Origin of the UK
Foot and Mouth Disease
epidemic in 2001

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs June 2002

Introduction

1. A full inquiry has been carried out into the origin of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic in the UK. The conclusions reached in this paper are based on information obtained as a result of the investigations completed to date. These investigations continue and any new information may result in the need to revise some of the opinions expressed.

2. There have been genuine difficulties in establishing precise timelines for events such as the introduction of infection onto key premises such as outbreaks FMD/04, FMD/06 and FMD/01. These stem from (a) difficulties in ageing FMD lesions in animals, (b) determining when clinical disease was first evident on premises such as FMD/04 and FMD/06 either because the animals that were first infected were not present at the time disease was first identified and investigated or because throughout the course of the epidemic, cattle often acted as the first indicator of the presence of disease that had gone unnoticed in sheep and (c) farmer recollection of when they first thought animals were affected by FMD as compared with other conditions. As a consequence, estimates of when infection entered a premises are just that, estimates, and represent theoretical ranges calculated on the basis of maximum and minimum incubation times. Ultimately, judgements on the likely sequence of events have had to be made on the totality of the epidemiological information available.

Factors contributing to the size and extent of the epidemic

;.3. The uniqueness of this epidemic in terms of its size and geographical extent is considered to have been due to a combination of factors. These included:

. • a delay in reporting suspicion of disease in pigs at the index case¹,

. • airborne infection of sheep on a premises nearby to the index case,

. • movement of infected sheep through markets before the first case² was diagnosed,

. • the fact that the above events took place at a time of year when the climate favoured virus survival and when large numbers of sheep were being marketed and moved around the country,

. • the nature of the disease in sheep and critically the absence of distinctive signs, compared with other classes of livestock,

. • structural changes in the sheep industry which over a period of years have resulted in an increase in the size of the national flock, a reduction in the farm labour force resulting in greater reliance on shared or contracted labour and the fact that >50% of livestock holdings have sheep on them at some time of the year,

. • the fact that sheep are regularly gathered throughout the year for management purposes creating opportunities for disease spread particularly if shared or contracted labour is used.

4. The initial movement of infected sheep through markets and dealers led to multiple (effectively primary³) introductions of FMD virus into major sheep keeping areas.

¹ the first premises to be infected with FMD (outbreak FMD/04) ² the premises on which FMD was first confirmed (outbreak FMD/01)

outbreaks which acted as the principle source of infection for others or as local “index” cases

Subsequent local spread from these initial insertions of disease undoubtedly caused the majority of cases in the epidemic.

Origin of the epidemic

5. Although the first FMD outbreak was confirmed in pigs in an abattoir in Essex on 20 February (outbreak FMD/01), the origin for that outbreak, and the index case for the whole epidemic, is considered to have been a pig finishing unit at Burnside Farm, Heddon on the Wall, Northumberland (outbreak FMD/04), which was licensed to feed processed waste food under the Animal Byproducts Order 1999. Disease was confirmed on these premises on 23 February as a result of the epidemiological inquiry carried out into the origin of outbreak FMD/01. Detailed investigations carried out on 24 February at Burnside Farm by FMD experts from the National and World FMD Reference Laboratory, Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, revealed that the majority of pigs on the premises at that time were infected with FMD but at different stages of the disease. The expert’s opinion was that some pigs had 12-day-old lesions. This implies that disease was certainly present on 12 February and with an incubation period of 2-14 days it could have been present from as early as 26 January. However, Burnside Farm had moved pigs off the premises on two occasions between 8 and 22 February. With an ever-changing pig population and advancing disease, it is possible that pigs that had recovered from the initial, acute phase of the disease had already been sent to the abattoir. The significance of this is that the pigs that had been sent to slaughter may have had older disease than that evident on the farm at the time of the 24 February investigation, so disease may have entered the premises earlier in January.

6. All possible means for the introduction of FMD into Burnside Farm have been investigated. Investigations have shown no evidence that disease was introduced to the farm by animals, people, vehicles, equipment, vermin, wildlife etc. There was no evidence of disease on premises within 3km of Burnside Farm which predates that found there.

7. Having investigated and eliminated all other possible sources of infection I have concluded that the likeliest source of infection for the pigs on Burnside Farm was meat or meat products containing or contaminated with FMD virus and that the virus could have been introduced to his pigs through the consumption of such material in unprocessed or inadequately processed waste food or the consumption of processed waste food contaminated with such material.

Subsequent spread of the disease

8. The epidemiological inquiry indicates that there were two routes of spread from the Burnside Farm. First, the movement of diseased pigs or pigs recovering from FMD on 8 and15 February resulted in infection being transferred to Cheale’s abattoir in Essex where the first FMD outbreak (FMD/01) was confirmed on 20 February. Recovered pigs in the post-acute phase of the disease could be difficult to identify at ante-mortem inspection. The subsequent spread of disease to holdings in Essex was a consequence of mechanical and personnel transmission from the abattoir. Compared

with the second route of spread, this first route made only a small contribution to the totality of outbreaks in the country as a whole.

