INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN LIVESTOCK
Summary t 19/02
Recommendations of the ROYAL SOCIETY
The 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in
Britain highlighted some major policy issues, which are the
subject of numerous inquiries and reports.
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) and the Office of Science and Technology jointly
commissioned the Royal Society to carry out one of these
inquiriesan independent review, from a scientific
standpoint, of how to prevent and combat further
invasions of highly infectious livestock diseases, such as
the 15 included in List A of the International Organisation
of Epizootics (OIE). The review was strategic and wide-ranging,
focusing on the current state of relevant scientific
knowledge and its policy implications. It also highlighted
gaps in that knowledge and the work required to fill them.
The full report was published on 16 July 2002
This document summarises the main points of that report.
List A diseases are serious for animal health and for the
economics of the livestock industry. While FMD is not
normally fatal to adult cattle, pigs and sheep, it is
debilitating and causes significant loss of productivity. In
young animals it can be fatal on a large scale. It is one of
the most infectious animal diseases, with huge quantities
of virus particles being released and the disease spreading
rapidly. So it is vital that the UK and its EU partners have a
considered strategy for dealing with outbreaks of FMD
and other List A diseases, and that this strategy be based
on the best available science.
The Royal Society report was prepared by a Committee
comprising scientists, veterinarians, farmers and experts in
The Committee issued a public call for
evidence and received some 400 written submissions from
individuals, the livestock industry and public- and private-sector
organisations. We visited affected areas in Cumbria,
Dumfries and Galloway, and Abergavenny, and held a public
meeting in Carlisle. We also took oral evidence from many of
those most affected by, or closely involved in managing,
the outbreak. We have made the evidence publicly
available on the Societys website [www.royalsoc.ac.uk]
and on a CD-ROM enclosed with the full report.
Ten key findings
The overall objective of policy must be to minimise the
risk of a disease entering the country and, if it does enter,
to ensure the outbreak is localised and does not develop
into an epidemic.
The UK, and the EU, should seek to retain disease-free
status with respect to FMD and the other most serious
infectious diseases. Under present circumstances, this
status should be disease-free without (routine)
vaccination. But this proviso could change if, for
example, the risk of an outbreak occurring increased
sharply, better vaccines became available or the trading
regulations associated with disease-free status were
further changed, so it must be kept under active review.
Better contingency planning is vital. The Government
must be empowered to act decisively during an outbreak.
This requires prior debate about the control measures to be
The Governments Contingency Plans should
therefore be brought before Parliament for debate and
The Plans should be subject to a practical
rehearsal each year and should be formally reviewed
triennially to ensure that they take account of: the latest
information about the scale of international disease threat;
changes in farming practice; scientific and technological
developments; regulatory developments at national, EU
and global level; and the countrys state of preparedness.
As a result of globalisation, the risk of invasion by exotic
(ie non-endemic) animal diseases has increased. It is
essential that the UK, and the EU, strengthen their early
warning systems and ensure that warnings are acted
upon. This requires an EU risk and surveillance unit; better
funding for the OIE reference laboratories to track disease
spread and identify the strains; heightened animal disease
surveillance on farms; and greater interaction between
farmers and veterinarians to improve the effectiveness of
national surveillance. Import controls over meat products
Routine vaccination against some of the most infectious
diseases is possible. While there are no overwhelming
scientific or economic reasons against this approach being
adopted we believe that, at present, the considerable
technical problems and the trade implications argue
against changing current arrangements. Nevertheless it is
clear that the long-term solution is to develop a vaccine
against FMD (and other diseases such as classical swine
fever) that confers lifelong sterile immunity against all
strains of the virus. An international research effort is
required to develop such a vaccine.
The precautionary principleif in doubt, err on the
side of cautionshould be adopted more widely to
ensure that any disease outbreak cannot develop into an
epidemic. One of the most effective means of achieving
this is to minimise animal movements at all times. The
Government should consider a system whereby early
warning of infection triggers significantly enhanced
Rapid culling of infected premises and known dangerous
contacts, combined with movement control and rapid
diagnosis, will remain essential to controlling FMD and
most other highly infectious diseases. In many cases this
will not be sufficient to guarantee that the outbreak does
not develop into an epidemic.
