The revised re-presented chapter should be completed and publicly available on the Defra website in April 2004.
Defra are developing a series of exercises over the first 6 months of 2004. These will culminate in a final exercise in June 2004. This will be a full invocation of the Defra response at HQ level and in 5 Animal Health Divisional Offices involving operational partners and several other external agencies. In addition to the national exercise, Animal Health Divisional Offices have been and will continue to hold local exercises, seminars and training days.
The Plan and instructions are being exercised under a variety of scenarios.
The prompt detection and reporting of the initial outbreak of disease are crucial in limiting the ultimate scale of the emergency, and arrangements to enhance surveillance are being taken forward under the Veterinary Surveillance Strategy which was launched in October 2003. Part of this strategy aims to upgrade the use of information on the numbers and location of livestock, which will be important in the smooth operation of this contingency plan in the event of an outbreak. Management of the outbreak will also depend upon the availability of geographical information systems and expertise which are being developed outwith this plan.
An updated illegal imports action plan for 2003-2004 was published in June 2003, which consolidates and builds upon progress made since March 2002. Since 1 January 2003 the import of meat, milk and their products into the United Kingdom (UK) from most non-European Union (EU) countries for personal use has been prohibited. There are also restrictions on other products of animal origin. The concession which provides for small quantities of controlled plants and plant products to be imported by travellers from outside the EU for personal use is currently under review.
To improve effectiveness of border controls, all anti-smuggling activity was transferred to Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise on 11 April 2003 and this is proving successful. It also means that more stringent penalties for smuggling prohibited or restricted items of up to seven years’ imprisonment and/or unlimited fines, could be applied through prosecution under the Customs and Excise Management Act. All Customs officers have powers to seize illegal imports.
HM Customs has four mobile strike teams dedicated to the enforcement of restrictions on products of animal origin (POAO). They have also increased the number of detector dogs teams trained to tackle smuggling of POAO. This enforcement activity will be further enhanced over the coming financial year.
A leaflet setting out in detail the rules on personal imports is being distributed via HM Customs, who have taken over responsibility for publicity at our ports and airports. Revised posters are on display in more prominent positions at ports and airports.
CONTENTS
Page
GLOSSARY 10
Section 1 – Background, Structures and Policies
1.1 Background 15
1.5 Outline of Command Structures 15
Single-Line Command Structure for Control of FMD 18
Diagram showing the development and inter-relationship of
veterinary and scientific advice 19
Daily Battle Rhythm 20
Section 2 - Alert System & States of Alert
2.2 Action on Suspicion of FMD 21
2.7 AMBER - Action on Suspicion of FMD 21
2.19 RED - Initial Action on Confirmation of FMD 24
2.21 Policies to be applied on confirmation of FMD 25
Section 3 - Resources
3.1 Involvement of the Armed Forces 27
3.5 Human Resources 27
3.5 Veterinary Personnel 27
3.8 Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and Divisional
Operations Managers (DOMs) 28
3.12 Administrative, Field and Technical Personnel 29
3.23 Legal Services 30
3.26 Vaccination Teams 31
3.28 Involvement of Stakeholders and Operational Partners 31
3.31 Training & Exercises 32
3.31 Veterinary Training 32
3.33 AHDO training 32
3.34 Induction Training 32
3.37 Media Training 33
3.38 Contingency Planning Exercises 33
3.39 Health & Safety & Staff Welfare 33
3.44 Accommodation 34
3.48 Information Technology & Data Systems 35
3.49 Disease Control System (DCS) 35
3.55 Financial System 36
3.57 Procurement 36
3.57 General - Procurement & Commercial Contracting
Contingency Plan 36
3.64 National/Regional/Local Contingency Agreements &
Supply Contingency Arrangements 37
3.69 Financial Control 38
3.73 Arrangements for Financial Control in NDCC 38
3.74 Arrangements for Financial Control in LDCCs 39
3.77 Equipment and Stores 40
3.77 National Minimum Stocking Levels 40
3.78 Divisional Minimum Stocking Levels 40
3.80 Stores to Supply Vaccination Teams 40
Section 4 - Key Operations
4.1 Emergency Vaccination 41
4.6 Animal Welfare 42
4.13 Conservation of “Farm Animal Genetic Resources” 43
4.14 Valuation 43
4.18 Protection and Surveillance Zones 44
4.19 Immediate ban on moving livestock 44
4.24 Biosecurity Guidance 45
4.26 Disposal 45
4.30 Incineration 46
4.34 Rendering 46
4.37 Licensed Commercial Landfill sites 47
4.40 On-Farm burial 47
4.41 Pyre Burning 47
4.43 Serology 48
4.49 Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group 49
4.55 Cleansing & Disinfection of Affected Premises 50
4.57 Rodent Control 50
Section 5 - Management Information & Communications
5.1 Management Information & Disease Control Information 51
5.5 Communications 51
5.5 Media 51
5.7 Website 52
5.9 Helplines 52
5.10 Central Co-ordination 52
5.12 Notifiable Disease Awareness Programmes 53
5.13 Responding to requests for information 53
5.19 Mobile Assurance Team 54
Section 6 - Strategic Level Plan
6.1 Background and Scope 55
Strategic Aims and Objectives 57
Battle Rhythm – Strategic Level 58
Key Strategic Structures and roles 59
Defra Emergency Management Board Meeting - Agenda 61
Strategic Level Roles 72
6.9 FMD Expert Group 77
6.13 Epidemiology 78