9. Second, airborne spread of disease from Burnside Farm to sheep on a nearby premises (Prestwick Hall Farm, Ponteland, outbreak FMD/06) and the subsequent sale of 16 sheep, some of which were inapparently infected, from these premises at Hexham market on 13 February. These sheep entered the marketing chain and were sold via Hexham and Longtown markets and through dealers where they infected other sheep, people or vehicles thereby spreading FMD virus widely in England and Wales and the bordering counties of southern Scotland.

10.Having investigated and eliminated all other possible sources of infection, it is my opinion that the likeliest source of infection for the animals on Prestwick Hall Farm was airborne virus from infected pigs on Burnside Farm.

11.Epidemiological investigations of the other 2,025 outbreaks, the majority of which were due to local spread after the initial introduction of disease into an area, have shown no evidence of any disease pre-dating outbreak FMD/04.

Introduction of FMD virus into Great Britain

15.A detailed analysis of potential routes of entry into Great Britain indicates that the source of the virus for the 2001 epidemic was most probably infected or contaminated meat or meat products. The probability of other sources is very low especially with this strain of virus.

16.Whilst legal imports of meat or meat products are a theoretical possibility as an origin of disease, the complex of risk management measures makes the practical reality of this occurring extremely unlikely. Legal imports have not taken place from any country where the Type O, PanAsia strain of FMD virus occurs apart from South Africa. It is highly improbable that disease was imported with South African meat and the information available on imports from South Africa would support this view.

17.It will never be possible to determine the exact route by which the virus entered the country. Infected meat or meat products imported as “personal imports” are a possibility but it is more likely that most will be consumed or discarded as domestic waste and not find their way into animals. Even if they did end up being included in food for livestock, proper observance of the legislative controls covering the feeding of waste containing meat or meat products, and which had been in place since 1973, should prevent any virus reaching livestock. A total ban on the feeding of catering waste containing meat or meat products was introduced early in the 2001 epidemic.

18.Illegal shipments on a commercial scale are more likely to be intended for wholesale outlets or sale to restaurants or canteens. These are more likely to be refrigerated and illegally described as food or dried, cured or salted and presented as non-food imports. This increases the chance of the virus getting into catering waste which if not properly cooked before feeding to livestock could reach pigs in sufficient quantities to cause disease.

Conclusions

19.Based on the currently available evidence and following detailed investigations I have concluded that:

. • There was a single index case for the UK epidemic

. • The source of the infection was infected meat/meat products consumed by pigs on Burnside Farm (outbreak FMD/04

. • Disease was present at Burnside farm on 12 February and was probably present at the beginning of February/late January.

. • The movement of infected pigs from Burnside farm on 8 and 15 February spread disease to pigs in the Essex abattoir (outbreak FMD/01) from which disease spread to a limited number of other farms in Essex and Kent.

. • Windborne spread from Burnside Farm resulted in the transmission of FMD virus to sheep at Prestwick Hall farm (outbreak FMD/06) and their subsequent sale through Hexham and Longtown markets resulted in infection being widely disseminated to other parts of the country by animal or mechanical means.

. • There is no evidence of the existence of FMD disease in the UK, pre-dating the development of disease at Burnside farm.

. • The source of the virus for the 2001 epidemic was most probably infected or contaminated meat or meat products but it is unlikely that the origin of this material or the route by which it entered the UK and reached Burnside Farm will ever be identified.

20.A more detailed account of the investigations carried out into the origin of the 2001epidemic is provided in Annexes 1-7 to this paper.

21.Finally I would like to acknowledge the assistance I have received from members of the FMD epidemiological teams in London, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency and in the field, as well as the Institute of Animal Health Pirbright, in gathering and interpreting the information contained in this report.

J M Scudamore Chief Veterinary Officer June 2002

ANNEX 1

OVERVIEW OF THE 2001 FMD EPIDEMIC IN THE UK

Summary

1. A total of 2,026 cases of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) were confirmed in Great Britain between 20 February and 30 September 2001. Although the first case to be confirmed was in pigs at an abattoir in Essex (outbreak FMD/01), this was not the index or primary case in the epidemic.