Given recent advances in
vaccine science and improved trading regulations,
emergency vaccination should now be considered as
part of the control strategy from the start of any outbreak
By this we mean vaccination-to-live, under which
meat and meat products from animals vaccinated and
subsequently found to be uninfected may enter the
normal human food chain (infected animals, of course,
must not enter the food chain).
The Government should
prepare the regulatory framework and practical
arrangements (eg validation of tests, and the supply of
vaccines) that would allow this.
There must at the outset
be a strategy agreed among the main stakeholders to
allow the country to return to the preferred disease-free
without vaccination status after the outbreak.
The first suspected case in an outbreak must be diagnosed
in an approved OIE reference laboratory. Thereafter,
modern diagnostic methods including pen-side tests
need to be developed that can shift the burden of
diagnosis to veterinarians on the farm.
particularly before clinical signs appear, would limit the
size of any epidemic and improve strategic deployment of
resources. Such diagnostic methods must be linked by
modern telecommunications to central headquarters.
There is considerable benefit to be gained from
understanding the quantitative aspects of infectious
Quantitative modelling is one of the
essential tools both for developing strategies in
preparation for an outbreak and for predicting and
evaluating the effectiveness of control policies during an
outbreak. A prerequisite is a central database
incorporating improved data on farms, the location of
animals, animal movements, and the characteristics of
the diseases, together with arrangements to input disease
control data in a timely and assured way during an
More work is required to refine the existing
models and to strengthen their capacity to inform policy,
which in turn requires full access by researchers to this
database and to the data on previous outbreaks.
A national strategy for animal disease research should
be developed. The overall costs of animal diseases to the
UK over the past 15 years may well have exceeded #15
billion: research is the only rational means available of
improving animal health and diminishing disease. The
strategy should be delivered through a virtual national
centre for animal disease research and surveillance
involving the Institute for Animal Health, the Veterinary
Laboratories Agency and research groups in universities. It
should also involve private research institutes and publicly
funded animal disease research being undertaken in
Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Synopsis of full report
The modern livestock industry
The total value of UK livestock production in 2000 was
around #7.5 bn, a fall of over a quarter since 1996. Since
1967 the biggest changes have been a 40% fall in the
dairy herd and a nearly 50% increase in beef. The sheep
population has increased by 46% and broiler chickens by
180%, while the laying flock has fallen by about 60%.
The average farm size has increased, and there are fewer
individual farm holdings. These changes reflect a change
in the publics eating habits and the improved efficiency
of UK agricultural production.
Animal movements around the country are considerable
and it is easy for disease to spreadas last years outbreak
showed. Ways to minimise movement need to be found,
including wider application of standstill quarantine
arrangements and ensuring animals are slaughtered as
close to the farm as possible.
Domestic livestock have always suffered from a wide
range of diseases. As livestock are concentrated in larger
and larger numbers, the problems of major epidemics
have become more severe. One response was the
formation in 1924 of the OIE. The OIE set up an agreed
international classification of diseases, with 15 in the
most severe List A category and a further 80 in the less
severe List B.
The Royal Society report concentrates, inevitably, on FMD,
but also covers briefly a few of the more severe diseases in
the OIE List A affecting each of the main livestock sectors,
including: classical swine fever (CSF) (suffered very badly in
The Netherlands in 1998, and in the UK in 2000); African
swine fever; avian influenza; Newcastle (poultry) disease;
bluetongue; and African horse sickness. Bluetongue,
which particularly affects sheep, is transmitted by midges
and is of special concern because of its northward
progression, perhaps a result of global warming, which if
current trends continue could bring it to the UK.
The trading dimension the importance of
As a member of the EU and the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), the UK is bound by the series of rules and
regulations of those bodies designed both to protect free
trade and to limit the international spread of disease.