6.14 National Emergencies Epidemiology Group 78
Section 7 - Tactical Level Plan
7.1 Background & Scope 79
7.7 Activation 79
7.9 NDCC Team Tasks 80
Map of Initial High Level Actions following confirmation of
FMD Outbreak 81
7.23 Stakeholders 83
7.24 Co-ordination 84
7.27 Corporate Communications 84
7.28 Meetings 84
Battle Rhythm – Tactical (NDCC) Level 86
Section 8 - Operational Level Plan
8.1 Background & Scope 88
8.3 Objectives 88
8.7 Activation Process 89
8.11 Involvement of Stakeholders & Operational Partners 89
Page
Page
Battle Rhythm – Operational (LDCC) Level 90
ANNEXES
Page
Annex A General Legislation 91
Annex B Veterinary Guidance for initial action on suspect
Annex F Diagram showing Protection Zone and
Annex G Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for
Annex H Protocol for restrictions on public rights of way
Annex J Communications - Action by Communications
Contact with Farm Animals
Premises with Farm Animals During an Outbreak
of an Exotic Notifiable Disease
cases 93
Annex C Decision Tree 94
Annex D Slaughter Protocol 110
Annex E Emergency Vaccination Arrangements 113
Surveillance Zone. 117
Rights of Way Closures 118
and access to open country, in the event of an
outbreak of Foot and Mouth or similar animal
diseases. 123
Annex I Contacts List 128
Directorate 132
Annex K Data Protection Act 137
Annex L Organograms of Key Structures - NDCC 138
Annex M Format of FMD Daily Situation Report (SITREP) 139
Annex N Health & Safety Plan 140
Annex O Welfare Service Plan 142
Annex P Biosecurity Advice and Guidance 144
Annex P (A) General Biosecurity Measures when in Direct 152
Annex P (B) Additional Biosecurity Measures when Visiting 154
Page
Annex P (C) Measures which must be Observed for Visits to
Premises Under Specific Restrictions 155
Annex Q Key Stakeholders - Capabilities 156
Annex R Devolved Administrations 160
-Scotland 160
-Wales 161
Glossary
ACPO
Association of Chief Police Officers
ACVO
Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer
AHDO
Animal Health Divisional Office
AHO
Animal Health Officer
AHWD
Animal Health and Welfare Directorate
AMED
Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division
ASD
Accounting Services Division
CA
Countryside Agency
C&D
Cleansing and Disinfection
CCC
Civil Contingencies Committee
CCC(O)
Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials)
CCS
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office)
CD
Communications Directorate
CMO
Chief Medical Officer
COBR
Cabinet Office Briefing Room
Comms
Communications
CP
Contiguous Premises
CSA
Chief Scientific Adviser (Defra)
CSD
Corporate Services Division
CVO
Chief Veterinary Officer
DARDNI
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern
Ireland
DC
Dangerous Contact – These are animals of susceptible species
which are believed to have been exposed to infection.
DCMS
Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DCS
Disease Control System Database
DCVO
Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Director Vet Policy
Defra
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DG
Director General
DGLS
Director General Legal Services (Defra)
DG LURA
Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs (Defra)
DG OSD
Director General Operations and Service Delivery (Defra)
DHSM Departmental Health and Safety Manager DHSU Departmental Health and Safety Unit DOH Department of Health DOM Divisional Operations Manager DOT Department of Transport DVM Divisional Veterinary Manager DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EA Environment Agency EC European Commission EDG Emergency Direction Group EFRA Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Select Committee) ESA Environment Services Association ESSD Estate Strategy and Services Division EU European Union ExDCS Exotics Disease Control System
FMD Foot and Mouth Disease FSA Food Standards Agency
GICS Government Information and Communication Service GIS Geographic Information Systems GNN Government News Network GOs Government Offices in the Regions
H&S Health and Safety HASANS Defra Departmental Health and Safety Notices HOD Head of Division HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury HPA Health Protection Agency HQ Defra Headquarters HR Human Resources HSE Health and Safety Executive HsVS Heads of Veterinary Services in Defra Regions HVS Head of Veterinary Services
IAH Pirbright Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright IP Infected Premises ITD Information Technology Division LA Local Authority LACORS Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services LASSA Licensed Animal Slaughterers and Salvage Association LDCC Local Disease Control Centre LGA Local Government Association LSDG Legal Services Directorate General LURA Land Use and Rural Affairs
Local Veterinary Inspector
MOD Ministry of Defence MPs Members of Parliament
NAO National Audit Office NCC News Co-ordination Centre NDCC National Disease Control Centre NFU National Farmers Union NSP Non-structural protein NWMT National Wildlife Management Team
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister OD SEC Cabinet Office Overseas & Defence Secretariat OD(W) Operations Director Wales OGD Other Government Department OIE Office International des Epizooties OSD Operations and Service Delivery OST Office of Science and Technology
PCD Procurements and Contracts Division PERT Procurement Emergency Response Team
“Pre-emptive” or “preventative slaughter” “firebreak” cull
This involves the culling of animals which are not on infected premises nor are dangerous contacts or necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of disease outwith an area. Use of this power is described by a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol as required by the Animal Health Act 1981, as amended.