2. Epidemiological evidence suggests that the index case occurred in pigs on Burnside Farm, Heddon on the Wall, Northumberland (outbreak FMD/04) which was licensed to feed waste food under the Animal Byproducts Order 1991. Disease is thought to have been introduced to this holding at the beginning of February or the end of January 2001. It was subsequently spread in two ways. First, by the movement of pigs to an Essex abattoir and from there by various means to other farms in Essex and Kent. Second, airborne spread to sheep at Prestwick Hall Farm, Ponteland, Northumberland (outbreak FMD/06). Subsequent sale of infected sheep from Prestwick Hall Farm, through markets at Hexham (Northumberland), and Longtown (Cumbria), resulted in widespread dissemination of disease throughout the rest of England and Wales and to bordering counties in southern Scotland. The latter took place before the suspicion of FMD in pigs at the Essex abattoir had been reported and the index case traced and identified (Gibbens et al 2001)⁴

3. The scale and temporal pattern of FMD cases in the first months of the 2001 epidemic was similar to that in 1967/8. Both reflected the practical problems of controlling epidemics characterised by initial multiple seeding followed by local spread. However the evidence suggests that in the 2001 epidemic, the index case (outbreak FMD/04) was the source of infection for all other cases, whereas the 1967/68 epidemic had a multi-centric origin in which a number of pig farms were infected concurrently from the same source. The peak of the 1967/68 epidemic was greater and occurred earlier after the first case.

4. In the 2001 epidemic there was a delay between the introduction of infection and the reporting of suspect disease to the authorities. This contributed to the widespread dissemination of disease and the scale of the epidemic (Gibbens et al 2001). In the 1967/68 outbreak disease was detected within 4 days of the onset of clinical signs on the first affected farm (Northumberland Report, Part 1, 1968). The only intervening outbreak in 1981 was detected on the index farm and was restricted to a single farm (Donaldson and others, 1982)⁵.

⁴ Gibbens JC et al Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 epidemic in Great Britain: the first five months Veterinary Record 2001 149 729-743 ⁵Donaldson AI et al (1982)Use of prediction Models to forecast and analyse airborne spread during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in Brittany, Jersey and the Isle of Wight in 1981. Vet. Rec. 110 53-57.

Investigations

5. Each of the 2,026 FMD cases was subjected to a detailed clinical and epidemiological investigation. This data and information was used to estimate the age of the lesions at the time of reporting, to evaluate the origin of infection for each premises and thereby estimate the date on which infection was introduced to each infected premises. Considerable effort, in terms of field epidemiological research, has been put in to investigating the early cases in order to provide substantive epidemiological evidence, so far as is practically possible, to identify the index case and therefore where infection was first introduced to the country.

6. Initial spread of disease from the index case was by two routes, the first linked to the movement of infected pigs from Burnside Farm, Northumberland to Cheales Abattoir, Essex, the second associated with airborne spread to sheep from Burnside Farm on a nearby holding, Prestwick Hall Farm, and subsequent movement of those sheep through market/dealer premises which was facilitated by the relatively large market at Longtown and subsequent dealing.

7. The earliest case of FMD was identified at a pig finishing unit located at Burnside Farm in Northumberland (Outbreak FMD/04) which was licensed to feed waste food. This unit sent infected pigs to Cheales Abattoir in Essex where FMD was confirmed on 20 February 2001 in pigs that had been in contact with pigs from Burnside Farm. Before the possible presence of FMD in the country was reported to the authorities on 19 February 2001, windborne spread of the virus from Burnside Farm had infected sheep and cattle on nearby farms in Northumberland including Prestwick Hall Farm (outbreak FMD/06) that was the second farm to show disease in Northumberland.

8. The accumulated epidemiological evidence suggests that movement of infected sheep from Prestwick Hall Farm through markets, led to the widespread dissemination of FMD throughout Great Britain. Sixteen sheep from Prestwick Hall Farm, believed to be incubating disease, together with 3 others, were sold through Hexham Market on 13 February. Onward tracing of the sheep from Prestwick Hall Farm showed the group of 19 was split at Hexham Market and sold to two dealers (lots of 7 and 10 sheep) and 2 local butchers (2 sheep). One dealer sent the 7 sheep he bought to his home farm in Lancashire where disease was confirmed on the 27^th February (outbreak FMD/15). The second sent the 10 sheep he bought, together with 174 other sheep also bought at Hexham Market on 13^th February, for sale at Longtown market in Cumbria, on 15^thFebruary.

9. Thereafter disease was spread either by the movement of infected animals or through the contamination of vehicles and people in this initial transmission phase. The bulk of infected animals passing through markets went through Longtown market; some infected sheep passed through more than one market.

10.Examination of Longtown market’s records showed that at least 24,500 sheep entered the market between 14 and 23 February and could have been exposed to infection. Tracing of the 181 purchasers of sheep at Longtown began on 25^th February. This tracing exercise was confounded by the immediate trading of sheep subsequent to their formal sale in the market and subsequent inter-dealer trading which increased the risk of transmission.

11.Movement of infected sheep out of Longtown market accounted directly for the infection of at least 71 premises, including 20 sheep dealers’ premises in Cumbria, Dumfries & Galloway, Devon, Durham, Hereford and Lancashire and 3 abattoirs, 1 in Wales (Anglesey) and 2 in Durham, by 23 February.