Central to those rules is the concept of the disease status
of countries. The UK has traditionally aspired to and
maintained the highest level of animal health status,
namely Disease free without (routine) vaccination. This
enables the UK to trade with other nations that have a
similar status. The evidence and advice we have received
confirms our view that the UK should continue to strive
for and maintain that status.
Surveillance and early warning
The threat of importing disease is high because of: high
global demand for meat and meat products; extensive
international travel and transport of meat and other foods
around the world; improved transport routes; and climate
change. A more recent risk is that of deliberate release of
pathogensbioterrorism. To forestall and meet the threat of
importing disease, the UK must work with its international
partners, both in Europe and more widely, to strengthen the
present surveillance and early warning systems managed by
the OIE and Food and Agriculture Organisation.
At the working level, farmers and veterinarians need to be
more aware of the risks and more familiar with the
symptoms of rarely encountered exotic diseases. Effective
surveillance depends on close collaboration between
farmers and their veterinarians, and between them and
the State Veterinary Service (SVS). The SVS has become
smaller in recent years. Farm animal disease surveillance
needs to be strengthened. A major issue remains the poor
understanding of how highly infectious exotic diseases
are spread locally. This requires resolution through a
targeted research initiative with the clear aim of
improving standards of biosecurity at the farm level.
Success in preparing for, and then handling, an outbreak
of any infectious disease depends critically on having the
right data eg on the distribution of farms, their sizes and
their livestock holdings and using it effectively. Field
epidemiology is essential for the vital detective work of
tracking the spread of infection.
of infectious diseases should be used between outbreaks
to model and help prepare for different outbreak
scenarios. Models can also be used when an outbreak
occurs to predict the course of the outbreak and to
estimate the effect of different control strategies, and
thus to provide input to policy makers about the most
effective control strategy for the specific disease and
animal species involved.
Because of the speed at which infectious diseases such as
FMD can spread, the key to controlling an outbreak is to
detect the disease at the earliest possible moment, and
thereafter to diagnose infected animals as rapidly as
There is a high premium on being able to
diagnose a disease even before clinical signs appear.
Recent developments offer good prospects for a pen-side
test that could be used by veterinarians in the field.
Working devices exist, but still need to be internationally
validated and further developed so that they are
sufficiently cheap and robust for regular use. When
developed they should be linked electronically (eg by
satellite link) to a central database that would hold all the
results in an outbreak.
Routine vaccination has played a major role in
controlling human and animal infectious diseases. It has
led to the eradication of smallpox worldwide and the
virtual elimination of rinderpest.
There are many animal
diseases where routine vaccination is the best control
measure, and most animals in the food chain have been
Routine FMD vaccination has never been used
in the UK, but it was used by many other EU countries
until 1991, when it was argued that the disease had
ceased to be endemic and the risk of outbreaks had
declined to such an extent that it was no longer the most
cost-effective way to prevent outbreaks of the disease.
The short length of conferred immunity and the large
number of FMD strains were significant factors.
New developments in vaccine research and development
should be applied to produce a vaccine capable of
conferring lifelong sterile immunity against all strains of
the FMD virus. With such a vaccine available it would be
possible to change policies radically and introduce routine
vaccination for all susceptible species.
During an outbreak, the short length of immunity conferred
by current vaccines is less of a problem because it would
normally still be longer than the outbreak. Moreover, it
would be clear which specific FMD strain had to be
So emergency vaccination is a technical option.
Until recently, the main problem over the use of emergency
vaccination has been the difficulty in distinguishing animals
that have been infected but then recovered from those that
have simply been vaccinated. The possibility of infection
from the former is very low, but it led the OIE/WTO to
impose a 12 month delay before a country that had used
emergency vaccination could regain the status of
disease free without vaccination. This compared with a 3
month delay if culling alone had been used, and the
additional 9 months delay was why emergency vaccination
had always been considered a strategy of last resort. That
was why the animals vaccinated in the 2001 FMD epidemic
in The Netherlands were subsequently destroyed and did
not enter the food chain.