PZ Protection Zone
RCU RDS RIDDOR
ROD RPA RSAP WG
SAC SAHO SAPER
SEAC
SEERAD SEPA Sitrep SLA SOS SCOFCAH SVS SVSCP
SZ
TVI
VIPER
VA VEXDD VLA VO VTVS
WAG WAG ARAD
Regional Co-ordination Unit (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) Rural Development Service Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurances Regulations Regional Operations Director Rural Payments Agency (Defra Agency) Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group
Science Advisory Council (Defra) Senior Animal Health Officer Science Advisory Panel for Emergency Response Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department Scottish Environment Protection Agency Situation Report Service Level Agreement Slaughter on Suspicion Standing Committees on Food Chain and Animal Health State Veterinary Service State Veterinary Service Contingency Planning Division Surveillance Zone
Temporary Veterinary Inspector
Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines (State Veterinary Service Operational Instructions) Veterinary Adviser Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division Veterinary Laboratory Agency, Weybridge Veterinary Officer Vetnet Tracing Verification System
Welsh Assembly Government Welsh Assembly Government Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly infectious viral disease affecting cloven-hoofed animals, in particular cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer. Other susceptible animals include some wild animals such as coypu, deer and zoo animals including elephants.
Fever is followed by the development of vesicles or blisters - chiefly in the mouth or on the feet. There are 7 main types of virus, which produce similar clinical signs and which can only be differentiated in the laboratory.
FMD can spread by direct or indirect contact with infected animals. Infected animals begin by excreting the virus a few days before signs of the disease develop. Pigs in particular produce large numbers of virus particles. The disease is spread mechanically by the movement of animals, persons, vehicles and other things, which have been contaminated by the virus. Airborne spread of the disease can also take place. The prevailing meteorological conditions and local topography determine the distance that the disease can travel and this may be considerable.
Meat from the carcases of animals infected with FMD at the time of slaughter can transmit the virus. In the past, outbreaks of the disease have been linked with the importation of infected meat and meat products.
Advice from the Department of Health is that it is very rare for humans to be affected by FMD. There has only been one recorded case of FMD in a human being in Great Britain in 1966. The general effects of the disease in that case were similar to influenza with some blisters. The Food Standards Agency has advised that the disease has no implications for the human food chain.
The Foot and Mouth virus can be destroyed by heat, low humidity, or certain disinfectants, but it may remain active for a varying time in a suitable medium such as the frozen or chilled carcase of an infected animal and on contaminated objects.
Good biosecurity is required to stop onward spread.
BACKGROUND
1. 1.1 The legislation under which Government action is taken to control foot and mouth disease is set out at Annex A This Contingency Plan sets out the framework for dealing with an outbreak implementing that legislation. It augments the structures provided by the EU approved contingency plan. The Plan provides and details the necessary practices to enable the legislation listed in Annex A to be met and implemented. It is a working document subject to regular review and update.
2. 1.2 The Plan follows guidance produced by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and Defra’s Emergencies Unit.
3. 1.3 This framework document within the framework of the EU approved Contingency Plan and taken together with the State Veterinary Service operational instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) and local contingency plans form Defra’s FMD contingency plans. The State Veterinary Service operational instructions (VIPER Chapter 3) include detailed guidance and instruction for staff in local Animal Health Divisional Offices (or Local Disease Control Centres) and the National Disease Control Centre. Local plans, prepared by AHDOs, include local procedures and contact lists to allow the implementation of VIPER Chapter 3 instructions and the National Contingency Plan. This ensures a consistent national approach whilst allowing necessary adaptation to local circumstances. This framework contingency plan does not re-iterate VIPER Chapter 3 and local instructions. This Plan provides a clear view of the structures, roles and responsibilities required at strategic and tactical levels in order to support the operations on the ground.
4. 1.4 The Plan is based on established veterinary procedures and also incorporates some of the control policies that developed from the experience of the 2001 outbreak.
OUTLINE OF COMMAND STRUCTURES
Command and Control
1.5 The response to a disease alert will be controlled using a Strategic, Tactical and Operational command structure.
Strategic Command
1. 1.6 Purpose: To provide high level command and control at all stages of an animal disease outbreak, enabling a cross departmental response which gives clear strategic direction. Initially Defra Management Board, but rapid establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC and/or CCC(O)) which will include Ministers (both Defra and other Government Departments), Defra Permanent Secretary, Defra Directors General (including the Chief Veterinary Officer), Directors of: State Veterinary Service and Defra Communications Directorate and senior officials from other relevant Government Departments (as below).
2. 1.7 Representatives from No. 10, Devolved Administrations (SEERAD, WAG ARAD), Cabinet Office (Civil Contingencies Secretariat), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Regional Co-ordination Unit), Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, Department of Health, Home Office (and Association of Chief Police Officers), Ministry of Defence, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Department for Transport, HM Treasury, Food Standards Agency, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Trade and Industry, Health Protection Agency.