12.When it became clear that the presence of disease was not confined to Essex, national animal movement controls were imposed on 23 February. Subsequent epidemiological analysis has shown that at least 57 farms were infected by the time the first outbreak was confirmed on 20 February and at least 119 farms in 11 of the 12 mini-epidemics or geographical clusters of outbreaks that characterised the epidemic as a whole, had been infected as a result of “infected animal” movements before national movement controls were imposed on 23 February.

Epidemiological clustering of outbreaks

13.The greatest numbers of outbreaks occurred in Cumbria (893), Devon (173), Dumfries & Galloway, Scotland (176) and North Yorkshire (133), Co Durham (85), Powys, Wales

(70) and Northumberland (88). Collectively, outbreaks in these 7 counties were responsible for 75.5% of all FMD outbreaks in Great Britain.

14.This reflects the original distribution of sheep that took place via Longtown Market and subsequent spread by markets and dealers during February and before the existence of disease in the country had been recognised. These movements coupled with subsequent local spread resulted in the epidemic resolving itself into 12 epidemiological groups centred around outbreaks in Anglesey, Cumbria, Devon, County Durham, Lancashire (East), Essex, Hereford & Worcester, Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Wales (Powys), Staffordshire and Yorkshire (Yorkshire and Lancashire).

15.Disease was introduced into Mid Wales when ewes destined for Welshpool market were transported there in a contaminated lorry that had carried infected sheep from Longtown Market the previous day. The Staffordshire cluster of farms and dealers received infected sheep from Longtown and Hexham markets, and infected cattle from Northampton market. The Durham group was associated with one infected dealer and two infected abattoirs.

16.Infected abattoirs were the main source for the Anglesey, “Essex & Kent” and the “Yorkshire & Lancashire” clusters of cases, as well as the Wiltshire cluster. Sheep dealers were the primary source of FMD for the Devon and Hereford clusters. In fact, a dealer’s premises in Devon became infected on 15/16 February as a result of movement for Longtown market and this was the sole reason for the introduction of infection into Devon and eastern Cornwall. In Hereford this was compounded by further market distribution of infected animals. The East Lancashire Group was infected by local spread from the Settle subgroup in North Yorkshire into which disease was introduced as a result of mechanical (vehicle) transmission via a dealer with Longtown Market connections.

Conclusions

17.A study of FMD epidemics in unvaccinated populations in Europe between 1965 and1982 (Lorenz,1989)⁶ showed a median of 29 holdings affected, indicating that outbreaks had usually been controlled rapidly. However, under certain favourable conditions very large epidemics could occur. The 2001 epidemic proved to be much larger and with many more livestock holdings affected than might reasonably have been expected or predicted following the introduction of FMD virus into Great Britain.

18.The 2001 epidemic was largely sheep based and its size can be attributed to a variety of factors which led to many, initially undetected, secondary sources of infection across the sheep dense areas of England, Wales and southern Scotland. These were equivalent in effect to multiple primary cases of FMD that propagated the epidemic locally for days before the first case was diagnosed in GB.

19.One important factor was the initial delay in reporting suspicion of FMD on the index farm. Awareness of FMD as a possible differential diagnosis for the cause of lameness or oral lesions in pigs and sheep is low in countries such as Great Britain that have been free of the disease for many years. There had been little propaganda since the last outbreak to make farmers aware of the clinical signs or to encourage reporting of suspect disease. In most FMD epidemics, as in this one, the first case has been detected and reported by a veterinary surgeon (Donaldson and others, 1982; Hugh-Jones, 1976)⁷. In both the 1967/68 and 2001 epidemics, FMD was detected when pigs were observed to be lame and when the morbidity had reached 25%.

20.This in itself might not have been so important if windborne spread of infection from the index case had not infected sheep on a nearby farm or that the introduction of disease had occurred at another time of the year when large numbers of sheep were not being traded through markets and dealers as part of the seasonal sheep management cycle. Setting aside the problems of diagnosing FMD in sheep, prolongation of the epidemic could in part be attributed to changes in the structure of the sheep industry over the years leading to a greater reliance on shared or contract labour creating greater opportunities for the spread of disease despite a national ban on livestock movements.

⁶ Lorenz (1989)Economic evaluation of the foot-and-mouth disease vaccination control programme in the Federal Republic of Germany, Part1.Tierarztliche 44 275-279 ⁷Hugh-Jones (1976) Epidemiological studies on the 1967-68 foot and mouth disease epidemic; the reporting of suspect disease. Journal of Hygiene, Cambridge, 77 299-306.