Important advances have taken place within the last year
both technical and in the attitudes of the authorities and
consumers that should allow emergency vaccination to
develop into a prime control strategy rather than one of
last resort. It is now possible to distinguish vaccinated
from vaccinated-infected animals. At its meeting in May
2002, the OIE therefore agreed to reduce the minimum
period before a country can reapply for full trade status
from 12 to 6 months, only 3 months longer than for
culling-only control measures.
The following issues have to be solved before emergency
vaccination can be introduced. With significant effort by
DEFRA, this should be possible by the end of 2003.
The policy should be vaccinate-to-live. This will
necessitate clear acceptance by all concerned that
meat and meat products from vaccinated animals may
enter the food chain normally.
Validation of the marker vaccines to be employed and
the tests to distinguish between vaccinated and
vaccinated-infected animals, and clear rules for
defining the post-surveillance strategy for monitoring
herds and flocks.
Remaining trade implications both within and beyond
The precise vaccination strategy to be employed,
including the threshold criteria for its implementation
when an outbreak occurs and the relative focus upon
geographical regions, high risk farms or species to be
vaccinated. Modelling should play a key role here.
Practical issues concerned with storing vaccines,
manufacturing extra vaccine stocks, delivery of
vaccines and the training of vaccination teams.
Hence, we believe that the UK should now be planning to
use emergency vaccination as an important component
of its control strategy for FMD. Culling of infected
premises and known dangerous contacts, and any other
farms on which evidence of disease is subsequently
found, will still be required, but emergency vaccination
could be far more appropriate than the alternative of
Dealing with an outbreak
For the foreseeable future there is no alternative, when an
outbreak occurs, to the rapid culling of diseased animals,
and all those that are known, or very likely, to have been
infected by them. Containing an outbreak rests upon
speed of response. In the case of FMD, we envisage the
response as involving these first steps.
On suspicion of disease, impose local movement bans
and send the index case to an OIE-reference
laboratory for diagnosis.
If confirmed, impose a national ban upon all livestock
movements, standstill arrangements on all susceptible
animals bought and sold (if not already in existence),
and a 72 hour ban on any movements on and off
farms within the restricted infected area by all vehicles
and people except in extreme emergency.
Instigate enhanced biosecurity at all levels, offering
advice and support to achieve this.
Deploy the national structures for handling potential
disaster situations, including inter-Departmental
coordination and provision of scientific advice and the
specific command structures for FMD.
Cull infected premises within 24 hours and all
identified dangerous contacts within 48 hours.
If all these actions are taken rapidly enough, and
environmental and farming conditions are favourable,
then an outbreak may be contained. This is the historic
and, in 2001, the initial approach within the UK.
However, for some outbreaks additional measures are
needed to stop the disease spreading and to eradicate the
virus. In Britain this situation has developed five times over
the last 80 years and in all cases the epidemics have
proved extremely serious.
Until far more is known about
the mechanisms of local spread of the virus only two
options exist for the additional measures: more
extensive culling and emergency vaccination.
Under a culling-only strategy the aim is to get ahead of the
disease by creating a firebreak that will stop the virus
spreading and allow the disease to die out. Inevitably this
involves culling a larger geographical area than the
dangerous contacts alone, and/or targeted culling of
farms that are particularly at risk. During the 2001 UK
outbreak this was achieved by culling contiguous
premises, but in other outbreaks culling has focused on
large dairy farms or pig units.
If there is a likelihood of
significant airborne spread of virus plumes, as occurred in
1967, extensive culling downwind may become necessary.
In all these cases large numbers of animals rapidly become
involved in the culling policy and major problems develop
over logistics. In parallel, difficulties arise because of
animals becoming trapped within restricted infected
areas: there were major welfare culls associated with the
1997/98 CSF outbreak in The Netherlands and the 2001
FMD outbreak in the UK.