3. 1.8 Defra’s Science Advisory Council (SAC) exists to ratify, audit, advise and guide the development of the control strategies that are implemented by Defra and its agents. It will also need to consider whether SAPER should be involved. The mechanisms for activating SAPER require the departmental Permanent Secretary or Chief Scientific Adviser to write to the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, or, in his absence the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, copied to the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser.
Tactical Command
1.9 Purpose: Twofold.
1) To provide a co-ordinated response to the direction received from the Strategic Group and provide operational feedback.
2) To devise tactics for operational implementation.
Emergency Direction Group and National Disease Control Centre (NDCC). Includes representatives from other Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, executive agencies and key operational partners including the local authorities and Defra Directors (FMD Operations, Communications, Veterinary Policy, Animal Health and Welfare (and Livestock Strategy Division), Corporate Services, Finance, Environment Quality and Waste, Rural Economies and Communities and Legal Services A).
Operational Command
1.10 Purpose: Twofold.
1) To implement contingency plans, working with stakeholders to ensure effective control of the disease outbreak.
2) To receive tactical guidance and implement it in liaison with other local responders and provide regular feedback.
Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) under Regional Operations Director/Divisional Veterinary Manager control; to include representatives from relevant agencies, local authorities, other key stakeholders and operational partners (see Annex Q).
1. 1.11 N.B. This Plan covers operations in England. Annex R sets out outline details of the contingency plans for Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland also has a separate contingency plan, details of which are not outlined in this plan as the island of Ireland is treated as a separate epidemiological entity.
2. 1.12 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree (Annex C) will be followed in deciding what action to take.
Diagram showing Single-Line Command Structure for Control of Foot and Mouth Disease
Civil Contingencies Committees
Defra Emergency Strategic Level
Management Board
(including Director General Operations and Service Delivery)
Director of
Operations
(Director of State
Tactical Level
Veterinary Service)
National Disease Control Centre
Local Disease Control Centre Regional Operations Director Operational Level
Divisional Veterinary Divisional Operations Finance
Regional Manager Manager Manager
Resilience Teams, Local Authorities, Environment Agency, Police
Operational Personnel Devolved Administrations, Operational Partners, Government Depts & Agencies, Stakeholder Representation
Stakeholder representation, Operational Partners,
Science feed to policy and tactical levels is shown in the diagram on Page 19.
DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN
Diagram showing the development and inter relationship of veterinary and scientific advice and their input to decision making
DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN
DAILY BATTLE RHYTHM
07:30-08:00
08:00-08:30
09:30-10:30
10:30-11:30
11:30-12:00
12:00-12:30
14:30-15:00
15:15-16:00
16:15-17:15
18:00
19:00-19:30
21:00
Strategic
Daily Comms Meeting
Civil Contingen- cies Committee (Officials) CCC(O)
Civil Contingen- cies Committee
Media Briefing
Defra Manage- ment Board (if required)
Tactical (NDCC)
Birdtable
Emergency Direction Group (10:45-11:15)
Birdtable
RODs Teleconfer ence
Emergency Direction Group (if required)
Receive RODs Sitrep
Birdtable
NDCC Report Compiled and Circulated
Operational (LDCC)
Birdtable
Daily Manage- ment Comms Meeting
Media Briefing
Birdtable
RODs Teleconfer ence
Send SitReps to NDCC
Birdtable
20
2.1 A standard alert system has been adopted as a basis for planning the response to a disease outbreak. Alert states of ‘Amber’ (in the case of suspicion of disease) and ‘Red’ (on confirmation of the first case of disease) will be called.
ACTION ON SUSPICION OF FMD
1. 2.2 Any suspicion of FMD must be reported to the local Animal Health Division Office (AHDO) of the State Veterinary Service who will take action according to SVS instructions. Annex B of this Plan indicates the local veterinary action to be taken in relation to the level of suspicion.
2. 2.3 All investigations into suspicion of disease are reported to Headquarters.
3. 2.4 Responsibility for providing and communicating information on a case of suspect disease, including laboratory results, lies with Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division (VEXD) who use Notification of Disease form NDI 1 to notify Defra Ministers, appropriate Senior Officials within Defra and key veterinary and policy personnel in HQ and the regions, including the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Director of the State Veterinary Service. The NDI 1 form records the appropriate level of suspicion as described in Annex B.
4. 2.5 Out of Hours notification is the responsibility of the Duty Veterinary Adviser and Duty Press Officer. As the Duty VA is unlikely to have immediate access to the necessary IT equipment, notification of suspicion of disease will be made via telephone calls. Key veterinary and policy staff will be notified of developments and an NDI 1 circulated at the first available opportunity
5. 2.6 If the level of suspicion is recorded as Level 1 or above the status of alert will be Amber and the following action will be taken.
AMBER
a) The following protocol governing the distribution and timing of release of information on test results, both internally and externally, will be followed:
Communications Protocol - Laboratory Test Results on a suspect case
2.7 Information will be made available as soon as possible. To enable this a discussion, normally by conference call, will take place with the CVO or nominated representative leading and those listed below participating.