ANNEX 2

THE ESSEX CLUSTER OF FMD CASES

Summary

1. On 20 February FMD was confirmed in 3 groups of pigs which had arrived at Cheales abattoir in Essex on 16-18 February. There was no evidence of FMD on the farms from which these pigs originated. The source farms for the three groups were not infected with FMD.

2. FMD virus was probably introduced into the abattoir by pigs delivered from Burnside farm (outbreak FMD/04) on the nights of 8/9 February and 15/16 February. Mechanical and personnel spread from the abattoir was the probable cause of infection at farms in Upminster (outbreak FMD/02), Brentwood (outbtreak FMD/03) and Canewdon (outbreak FMD/05) in Essex.

3. The pigs in which suspect FMD was reported on 19 February showed early acute clinical signs with obvious lameness which could be easily detected on ante mortem inspection. Pigs usually recover quickly especially once the blisters on the feet have ruptured and provided the horn of the hoof does not separate and there is no secondary infection. Affected but recovered pigs would not be expected to show clinical evidence of disease at post mortem examination. This may account for the failure to detect evidence of disease in pigs arriving from Burnside Farm on 8/9 February.

4. No other possible source of infection for outbreak FMD/01 was found in spite of intensive tracing to identify and visit all holdings that might have introduced FMD infection into the abattoir.

Investigations

5. On 19^th February 2001 the Official Veterinary Surgeon at Cheales abattoir in Essex noticed lameness with vesicles on the feet in sows at ante-mortem veterinary inspection. He reported suspicion of a vesicular disease to MAFF and all slaughtering ceased. A MAFF Veterinary Officer (VO) examined the 109 pigs remaining alive at the abattoir and found disease suspicious of FMD in 28 of them. FMD was confirmed the following day after the receipt of positive laboratory test results from the National and World Reference Laboratory for FMD, the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, Surrey.

6. An expert from the Pirbright Laboratory visited the abattoir on 20 February. The oldest lesions were seen in two groups of pigs from the Isle of Wight and Buckinghamshire that had entered the abattoir on the 16^th February. More recent lesions were seen in the third group of pigs that had arrived from Yorkshire on the 18^th February and in a group of pigs that arrived from Suffolk on 19 February, suggesting a very short incubation period.

7. FMD virus Type O, Pan-Asia strain (Knowles and others, 2001)⁸ was recovered from epithelial tissue samples from pigs from all three sources.

8. Urgent tracings were instigated and the farms of origin for the 3 groups of pigs were subjected to clinical inspection by the MAFF State Veterinary Service (SVS). No evidence of FMD was found on these farms. This fact, together with the estimated age of the lesions suggested that all the pigs had become infected after leaving their farms.

9. Pigs (cull adults and finishers) were sent to Cheales Essex abattoir from all over the country. Pigs were not normally slaughtered at the weekends. If they arrived late in the week they sometimes remained in the lairage to be slaughtered on the following Monday. This practice appears to have allowed FMD to develop and manifest itself in the pigs that remained in the lairage over the weekend of 16/17 February.

10.MAFF VOs visited all premises that had supplied livestock to the abattoir during the previous two weeks. Tracings were prioritised and visits to premises feeding waste food to pigs were undertaken first. In addition the tracing of dangerous contacts with potential links to the abattoir were initiated.

11.On 22 February, a MAFF VO reported suspect FMD at Burnside Farm(outbreak FMD/04) a pig finishing unit in Northumberland. Disease was confirmed following laboratory confirmation on 23 February. This farm had sent sows to Cheales abattoir that arrived on the nights of 8/9 and 15/16 February and which were slaughtered on the mornings of 9 and 16 February.

Spread of FMD from Burnside Farm (Outbreak FMD/04)

12.Burnside Farm regularly supplied pigs to Cheales abattoir every Thursday. These were either pigs purchased by the owners from other premises and markets or from their own premises. Burnside Farm had not sent pigs to the abattoir for a period of 4 weeks from 12 January until 8 February.

13.Pigs from Burnside Farm arrived at Cheales abattoir during the night of 8/9 February. 10 sows and 1 boar in the batch were slaughtered on Friday 9 February, possibly quite early in the morning. A further 160 pigs from other sources arrived on 9 February and were put into the lairage over the weekend of 10/11 February. Although they overlapped with pigs from Burnside Farm, no clinical signs of disease were seen in pigs slaughtered on Monday 12 February. These pigs were held in a separate pen and did not move around the lairage.

14.On 15/16 February two batches of pigs arrived at the abattoir. One batch comprised 29 pigs from the owners of Burnside Farm which possibly originated from the farm, the second batch comprised 34 pigs from Burnside Farm and 34 pigs bought by the owners via Darlington market.