Emergency vaccination offers an attractive alternative to
extensive culling. But, as discussed earlier, its
implementation requires a number of issues to be resolved,
not all of which are scientific or technical in nature. Once in
place, however, we envisage emergency vaccination being
employed at an early stage in an FMD outbreak so as to
ensure it does not develop into an epidemic. The
Government, in collaboration with its EU partners, should
put in hand the work necessary to address the related
issues identified above.
A strategy for dealing with an outbreak must include
arrangements for returning to normal once the outbreak
Under a culling-only policy this involves extensive
post-disease monitoring of herds and flocks for
antibodies against the disease. When emergency
vaccination is used, diagnostic tests must distinguish
animals in herds and flocks that have been vaccinated
from those that have also become infected.
At this stage
in the use of emergency vaccination we envisage that any
flocks or herds found to contain animals that have been
infected would be culled.
Some applied research is still
needed on the diagnostic tests, but the evidence indicates
that they are adequate for the intended purpose. The
aim, of course, is to return the country as soon as possible
to the status of disease-free without vaccination and full
Worldwide, there is about one-tenth as much research on
animal diseases as on human diseases.
In the UK its
funding from Government has declined, particularly
through reductions in applied research commissioned by
The quality of individual UK groups in general
remains world class, and many of the OIE Reference
Laboratories are in the UK. But the research is fragmented,
and therefore not as effective as it could be.
greater coherence to the delivery of animal health R&D, a
new National Centre for Animal Disease Research and
Surveillance should be established a virtual centre,
organisationally coherent but physically dispersed.
We support the Curry Commissions call for a new priorities
board for research into farming and food matters, and we
recommend that DEFRA develop a national strategy for
research in animal disease, to give leadership, direction and
coherence to the several agencies involved. This should
cover both endemic and exotic infectious diseases.
An extra #250M is needed over the next ten years for
recurrent expenditure to strengthen research groups and
to provide expensive large containment animal research
facilities. We recommend establishing university-based
Research Units in specific areas complementary to those
within the Institutes. These Units should be supported
long-term (eg 10 years) and be subject to proper levels of
funding and strict peer review.
Education, training and continuous professional
The Government should work with the professional bodies to
improve the education and training of farmers in infectious
diseases of livestock and to investigate the subject and skill
development priorities in the training of veterinarians.
Up-to-date training of veterinarians and farmers, and their
continuous professional development, are important
elements in disease awareness, prevention and control. We
welcome DEFRAs planned review of the effectiveness of
training of farmers and land managers, and encourage
action to improve their continuous professional
development. In its work on veterinary education and
training, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons should
reflect on the experiences of the recent veterinary graduates
pitched into dealing with the 2001 FMD outbreak.
Our recommendations are addressed primarily to the UK
Control of exotic diseases is a devolved
matter in Northern Ireland and Scotland and is subject to
current discussions with the Welsh Assembly, and many
of our recommendations should be read as applying both
to DEFRA and to the equivalent ministries in Scotland and
Wales. Our terms of reference cover Great Britain only but
we hope that this report will be read by the Department
for Agriculture and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland.
regulatory framework for disease control in animals is
largely determined internationally by the EU and, at the
global level, by the OIE as part of the WTO framework.
Some of our recommendations should therefore be
considered also by these bodies.
The UK Government should bring before Parliament for
debate a framework for the Contingency Plans covering
the principles involved in handling outbreaks of infectious
exotic diseases and the resources required for their
The Prime Minister should establish a formal procedure to
review at three-yearly intervals:
the level of threat from imported diseases of livestock;
changes in livestock farming practices that could
affect vulnerability to disease;
scientific and therapeutic advances that could affect
the UKs, and Europes, state of preparedness.
The UK should continue to strive for disease-free status
against highly infectious diseases such as those listed in
the OIEs List A.