CVO
DG OSD
Director SVS
AHWD - Director or Head of Division
LSDG - Director or Head of Division
CD (and GNN)
Private Offices
No. 10
VEXDD
SVS Contingency Planning
DVM
HVS
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
News Co-ordination Centre
SEERAD
WAG ARAD
1. 2.8 The arrangements for convening the conference call will be undertaken by CD (out of hours the duty press officer will be notified by the Duty Veterinary Advisor in AHWD). A list of contact names and numbers for internal principals and their deputies will be maintained by AHWD and available from the Defra Duty Officer and the SVS Home Duty Clerk.
2. 2.9 The agenda for the communications teleconference call will comprise (with a report from bracketed party)
1. Situation Report - National (CVO or nominated
representative)
-Local (DVM)
1. 2. Timescale (CVO or nominated representative)
2. 3. Risk assessment (CVO or nominated representative/DVM)
3. 4. Communications objectives (Director of Communications)
4. 5. Stakeholder Handling (national and local) (AHWD, DVM)
5. 6. Agreed lines to take/press notice (Director of Communications)
6. 7. Time of release and action points (CVO or nominated representative)
2.10 The following will then take responsibility for informing externally at an agreed time:
�.- DVM: individual farmer (DVM to alert CD/regional GNN as soon as the individual is told and before informing other external groups);
�.- DVM: Emergency planning departments of relevant local authorities, local police force, the Environment Agency, local NFU and local large animal veterinary practices;
�.- DVM: local stakeholders, local vets and farmers;
- DCVO (policy): RCVS and BVA
- AHWD: NFU (HQ)
- DG OSD: CCS, RCU and EA
- CD/GNN: media, website, helpline, intranet (and other internal communications to Defra staff), GNN
1. 2.11 News Releases will be drafted by AHWD in conjunction with CD and must be sent to all internal principals (particularly the DVM and HVS) before being released externally.
2. 2.12 Questions about test results and timing of their delivery must be addressed to the CVO or nominated contact.
End of Protocol
1. 2.13 The Director of the SVS will put the relevant ROD & DOM on alert and will put the relevant Head of Veterinary Service on immediate standby to cover the ROD post until such time as the nominated ROD can take up position (within approx. 48 hours). Heads of Veterinary Service will debrief and provide a ‘handover’ to RODs (and DOMs) upon their arrival.
2. 2.14 The Director General Operations and Service Delivery will notify the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat of the suspect case.
3. 2.15 The Director of the SVS will consider authorising the establishment of a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC). The Director of the SVS will also put all nominated Heads of NDCC cells on alert and will consider the establishment of some elements of the National Disease Control Centre (SVS Instructions contain detailed plans for establishment and resourcing).
4. 2.16 SVS Contingency Planning Division will activate the Emergency First Response Team. The EFRT will be actively involved in the early stages of managing an animal disease outbreak. They will set up the first operational desks in the Disease Reporting Team of the NDCC.
5. 2.17 The Head of Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division will contact SVS ITU in order to instigate the set up of Defra’s Disease Control System (current ‘up and running’ time is 24 – 48 hours).
6. 2.18 In some cases where laboratory confirmation is awaited and the veterinary assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting, the Chief Veterinary Officer may take the decision to move to red alert before final confirmation is received. In this case all action indicated as required under ‘Red’ alert will be immediately initiated.
RED - INITIAL ACTION ON CONFIRMATION OF FMD
2.19 If the suspected case is subsequently confirmed by the CVO as having disease or if the risk assessment indicates, the alert state will immediately be raised to ‘Red’ and the following action will take place:-
. • the Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division will notify Defra Ministers and senior officials, other government departments, devolved administrations and agencies and organisations directly affected;
. • the DCVO (policy) will inform the European Commission, OIE, and national veterinary organisations;
. • The Director General Operations and Service Delivery will notify the Home and Special Forces Secretariat, the Regional Co-ordination Unit and Directors of the relevant Government Offices in the Regions;
. • The Chief Veterinary Officer will notify the Department of Health and Health Protection Agency;
. • The Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs will notify the Department for Culture, Media and Sports;
. • the Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and the National Disease Control Centre. SVS Instructions contain detailed plans for their establishment and resourcing;
. • the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify all DVMs and Heads of Veterinary Services to ensure that AHDOs are staffed immediately to deal with enquiries from the public and support tracing requirements;
. • the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will also notify Head of Procurement and Contracts Division, nominated heads of NDCC cells from within Defra, those who will be invited to be represented in the NDCC, and nominated RODs and DOMs;
. • the Head of SVS CP Division will alert the vaccination contractors and put them on stand-by, subject to further direction from the Strategic Group. As soon as the FMD strain responsible for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the available vaccines will afford protection, the Head of AMED Division will instruct the relevant contractor to formulate vaccine;
. • an Emergency Management Board will be convened as soon as possible and will take a decision on triggering the Civil Contingencies Committee on the basis of emerging information about the disease;
• other Government Departments, operational partners and key local stakeholders such as local authorities will be notified as soon as possible. Utilities will be notified by LDCCs as set out in the SVS instructions.
NB. Detail of who should contact whom is set out at Annex I.
2.20 Action to be taken to establish the NDCC and relevant LDCC and to control the disease is set out in detail in the SVS instructions and the AHDO contingency plans.
OUTLINE OF POLICIES
2.21 The following policies will be applied on confirmation of FMD: (Note: The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)
. • A GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place immediately.