15.The relatively small number of pigs sent by Burnside Farm on 8/9^th and the relative position of the lairage pens is critical. Some of them may have been incubating

⁸ Knowles et al (2001) Outbreak of foot-and-mouth diseasevirus serotype O in the UK caused by a pandemic strain.Vet Rec 148 258-259

disease in which case virus excretion may have been low depending on the stage of incubation. On 9 February the pigs that overlapped with those from Burnside Farm remained solely in pen 23 at one end of the lairage until they moved for slaughter. As a consequence they did not have close contact with the pigs from Burnside farm. On 15/16 February, Burnside Farm supplied many more pigs to Cheale’s Abattoir and it appears there was much more movement within the pens in the lairage over the subsequent weekend which could have facilitated transmission, and with possibly a much greater virus load lead to shorter incubation in the contact pigs.

FMD infections on other, related farms in Essex

Old England Farm, Brentwwod (FMD/02)

16.Old England Farm (outbreak FMD/02) is adjacent to Cheale’s Essex abattoir and was sometimes used as an extension to its lairage. On Wednesday 14 February a bull from Oswestry entered the abattoir but was too dirty to slaughter and was removed to Old England Farm for cleaning. Old England Farm was visited on 20 February as a dangerous contact to the abattoir. The bull was identified as an index case on the farm with early clinical disease and lesions approximately 1 day old. Pigs on the premises were stated not to be affected.

17.The period is far too short for the bull to have been infected by airborne spread from the abattoir and two other routes of infection are possible:

. • the bull became infected in the lairage on 14 February and following a 5 day incubation developed clinical disease on 20 February; .

. • mechanical transmission of the virus by personnel movement from the abattoir on 16 or 17 February. This would fit in with an incubation period of 2-3 days resulting in the one day old lesions seen in the bull on 20 February.

Great Warley Hall, Basildon (FMD/03)

18.The outbreak at Great Warley Hall (outbreak FMD/03) was reported on 22 February and 3 cattle were identified with 2-3 day old lesions. Two other cattle nearby had signs of FMD when slaughtered on 21 February. This was a beef farm and was 1 km from Cheale’s abattoir. There were personnel contacts with the abattoir but the premises were also very close to a minor road down which pigs from Burnside Farm would have been transported to enter the abattoir.

Greenacres Farm, Canewdon (FMD/05)

19.This was a licensed waste food feeding premises situated approximately 30 km from the Cheale’s abattoir. Waste food was processed on site and pipeline fed to the pigs

20.The pigs belonged to the owner of Cheale’s abattoir and a tracing visit took place on 22 February. Around 40 sows were affected by FMD. The pigs in two pens had the oldest lesions and in one other pen in the same shed, pigs with early lesions were observed. The pigs in all other pens were unaffected. Early lesions were seen in some pigs in a second shed. Lesions thought to be 7-8 days old were visible when the pigs were slaughtered on 23 February. A stockman had reported they were becoming concerned about the pigs and increasing lameness.

21.By the ageing the lesions on this farms it was apparent that infection had been present from 15 or 16 February.

22.The outbreak at Greenacres Farm raises the question of whether the pigs were infected before the pigs from Burnside Farm arrived at the abattoir on 15/16 February. There are a number of possible options:

. • First, infection entered the abattoir at some earlier date from Burnside Farm and infection at Greenacres Farm was due to mechanical or personnel transmission from the abattoir.

. • Second, infection at Greenacres Farm predated the infection at the abattoir and was transmitted there and to Old England Farm and Great Warley Hall by mechanical means before the Burnside Farm pigs arrived at the abattoir on 15/16 February. There is no evidence that there was any direct contact with pigs from Burnside Farm. Equally the disease picture at these premises, the timelines and the lack of significant fallout in the immediate area where there were cattle indicators does not support the view that disease at Greenacres farm predated the infection at the abattoir

. • Third, infection entered both the abattoir and Greenacres Farm at the same time from another common source. The available epidemiological evidence does not support the existence of disease on any premises in GB predating that at Burnside Farm.

23.Option 1 is the most likely scenario based on the available evidence and suggests that Burnside Farm was the most likely common source for these outbreaks

ANNEX 3

OUTBREAK FMD/04 - "BURNSIDE FARM", HEDDON ON THE WALL, NORTHUMBERLAND

Summary

1. After exhaustive inquiries into the origin of FMD the conclusion has been reached that the likeliest source of infection at Burnside Farm was meat or meat products containing or contaminated with FMD virus consumed by the pigs on this premises sometime between in mid-January and early February 2001.

2. There is strong circumstantial evidence that inadequately processed waste food was the vehicle for the introduction of virus to the pigs especially when considered in conjunction with the procedures for the collection, processing, storage and feeding of waste food to the pigs on this premises.

3. There was no evidence of FMD predating the outbreak at Burnside Farm in the vicinity of the farm or on the premises that supplied it with pigs, or for that matter, anywhere in the UK. No disease was detected during the serological testing and clinical surveillance of farms within the 3km or 10km Protection and Surveillance Zones established around the outbreak. No evidence exists for a possible source of FMD virus from the tracing exercises conducted as part of the epidemiological inquiry carried out in connection with this outbreak.