Providing the level of international threat does not
increase; there are improved import controls; and there is
a demonstrable improvement in the arrangements for
handling disease outbreaks, the UK should not adopt a
policy of routine vaccination, and should retain the
internationally recognised status of disease-free without
Diseases of livestock
undertake a systematic analysis of the information
available on the relative threats to the UK from the range
of diseases covered here (and other significant disease
such as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies and
tuberculosis), taking account of the impact of
globalisation and climate change, in order to set
priorities for the national strategy for animal disease and
undertake a comprehensive review of the available
information on FMD, and develop a consistent and
coherent database of the basic information that
would be required during an outbreak;
carry out urgent research into local transmission of
FMD that will improve biosecurity in the field.
Surveillance, biosecurity and livestock management
propose an EU-wide risk assessment unit and
centralised database on surveillance and disease data,
and a review of the bodies that provide early warning
of animal disease threats;
promote the speedy implementation of their Action
Plan on illegal importing and of a much more
coordinated approach at all levels by all bodies
concerned with import control;
investigate all the issues connected with reducing
animal movements and come forward with
practicable solutions that strike the optimal balance
between the legitimate interests of livestock owners,
market systems and long-term disease control;
ensure that all keepers of livestock (including that not
kept for food production) are properly registered and
submit to DEFRA each year the name of their
nominated private veterinary surgeon and a health
plan approved by the same veterinary surgeon;
establish an Applied Research Unit on Livestock
Management Practices that will undertake or
commission research leading to: (i) the design of
effective biosecurity measures against infectious
animal diseases; and (ii) the design of livestock
management structures and practices that improve
animal health in terms of infectious diseases.
Epidemiology, data and modeling
establish a review to determine the data required for
informing policy both before and during epidemics of
infectious diseases. This review should involve all those
likely to be involved with disease control, including
modelling teams, and cover:
information to be collected on a routine basis, and
how this can be kept up to date;
information to be collected during the outbreak;
incorporation of the data into a central database;
use of modern techniques for real-time data capture
commission research to improve the methodology
used to identify dangerous contacts;
undertake a major research programme into the
potential of mathematical modelling for
understanding the quantitative aspects of animal
disease dynamics. Mathematical models can be used
both in preparing for outbreaks (including evaluating
alternative strategies) and during the course of
controlling an epidemic;
ensure that the data from the 2001 epidemic are
checked and then made widely available, while
ensuring that any data protection issues are resolved.
ensure that sufficiently specific and sensitive pen-side
antigen detection ELISAs are developed for FMD and
other major diseases, are validated as quickly as
possible, and are available on a large scale for use in
the field, and that a similar ELISA is developed
especially for detecting antibodies in sheep;
explore the potential for portable RT-PCR machines for
use in the field or at regional laboratories;
develop advanced telecommunications between the
field and central control;
consider the benefits of bringing responsibility for all
List A diseases under a single organisation.
The Government should take the lead in developing an
international research programme aimed at an improved
vaccine that would permit routine and global vaccination
of livestock against FMD and other List A diseases.
Emergency vaccination should be seen as a major tool of
first resort, along with culling of infected premises and
known dangerous contacts, for controlling FMD
This policy should be vaccinate-to-live, which
necessitates acceptance that meat and meat products
from vaccinated animals enter the food chain normally.
In determining the arrangements for deploying
emergency vaccination, DEFRA should:
take account of the urgent need to achieve validation
for field use of the tests that discriminate infected
from vaccinated animals;
develop emergency vaccination strategies that
integrate theoretical and empirical epidemiology and
the logistics of delivery of vaccine cover;
establish a strategy for returning to normal after an
outbreak that takes account of the need for ongoing
surveillance, safeguards for those involved and
agreement that products from vaccinated animals can
enter the normal human food chain.
DEFRA should explore with the EU and OIE what
improvements to vaccines and surveillance tests are
required to allow disease-free status to be based entirely
on surveillance results without the requirement for a
minimum waiting period.