. • Export health certificates for animals and animal products will be withdrawn. Exports from GB of susceptible animals during the risk period will be identified and notified to the importing countries.
. • Diseased and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled with a target of within 24 hours of report. Dangerous contacts will be culled with a target of within 48 hours of report.
. • Emergency Vaccination will immediately be considered as an option based upon emerging epidemiological and logistical factors. If emergency vaccination is used it would be on the basis of vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.
. • A Protection Zone will be imposed with a minimum radius of 3km around the Infected Premises and a Surveillance Zone with a minimum radius of 10km. In the Protection Zone no animal movements will be allowed except for movement to emergency slaughter. In both the Protection and Surveillance Zones, there will be requirements for increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms. Movement of animals, animal products, feed and bedding will be prohibited, except under licence. Products from animals in these zones will be subject to treatment to ensure destruction of the FMD virus. This is an animal health measure rather than a public health measure. Such treatments include the pasteurisation of milk (normal process for most milk produced in the UK), heat treatment or de-boning and maturation of milk.
. • Disposal by incineration will be implemented immediately with rendering as the next option and other disposal routes being available as an additional resource subject to environmental, land use planning and public health considerations.
. • Footpaths will only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex G).
1. 2.22 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree for FMD control strategies (Annex C) will be followed in deciding what action to take. This sets out the factors the Government will take into account in deciding which strategy to adopt in order to control and eradicate the disease. The Animal Health Act 1981, as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002, lays a duty on the Secretary of State to consider vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of the disease. Wherever possible this would be on the basis of emergency vaccinate-to-live. If a decision not to vaccinate were taken the reasons would be explained before further measures were introduced. Consultation with interested parties, to address outstanding technical, commercial and communications issues on emergency vaccination is continuing.
2. 2.23 Additional control strategies include:
. • culling of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and
. • pre-emptive or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals not on infected premises, not dangerous contacts or not necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of the disease outwith an area.
2.24 A Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol setting out the requirements that must be followed in the event of a pre-emptive cull is at Annex D.
Further Action
2.25 Once FMD is confirmed the main elements of this plan are brought into action.
Section 3 sets out the resources that would be deployed;
Section 4 describes the key operations that have a central input;
Section 5 sets out the main elements of the Communications Plan;
Section 6 describes the strategic organisations and structures;
Section 7 the tactical organisation; and
Section 8 the operational plan.
These last two are augmented by the SVS instructions and the local office contingency plans.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
1. 3.1 On suspicion of disease, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery will contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat to notify of the suspect case. Immediately a case of FMD is confirmed, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery will again contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat to inform of the outbreak so that, if necessary, aid can be sought with the minimum delay. If it were decided that it was necessary to seek aid from the armed forces, aid would be provided under the ‘Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’ (MACA) arrangements, subject to other Armed Forces commitments. The Armed Forces may provide assistance with logistic capability and it may be appropriate to deploy at both tactical (Tactical command) and operational (Operational command) levels.
2. 3.2 Contact details for MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat can be found at Annex I.
3. 3.3 The Armed Forces will have their own command and control structure with overall co-ordination of their effort being controlled by Armed Forces HQ Land. It is not appropriate for regional staff to approach Army Brigade headquarters directly. All requests for initial assistance must be passed through NDCC.
4. 3.4 Brigade Commanders will take direction (but not commands) from RODs/DVMs and will need to be given clear aims and objectives. The local military commander will decide how best to use their troops based on these aims and the directions received. Military Liaison Officers should be posted to LDCCs to take on a local strategic co-ordination function.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Veterinary Personnel
Identification of UK government veterinary personnel
3.5 On authority from the Director SVS individual veterinary staff will be alerted with immediate effect and deployed as instructed by Divisional Veterinary Managers. (SVS instructions and local office contingency plans expand on these arrangements). HR will contact vets from the following sources to secure additional assistance:
. • Retired veterinary staff
. • Veterinary staff from Defra agencies and other government departments.
Identification of non-government veterinary personnel
3.6 Pending new permanent arrangements private veterinary Surgeons in GB and abroad will be engaged as casual veterinary staff. Those who are already local veterinary inspectors (LVIs) will undertake work in that capacity.
Identification of overseas government veterinary personnel
3.7 If overseas government veterinary resource is deemed necessary following risk assessment and epidemiological advice, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will send a formal request to the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve countries. The CVO will also send a formal request to EU Member States if necessary. Induction briefing for incoming veterinary surgeons will be arranged at London HQ through Service Delivery Division. Training will be provided at Local DCCs.
Identification of Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and Divisional Operations Managers (DOMs)
1. 3.8 Members of the Senior Civil Service have been appointed for three years as contingency Regional Operations Directors (RODs) to take up post in the event of an outbreak and lead the LDCCs. They have been allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. SVS Contingency Planning Division maintains a list of RODs.
2. 3.9 When Amber is declared the Director of the SVS will alert the Head of Veterinary Service for that SVS Region to be on immediate standby to take up post as ROD. A contingency ROD for that region will also be alerted to replace the HVS as soon as possible to lead the LDCC so that the HVS can be transferred to strengthen veterinary management at HQ. Heads of Veterinary Service will debrief and provide a handover to RODs (and DOMs) upon their arrival.