4. Based on the timescales for infection, the age of the disease in the pigs at Burnside Farm, the movement of pigs to the Essex abattoir where the first FMD outbreak was detected and the airborne spread to Prestwick Hall Farm (outbreak FMD/06), the outbreak at Burnside Farm remains the index case for the GB epidemic of 2001.

5. Airborne spread from this outbreak was probably responsible for the outbreak at Prestwick Hall Farm and also for a further 9 outbreaks in the area under the plumes of virus excreted by affected pigs.

Investigation

6. FMD was confirmed at Burnside Farm on 23 February following the laboratory examination of samples collected from affected pigs on 22 February. Samples were examined at IAH Pirbright and included epithelium samples from 2 pigs and 20 blood samples taken from other pigs on the premises. The farm was visited on the afternoon of 22 February as a result of the epidemiological inquiry carried out to identify the source of infection for the abattoir outbreak (outbreak FMD/01) in Essex.

7. The pigs were accommodated in 4/5 sheds on the premises and the owners were licensed to feed them processed waste food obtained from a neighbouring premises. They were not licensed to process waste food for feeding to livestock.

8. At the clinical inspection on 22 February, there was little obvious sign of vesiculation in pigs in Shed 1 but the presence of “freckles” lesions on the snouts, indicative of long standing FMD infection, was recorded. None of these pigs appeared notably unwell, distressed or lame. Several, however, showed a growth check line on the hoof, often well down the hoof.

9. Shed 3, contained 70% of all the pigs on the premises. All the pigs in pens 14 & 16 were clearly unwell. They appeared miserable, were huddled together and reluctant to rise. FMD lesions of varying ages were found in the pigs, ranging from 9 to10 days old to one-day-old.

10. On 24 February 200, the premises was visited by FMD experts from IAH Pirbright. His examinations revealed widespread lameness in the pigs and it was estimated that approximately 90% of the 527 pigs on the farm had lesions suggestive of FMD. Many pigs exhibited lameness, with the feet showing separation of old horn from the underlying tissue. Vesicles were found on the snouts of some pigs and it was from these that FMD virus of an identical strain to that found at the Essex abattoir was recovered (N. Knowles, personal communication). The oldest lesions on this farm were estimated to be 12 days old.

11. The pigs with the oldest lesions were found in Shed 2, where a high proportion exhibited lesions estimated at 10 and 12 days old. In contrast, some of the pigs exhibited lesions only one to two days suggesting that disease was still active and spreading within the herd.

12. The pigs in Shed 1 showed lesions that were 1-4 days old with a few aged 8-10 days old.

13. This pattern of lesions suggested that the disease may have been spreading within the herd helped by the continuous introduction of purchased, susceptible pigs and that there may originally have been a point source introduction of FMD infection to one or a small number of pigs

14. Assuming an incubation period of 2-14 days and that those undertaking the epidemiological investigation had been presented with the pig with the oldest lesion, virus could have infected pigs between 26 January and 7 February 2001. However, Burnside Farm had moved up to 85 pigs of the premises on two occasions between 8 and 22 February. With an ever-changing pig population and advancing disease, it is possible that pigs that had recovered from the initial, acute phase of the disease had already been sent to the abattoir. The significance of this is that the pigs that had been sent to slaughter might have had older disease than those evident on the farm and that the introduction of virus onto the holding could have taken place earlier in January.

15. 88% of the 241 pigs blood sampled were seropositive for FMD Type O antibodies. This included pigs that showed no discernible FMD lesions. Given that the pipeline system used to deliver the processed waste food to the pigs was blocked and pigs were therefore being fed using a barrow and bucket, it would have been possible for inadequately processed waste food to have reached only one or two pens of pigs initially. The first phase of disease could then have been succeeded by second and third waves until all the pigs on the premises were infected. The disease could spread to other pens in the same house, and then adjoining houses. This could support an earlier introduction date.

Origin of the outbreak

16. A full investigation has been made into the origin of the outbreak and all possible routes by which FMD could have been introduced onto the farm between 1 January and 22 February 2001have been considered.

. • Movements of live animals:-The statutory animal movement records for Burnside Farm showed that all pig movements off the premises were sent to Cheale’s Abattoir in Essex: The animal movements onto Burnside Farm involved the direct purchase of 110 pigs from 11 producers between 3 January and 19 February 2001. All these producers were visited and none showed evidence of FMD on their premises

.• Purchase of pigs from markets:-Burnside Farm purchased pigs at Darlington, Thirsk, and Stokesley Markets.