Dealing with an outbreak
The main objective in dealing with an outbreak must be to
ensure that it does not develop into an epidemic. This
requires the following basic measures:
on suspicion of an outbreak, immediate imposition of
strict local movement restrictions and biosecurity
measures including culling the animal with clinical signs;
on confirmation by an OIE Reference Laboratory of
mobilization of the full emergency arrangements
including all additional logistic resources and the
interdepartmental coordination and scientific
imposition of a total country-wide ban on animal
movement with unambiguous and widely publicised
advice on the fate of any animals in transit;
rapid culling of all infected premises;
identification and rapid culling of all premises where
there is a high risk of the disease.
Where these measures are insufficient to guarantee that
the outbreak will be contained, we recommend in
addition the early deployment of emergency vaccination.
As a matter of urgency, DEFRA should draw up
arrangements for a process for the prior registration for
vaccination of zoos and rare breed collections.
DEFRA should review its arrangements for other diseases,
and in particular the developments required to enable
emergency vaccination to be used for CSF and bluetongue.
The detailed strategies for controlling outbreaks of
livestock diseases should be included in the published
contingency plan, which should consist of an umbrella plan
for matters that are common to all diseases, with specific
modules for each disease. These plans should be rehearsed
in an annual fire drill that must be realistic and involve
DEFRA and all other relevant bodies including MoD.
Research and development, education and training
The Government should:
undertake a thorough overhaul of research into
animal disease, and in particular develop a national
strategy for research in animal disease and
draw together the current research funding in
infectious diseases of animals (both endemic and
exotic) within England into a single joint arrangement,
the funds being made available to implement the
create a virtual national centre for Animal Disease
Research and Surveillance, the Board of which would
be responsible for delivering the national strategy;
increase investment in animal disease research and
development by the order of #250 million over the
next 10 years.
DEFRA should take rapid action to investigate and
the continuous professional development of farmers
and stock keepers;
postgraduate training in livestock health and welfare;
the attractiveness of careers within the State
the training of temporary and local veterinary
inspectors by DEFRA, with the RCVS, the BVA and its
species divisions, investigating the feasibility of the
Sir Brian Follett, FRS, Chair
Mr Peter Allen, Farmer and member of the Council of the
National Farmers Union
Professor Patrick Bateson, SecRS, Provost of Kings College
Cambridge and Biological Secretary and Vice-President of
the Royal Society
Mr David Black, Practising veterinarian in Cumbria
Professor Fred Brown, FRS, US Department of Agriculture,
Plumb Island Animal Disease Centre; formerly Deputy
Director, Animal Virus Research Institute, Pirbright
Mr Roger Eddy, Senior Vice-President of the Royal College of
Veterinary Surgeons, and practising veterinarian
Ms Suzi Leather, Deputy Chair, Food Standards Agency
Professor Simon Levin, Department of Ecology and
Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University
Professor Karl Linklater, Principal, Scottish Agricultural
Ms Jeanette Longfield, Coordinator of Sustain, The Alliance
for Better Food and Farming
Professor Ian McConnell, Director of Research, Department of
Clinical Veterinary Medicine, University of Cambridge
Dr Angela McLean, Department of Zoology, University of
Professor Andrew McMichael, FRS, Director, Weatherall
Institute of Molecular Medicine, University of Oxford
Dr Jenny Mumford, Director of Science, Animal Health Trust,
Professor Robin Weiss, FRS, Windeyer Institute of Medical
Science, University College London
Dr Jorgen Westergaard, Former Principal Administrator, Animal
Health and Welfare Unit, European Commission
Dr Malcolm Anderson
Ms Melissa Barrell
Dr Peter Collins
Dr Geoffrey Findlay
Ms Saskia Gretton
Mr John Horton
Dr Keith Root
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Front cover picture: A confocal microscope image of foot-and-mouth
disease virus infected cells, showing the disruption that the
virus causes to the cellular actin filaments. Virus proteins are
labelled in red, and actin in green. The nuclei are labelled in blue.
Image ) BBSRC, Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright Laboratory.
ISBN 0 85403 580 X
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