1. 3.10 Grade 6s (or Grade 7s on temporary promotion) have been appointed for three years as contingency Divisional Operations Managers to take up posts in the event of an outbreak and work beside DVMs to manage the administrative (non-veterinary) part of the operation. Like RODs, they have been allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. Upon confirmation of a case, a DOM for the relevant region will be called upon by SVS CPD to take up post as soon as possible. SVS CPD will maintain a list of DOMs. Similar arrangements are being set up in Scotland and Wales.
2. 3.11 During their period of appointment, the contingency RODs and DOMs will spend 5 days a year training, developing effective links with AHDOs, DVMs and key regional stakeholders and taking part in contingency planning exercises.
Key Administrative, Field & Technical Personnel
1. 3.12 The National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) will require access to middle managers who are able to take up key positions immediately on confirmation of disease. Key posts have been identified in the NDCC & LDCCs, together with job descriptions and Day 1 tasks.
2. 3.13 The Director SVS, through HR Resource Centre, Worcester, will maintain a list of Defra staff who have the required skills and experience to take up key positions in the NDCC. These individuals will be called upon as soon as disease is confirmed and are expected to take up post as soon as possible (within 24 hours of request).
3. 3.14 Staff in an AHDO in which an LDCC is being set up, and in the SVS more widely, will be the first to be called upon if FMD is confirmed. They will be expected to take up post as soon as possible while further staff resources are called in.
4. 3.15 Key administrative personnel will be expected to take part in contingency testing exercises. This should be written into their job descriptions and work objectives.
General field, technical and administrative personnel
1. 3.16 The NDCC and LDCCs will require immediate access to general field and administrative staff to support key personnel and veterinary colleagues in the eradication of disease.
2. 3.17 The Director General of Operations and Service Delivery will seek Management Board authority to require the release of staff from Defra and Defra Agencies to work on emergency sites. The Management Board will provide clear direction to Divisions, Agencies and work groups, in order that non-essential staff can volunteer their services and be released quickly. First call will be on those staff on the Defra Emergency Volunteers Register.
3. 3.18 HR Resource Centre, Worcester will co-ordinate action on the redeployment of administrative staff from the Emergency Volunteers Register, and other staff, to the NDCC and to LDCCs. The NDCC Personnel Cell will maintain an overview of numbers, provide terms of appointment for administrative staff in the regions, liaise with DWP and act as a central point, in close liaison with the HR Resource Centre at Worcester, for HR issues both in London and the Regions.
4. 3.19 The HR Resource Centre at Worcester will advise on Human Resource services for LDCCs and will provide one or more HR trained personnel to assist in setting up local HR teams. They will also maintain quality control and provide policy guidance to local managers and HR teams on HR issues. They will also be responsible for liaising with the LDCC personnel points,
monitoring national field-based resources and co-ordinating national veterinary recruitment exercises.
1. 3.20 Additional support staff may need to be drafted in from other government departments. Use of the protocols set out in a central Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Aid and the Redeployment of Human Resources will be triggered if necessary, and the Director General Operations and Service Delivery, through the Permanent Secretary, will contact the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to request assistance with additional staffing. Concurrently, Regional Operations Directors will liaise with Government Office Directors to seek additional assistance in locating further staff.
2. 3.21 Having first sought clearance from the Director General Operations and Service Delivery [or Director SVS], RODs may contact Regional Directors of Jobcentre Plus (Department for Work and Pensions) in order to recruit staff directly on short-term contracts. In this instance, guidance on contractual arrangements should be sought from the personnel cell in the NDCC and the personnel expertise that may be available in the LDCC. The Operational Support Secretariat of Jobcentre Plus (Department of Work and Pensions) may assist in brokering these arrangements and will be invited to send a representative to the NDCC. (See Annex I - Contact List for details).
3. 3.22 Additional technical staff from the following sources will also be considered:
. • Retired SVS technical staff
. • Veterinary students
. • Agricultural students
DEFRA LEGAL SERVICES
1. 3.23 Legal Services Directorate General must be instructed at the start of an outbreak. It is important to have an established system for ensuring the efficient preparation of Declaratory Orders and for the handling of claims for matters such as compensation for slaughtered animals and unintentional damage to premises.
2. 3.24 A Legal Liaison Unit will be immediately established in the NDCC to coordinate actions and evidence gathering between LSDG and the NDCC and the LDCCs. Additionally, a Legal Liaison Officer will be posted in each LDCC. Administrative staff will fill both the NDCC Legal Liaison Unit and the Legal Liaison Officers posts. LSDG will provide lawyers to the NDCC on a rota basis.
3. 3.25 LSDG hold all templates for Orders and must be approached immediately a Declaratory Order is required. Declaratory Orders are required immediately on confirmation of disease and are the means by which restrictions applying in defined areas (for example, a protection zone) are imposed.
VACCINATION TEAMS
Vets and team members responsible for vaccination
3.26 Upon confirmation of disease, the contractor responsible for emergency vaccination will be notified by the Head of SVS CP Division to set its plans in action to establish the required structures and organisation, numbers of vets and team members within the agreed time.
Lay Vaccinators
3.27 To ensure that emergency vaccination can be implemented without delay in any future outbreak, Defra is currently making arrangements, subject to public consultation, for the use of lay vaccinators to be permitted by orders made under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 and the Medicines Act 1968.
INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS
1. 3.28 High level involvement of other government departments, executive agencies and stakeholders is defined in Section 6 - the Strategic Level section of this plan. This will be confirmed by the Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) and may change as necessary. The Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will ensure that representatives of other government departments, operational partners and those affected by the disease and measures taken to control it are invited to form part of the NDCC.
2. 3.29 DVMs will engage with local stakeholders as part of their routine emergency-preparedness arrangements and, where possible, include them in the planning and implementation of regular local exercises. DVMs must establish strong links with their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all key local agencies as the co-ordination point for emergency response. It is also essential that DVMs have established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers, Trading Standards Officers and Local Authority Animal Health Inspectors, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency. All these agencies must know and understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an outbreak. It is also important that all those that would be affected by an outbreak including representatives of the farming industry, rural businesses, local community groups and those concerned with promoting tourism are engaged and involved, as appropriate, in exercises.
3. 3.30 The regular animal health stakeholder meetings will be upgraded in the event of an outbreak under the chairmanship of the Animal Health Minister [or as necessary by the Chief Veterinary Officer or the Director Animal Health
deputising for him] and meet more frequently. Representatives of key stakeholder organisations from outside the agriculture and the food sectors will be invited to attend in order to embrace wider countryside interests. The possibility of having separate sub-groups to look at particular issues in greater depth (e.g. trade, countryside access, tourism, etc.) will be kept under review, according to the scale of the outbreak.
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
Veterinary training
3.31 All new veterinary entrants to the SVS attend a one-day course on exotic viral diseases at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, in addition to general and specific training related to all their work areas. This includes training in notifiable disease procedures. Selected individuals also attend specific post-graduate training, e.g. in Epidemiology. Courses are held, as required, to ensure adequate numbers of trained people across the country.
Private Sector Veterinary Training
3.32 The current review of Local Veterinary Inspectors (LVIs) is considering the enhanced training of LVIs both in everyday and emergency situations.
AHDO training in key emergency procedures
3.33 DVMs will identify individual Animal Health Divisional Office (AHDO) staff to undertake key emergency roles in line with the job roles outlined in SVS instructions. They will ensure these staff are fully trained and equipped to undertake their respective roles and that their ‘everyday’ objectives include reference to the key responsibilities required.
Induction training
1. 3.34 Managers must ensure that new staff recruited into LDCCs or the NDCC during an outbreak receive induction training covering at least their roles and health and safety procedures. The Director SVS and DVMs will ensure their permanent staff are familiar with this contingency plan, the relevant local office contingency plans, SVS instructions, and business process maps.
2. 3.35 For key personnel, this will centre on the job descriptions within this plan. Desk instructions for key posts will be available in AHDOs. For other individuals recruited to support an LDCC, a brief outline job description must be drafted. Managers must take time to describe the jobholder’s duties, offer support and review the job role regularly. Managers should consider establishing a ‘buddying’ system, whereby new recruits work alongside existing jobholders to learn their job.
3. 3.36 The vaccination contractor will train vets and team members recruited to carry out vaccination in on-farm procedure and bio-security procedures.
Additionally, specialised training in vaccination, tagging and data recording will be provided. All external contractors will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity Protocols. All local recruits to vaccination teams must meet, and sign that they comply with, specified criteria including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the programme, during the programme and for 3 days after completion.
Media Training
3.37 DVMs/RODs/HsVS should already have received appropriate media training, in order to deal effectively with the intense media interest surrounding an outbreak. If not, a short two day course, organised by Communications Directorate in conjunction with an outside training company, uses broadcast journalists and a film crew to enable participants to deliver professional standard broadcast interviews.
Contingency Planning Exercises
3.38 This plan and the detailed instructions and local plans will be regularly tested at both local and national levels through simulation exercises using the key personnel identified. Operational partners and stakeholders will be involved in these exercises. It is intended that all operational partners and stakeholders should be aware of Defra’s emergency procedures and be fully involved in their on-going development.
HEALTH AND SAFETY AND STAFF WELFARE
1. 3.39 The Defra Departmental Health and Safety Unit (DHSU) and SVS Safety Team are the key safety professionals who must be involved in all aspects of operational planning. They will ensure that all LDCCs have a named safety professional to provide competent advice at all stages of operations; as far as is operationally possible this individual will be located in the LDCC and it is expected that provision will be made for this. DVMs and RODs must ensure that the competent safety person is included as part of their management team.
2. 3.40 The Departmental Health and Safety Manager will operate as part of the Operations Cell in the NDCC, providing health and safety advice at the strategic level.
3. 3.41 The Welfare Service will allocate a Welfare Officer (WO) to deliver the welfare service to each LDCC and HQ offices. The Chief Welfare Officer will keep in close contact with the NDCC to provide strategic welfare advice and guidance to the Deputy Director of the NDCC. The Counselling Support Service will be made available 24 hours daily (including weekends). All staff must be made aware of Defra’s Welfare Service which can provide support and guidance in individual cases of stress or hardship. RODs must ensure that Managers are aware of the potential for stress and must take
appropriate action, including referral to counselling and professional support.
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