. • Darlington between 11 January 2001 and 15 February 2001. Burnside Farm purchased 83 pigs from 23 vendors. No evidence of disease was found on these premises when they were visited and no outbreaks of disease were associated with the movement of pigs from these premises

. • Thirsk between 4 January 2001 and 15 February 2001. Burnside Farm purchased 116 pigs from 46 vendors. Again, no evidence of disease was found on these premises when they were visited and no outbreaks of disease were associated with the movement of pigs from these premises

. • Stokesley between 2 January 2001 and 13 February 2001 Burnside Farm bought 90 pigs from 16 vendors. No evidence of disease was found on these premises when they were visited and no outbreaks of disease were associated with the movement of pigs from these premises.

. • These visits to market vendors premises and the lack of evidence that disease was present in Darlington, Thirsk or Stokesley Markets indicates that the markets and the vendors were unlikely to have been the source of FMD infection for Burnside Farm.

. • Movements of people:-The tenants of Burnside Farm lived off site and visited the premises daily. Their landlord was not a farmer and did not enter the site. They had contact with the owner of Heddon View Farm East Heddon, where the waste food used by Burnside Farm was processed. There was one employee, who also had contact with Heddon View Farm.. There were no other visitors. Burnside Farm visited Thirsk, Stoksley and Darlington Markets during the period. No disease was associated with market source tracings. There were no migrant workers employed and none were noted in the area.

. • Feed:- Burnside Farm was licensed under the Animal Byproducts Order 1999 to feed processed waste food to its pigs: it was not licensed to process waste food for feeding to livestock. The waste food for Burnside Farm’s pigs was collected from a

number of restaurants, hotels, schools, bakeries and an armed forces establishment in the north-east of England by the tenants and two other collectors using their own vehicles. The records maintained by Burnside Farm did not allow these sources to be identified reliably. Unprocessed waste food was deposited on a hardstanding outside the curtiledge of Burnside Farm before being sent for processing at a neighbouring establishment, Heddon View Farm, after which it was returned to Burnside for feeding to the pigs, Burnside Farm had a pipeline feeding system for delivering the processed waste food to the pigs but this had not been in operation since late 2000 and the processed waste food was being fed by means of a barrow and bucket.

Bins of unprocessed waste food were present on Burnside Farm at the time of the MAFF VO visit on 23 February, some of which was in bins supposedly reserved exclusively for processed waste. There was also evidence of cutlery in the pig troughs and pens at Burnside Farm. Catering waste normally contains some cutlery but it would be unusual for this cutlery to survive the processing operation and end up in the processed waste fed to livestock.

. • Vehicles and equipment:-Slurry tanker traced with negative results. No visits by the knackerman.

. • Public:-No public footpaths or rights of way crossed the premises which were locked. The gates giving access to the premises were chained and locked. There was a well maintained perimeter fence. No hunts, hare coursing or whippet racing crossed the premises. No new age travellers seen in the area

. • Vehicles and Equipment: No evidence of disease was found on all the premises linked by vehicle movements with Burnside Farm. The tenants of Burnside Farm used their own vehicles for private movements. A contractor was used to move pigs from markets and to abattoir. They entered the site and reversed to a loading bank. Only Burnside Farm vehicles are thought to have entered the farm. Equipment moved between Burnside Farm and the waste food processing premises at Heddon View Farm.

. • Discharges onto site; -Human sewage sludge was not used on the premises. Slaughterhouse effluent had not been used on the premises. There was no evidence of discharge or overflowing from septic tanks from houses adjoining the premises.

. • Materials used on the farm: -Bedding was only used in hospital accommodation. No bedding had been purchased during the risk period.

. • Wildlife: -There were 2 dogs on the premises. No cats. No feral pigs, goats or sheep were in the area. Foxes seen occasionally in the area, no den on farm, not seen in or near farm buildings. Badgers were not reported on the farm. Rabbits and hares were present in the area. Roe deer were seen in the area but had not been seen in or near the pig sheds. Rats were present. No control other than the presence of 2 dogs on the premises.

. • Birds: -No migrating flocks were noted passing or alighting on the site during winter of 2000/2001. Birds noted include crows, sparrows, pigeons and starlings. None were recorded in unusual numbers. Small birds fly into farm buildings.

. • Waste Disposal site: -There was a municipal waste disposal site within 10 km run by Seta. No flocking of seagulls from this site had been seen. No movement of waste from the site had been seen or recorded.

. • Newcastle airport: -The airport is 5 km from the farm. There was a chain link, 2 metre high, perimeter fence around the airport. The airport buildings and main car park were 5 km from the farm; an overflow car park was half km further away.

. • Neighbouring farms: -Clinical examination of cattle

in Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic in 2001 below, Mr Scudamore claims that "Each of the 2,026 FMD cases was subjected to a detailed clinical and epidemiological investigation... "

Investigations